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FOREWORD 
t is a great pleasure to present this second major study by Anton 
Brender, Florence Pisani and Emile Gagna, on global financial markets. 
Their first study (Global Imbalances and the Collapse of Globalised Finance) 
provided a novel point of view on the global financial crisis that started in 
2007-08, by concentrating on the global distribution of risk-taking 
embodied in the particular way the current account imbalances between 
the major economic centres had been financed by the creation of assets, 
which only on first sight appeared riskless. Several years later, the 
epicentre of the crisis has wandered across the Atlantic, from the US where 
it all began, with the so-called ‘subprime’ mortgages, to Europe, where 
today the governments of a number of southern members of the euro area 
are now regarded as ‘subprime’. 
In this second, careful study, Brender and his co-authors concentrate 
on the tension between the need for the public sector to sustain demand in 
the face of a deleveraging private sector and the longer-term challenges for 
fiscal policy in the major developed economies of the world, namely the 
US, Japan and the euro area. In short, their overarching thesis is that 
sovereign debt is in crisis. A crisis that is apparent in the euro area, but is 
real, if at present only latent, in the US and Japan as well.  
What is the nature of this crisis? The developed countries must find a 
way to navigate between the Scylla of insufficient stimulus for their weak 
economies and the Charybdis of excessive issuance of public debt, which 
would endanger its risk-free status and thus deprive their economies of an 
indispensable benchmark.  
How large is the room for manoeuvring between these two dangers? 
The reader will get the impression that in some cases the passage might 
become extremely tight as the level of public debt is already so high (e.g. in 
Japan) that there might be very little scope left for further fiscal expansion. 
Some member countries in the euro area, e.g. Italy and Spain, have found 
I
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themselves already so close to insolvency that they simply had no choice 
but to radically change course.  
The book shows that even in countries that appear to be in a 
comfortable position today (like Germany), their captains of the public 
finance ship will have to be very skilful as they are facing strong 
headwinds in the form of a rapidly ageing population.  
This book does not provide a simple recipe to solve the difficult 
choices facing policy-makers, but it provides them with a clear analytical 
background and a realistic basis on which to cast the debate about the right 
course for fiscal policy which now engages Europe and the other major 
economies in the world. 
 
Daniel Gros 
Director of CEPS 
Brussels, May 2012 
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INTRODUCTION 
overeign bonds of the developed regions of the world were long 
regarded as safe investments. Those days are past. At the beginning of 
2012, holders of Greek public securities were obliged to relinquish 
more than half the value of their claims. Furthermore, since mid-2010, the 
price of the debt of several eurozone countries has fallen sharply. These 
evolutions, regularly punctuated by announcements of downgrading by 
the rating agencies, are the manifestation of a crisis threatening other 
developed countries outside the eurozone. In the autumn of 2008, the 
implosion of the western financial system, putting an end to the steady 
growth in private borrowing, made countries face up to the risk of collapse 
in global demand. To prevent this, they accepted marked deteriorations in 
their budget balances and in so doing sowed the seeds of the sovereign 
debt crisis.  
To allow borrowing by governments to act as a substitute for 
borrowing by private agents, at a time when savings remained 
overabundant was nevertheless the right thing to do. Public debt played its 
regulating role, absorbing excess savings to prevent them from depressing 
activity (Chapter 1). But governments must still be capable, when the time 
comes, of restoring the accumulated savings. This is where the real 
problem lies for the developed regions. With debt levels that are in many 
cases already high, with modest long-term growth prospects and with 
social budgets that are set to rise as a result of population ageing, many 
countries cannot maintain a substantial budget deficit without seeing their 
creditworthiness called into question. However, stemming the rise in their 
debt too rapidly, by reducing public deficits at a time when private savings 
still tend to be excessive, would impose a dangerous curb on activity 
(Chapter 2). Faced with this dilemma, countries have adopted differing 
strategies. Japan and the United States have opted to give priority to a 
return to growth, whereas the eurozone countries have preferred a return 
to budgetary equilibrium.  
S
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The Japanese case clearly illustrates the risks involved in the former 
strategy (Chapter 3). Having already been confronted for more than 20 
years with a situation of the kind now being experienced by many 
developed countries, Japan had then used fiscal policy to attempt to put its 
economy back on a growth path. It never succeeded. Since then, the public 
debt has grown constantly and at the beginning of 2012, Japan’s budget 
balance was again the weakest of all the major economies. Because its debt 
remained the preferred outlet for its excess of private savings, Japan was 
still able to borrow at the lowest rates. Starting in the middle of the current 
decade, however, with the disappearance of the excess savings by 
households, the government will be obliged to rebalance its budget. With 
little scope for a decline in spending, this can only be done through a 
drastic and lasting increase in tax pressure. If the government does not 
have the courage to propose this and if the Diet does not have the courage 
to accept it, the trap that has menaced Japan for the past 20 years will 
finally close. 
The United States, for its part, is gambling on being able to avoid this 
trap (Chapter 4). Aware of the difficulty of kick-starting an economy in 
which the large overhang of private debt deprives monetary policy of 
much of its impact, the federal government has decided to maintain 
budgetary support until such time as growth has manifestly returned, even 
at the risk of seeing public debt increase in the meantime. However, unlike 
Japan, much of the addition to the burden of social spending lies in the 
future and, in the absence of major reforms, this increase will impair 
budget equilibrium in the coming decade. The announcement at the earliest 
possible moment of such reforms is the best means for the American 
government to provide reassurance of its creditworthiness. In the shorter 
term, it has in fact the room for manoeuvre needed to stabilise its debt 
burden, on the obvious condition that Congress has the will to do so. The 
real risk is that of persistently weak growth. If this were to be the case, the 
worries of those holding US Treasury paper, at least half of them outside 
the United States, would push down the dollar, with all the consequences 
this might have.  
The path on which the eurozone countries have set out soon showed 
itself to be dangerous (Chapter 5). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
the situation of the eurozone as a whole was nevertheless better than that of 
the other major developed economies. Only for one of its members was the 
situation disastrous. Governments, seeking in vain to reconcile solidarity 
and the fight against moral hazard, then allowed a contagion dynamic to 
develop which led them, one after another, to try to stabilise the burden of 
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their public debt as rapidly as possible or even to reduce it. This dramatic 
episode has prompted the eurozone countries to clarify the conditions of 
their financial solidarity. Will this lead them to adopt joint management of 
their economic situations in a way that is more favourable to the return of 
growth? For this to happen, they have to accept the idea that budget 
discipline is not sufficient to ensure growth.  
This change of attitude would be all the more opportune in that the 
consequences of the eurozone crisis extend far beyond the euro’s frontiers. 
By calling into question the status of ‘riskless asset’ attributed to the 
sovereign debt of developed countries, this crisis is impairing the capacity 
for risk-taking – and hence also for intermediation – of the globalised 
financial system and imposing a reduction in international transfers of 
savings. Given that sovereign debt is the preferred vehicle for the 
accumulation of international reserves, international currency stability is 
also liable to be affected (Chapter 6). In a world economy where it is “every 
man for himself”, it will not be easy to respond to the challenge involved. 
We have by no means heard the last of the sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. PUBLIC DEBT, PRIVATE DEBTS 
t the end of the first decade of the 2000s, many governments ran up 
substantial fiscal deficits in an attempt to ward off the threat of an 
economic depression. This response has sometimes been perceived 
as a policy of “borrowing one’s way out of debt”, which could only lead to 
an even more severe depression. Could one really hope to put the world 
economy back on a more assured growth path by adding an excess of 
public debt to an excess of private debts? This scepticism is at least partly 
based on a misunderstanding, however. Admittedly, the quasi-general rise 
in borrowing since the start of the decade is cause for concern. But it should 
not be overlooked that, in the developed economies at least, it is no longer 
private debt that is on the rise, but rather public debt. Contrary to a 
frequently held view, the risks related to a rise in sovereign debt cannot be 
analysed in the same terms as those related to the debt of a private 
individual. Sovereign debt differs from private debt both by its nature and 
by the constraints on its accumulation. 
1.1 The particular nature of public debt  
The notion that a government must not “live beyond its means” and that a 
build-up of public debt is bound to asphyxiate the economy has long been 
widely held. Was it not Adam Smith who predicted “the ruin [of] all the 
great nations of Europe” under the impact of the “enormous debts” each of 
them had accumulated? Ricardo, more pragmatically, advocated partial 
repudiation of the debt incurred by Great Britain during the Napoleonic 
Wars, notably to prevent “emigration to other countries in order to avoid 
the burden of taxation which it entailed” [Gordon, 1987]. And yet, as 
Macaulay [1871, p. 261] pointed out later in his History of England, “still 
the debt went on growing; and still bankruptcy and ruin were as remote as 
ever”. He went on to observe, “they erroneously imagined that there was 
an exact analogy between the case of an individual who is in debt to 
A
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another individual and the case of a society which is in debt to a part of 
itself”. In the eyes of Schumpeter [1954, p. 310], the vision that had long 
predominated among economists according to which public finances have 
to be managed like those of a ‘good family man’, is explained by “the 
increasing influence of the bourgeois mind, which in fact had more reasons 
than one to dislike cavalier finance”.  
Herein in fact lies the first contrast between debt owed by the 
government and debt owed by a private individual: since the duration of 
the former is unlimited, the government can in fact borrow year after year to 
repay the debts reaching maturity without its being necessarily true that this 
‘cavalier finance’ leads to catastrophe. With size of the economy and 
interest rates unchanged, the debt burden transmitted from one generation 
to the next will remain the same. And if the economy is growing, the 
absolute amount of public debt can even rise without the burden on each 
generation increasing (on the sole condition that the growth rate of the debt 
does not exceed that of the economy).  
A government levies taxes 
A second difference lies in the respective underlying motives for 
borrowing. A government does not go into debt for the same reasons as a 
private agent. A household with insufficient income will borrow in order to 
bring forward in time a purchase that it would otherwise have been unable 
to make until it had gathered together the necessary savings. Borrowing 
enables it to anticipate future income: by drawing on this income, it will 
later be able to pay off the debt it has contracted. A firm that has not built 
up a sufficient financing margin will borrow in order to make an 
investment in expectation of the additional income it will produce. This 
additional income will then enable it to repay its debt. However, at no time 
is either the household or the firm in a position to decide the amount of its 
income. For lack of the accumulated savings needed to finance one 
purchase or another today, it borrows, counting on future income to cover 
the repayment. If tomorrow the household’s income is reduced as a result 
of job lay-offs, it may have difficulty in meeting its debt. The same will be 
true of the firm if the investment is ill-judged.  
By contrast, the government is in the special position of being able, 
in normal circumstances at least, to decide more or less what its income 
will be, since its tax revenue will depend on its own decisions regarding tax 
rates. This means that it enjoys control over its income in a way that private 
agents do not. Moreover, in principle at least, if it borrows in a given year, 
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this will be because its parliament decided to levy taxes for an amount 
smaller than its budgeted expenditure. What are the possible reasons for 
such a decision? 
A first possible reason relates to the actual nature of this expenditure 
and especially to investment expenditure whose impact will be felt in much 
more than just the initial fiscal year. Part of this investment will be directly 
productive in the sense that it will increase the economy’s market 
production potential and hence the potential for additional tax revenue at 
unchanged tax rates. In order to accelerate the implementation of the 
investment, the government – in the same way as a firm in this case – may 
decide to finance it through borrowing that will be repaid out of the 
expected ‘return’ in terms of tax revenue. Other types of public 
expenditure, without strictly falling into the category of productive 
investment, will nevertheless have effects that will benefit not only present 
taxpayers but also future taxpayers. By deciding to borrow in order to 
finance part of this expenditure, the government will be able to spread the 
burden between all the taxpayers concerned.  
A second possible reason relates to the government’s role in 
regulating the economy. Unlike a household or a firm, the government not 
only has its finances to look after, but it must also supervise the proper 
functioning of the economy and its fiscal policy can make a contribution in 
this respect. When certain private agents want to save more than others 
want to invest, overall demand slows down or even contracts and the risk 
of a recessionary spiral emerges. In order to try to ward off this risk, the 
government, for its part, can decide to spend more than it raises in revenue. 
It will then allow its revenue to grow more slowly than its expenditure, 
possibly by reducing tax rates. In this case, it will be borrowing, not to 
finance investment, but to underpin economic activity. Obviously, once the 
risk of recession has faded and the upturn in activity is assured, it will in 
principle implement the reverse policy, with its expenditure growing less 
rapidly than its revenue at a time when growth in the latter is accelerating, 
possibly following a rise in tax rates. In this way, the debt incurred can be 
reimbursed and the stabilisation policy will not add to the public debt. 
Things will be quite different, of course, if the economy is faced with a 
succession of shocks or if, once the upturn is well-entrenched, the 
government ‘forgets’ to generate the surplus needed to wipe out the debt 
previously incurred. 
We now come to the final reason that could explain borrowing by a 
government, namely sheer passivity. Apart from the inter-temporal and 
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economic management reasons mentioned above, the government has no 
reason to borrow because in normal circumstances it only has to levy the 
taxes needed to avoid doing so. This obviously assumes that this is the 
objective of those who vote for the year’s Finance Act and it is no secret that 
tax rises are rarely popular with voters! This means that the temptation to 
allow the public deficit to widen can be strong. Unfortunately, the resulting 
passivity can be encouraged by the third difference between public and 
private debt, namely that the government has its own special means of 
obtaining finance.  
A government issues money 
The government has a privilege that is not available to any ‘good family 
man’, namely that of issuing money. In this respect, it issues a form of debt 
that has the particularity of having ‘legal tender status’, i.e. of being 
acceptable in the settlement of any transaction, at least within its own 
sovereign domain. The government can therefore settle its debts with 
money issued by itself. Thanks to this, it is in principle protected against 
any default: in the last resort, it can always ask the public agency 
responsible for the money issue – the central bank – to provide it with the 
money needed to repay its maturing debt (or to subscribe to issues 
intended to provide it with the necessary liquidity). If, however, as has 
been seen in the past in a certain number of countries, it uses this privilege 
to maintain a budget deficit that leads to demand that is excessive in 
relation to the economy’s productive capacity, the result will be a rise in 
prices. If nothing is then done to put an end to this ‘monetisation’ of the 
public debt, history shows that inflation will take on increasing 
proportions, with economic and social consequences that can rapidly 
become disastrous.  
In most of the developed economies, the lessons of this experience 
have been learned and the central bank’s primary mission nowadays is to 
implement policies aimed at ensuring price stability. For this purpose, the 
bank decides at regular intervals, in the light of the economic situation, the 
terms on which money is issued. The central bank’s liabilities in fact define 
the quantity of money – in its narrowest sense (‘base’ money) – available to 
the economy. These liabilities include the currency used for the settlement 
of everyday transactions and the deposits made by banks with the central 
bank – the reserves – used for the settlement of interbank transactions.  
The injections of money being made by central banks today are, in 
principle, decided independently of considerations concerning the government’s 
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financing needs. Even so, the issue of money can to a certain extent facilitate 
the financing of a public deficit. This will be the case if the central bank is in 
the habit of issuing money (increasing its liabilities) through purchases of 
public securities. For example, the Federal Reserve systematically acquires 
a quantity of Treasury securities exactly equivalent to the amount of dollars 
in circulation. This demand for currency is determined by the settlement 
practices (and possibly the money hoarding practices) pertaining to the 
American monetary area. In all the economies where the issue of money is 
backed by public securities, the government can therefore borrow up to the 
amount of money issued by the central bank without having to convince 
any private agent to subscribe to its debt. Since the central bank’s liabilities 
are not remunerated (in the case of the currency) or only to a small extent 
(in the case of the reserves), the government derives a financial advantage 
from this entitlement to ‘print money’, known as seigniorage. 
 One major exception is to be noted. The statutes of the European 
Central Bank prevent it, in principle, from acquiring debt securities issued 
by member countries. This means that the eurozone governments are 
deprived not only of access to a ‘purchaser of last resort’ of their debt, but 
also of the facility of obtaining financing linked to the issue of the cash 
balances needed for the normal functioning of the economy.  
In order to fully appreciate the implications of this last point, it must 
nevertheless be noted that even if it does not purchase public securities, the 
ECB accepts them as collateral for the lending operations through which it 
meets the demand for liquidity (and that it returns to members the gain 
made by ‘borrowing’ at low cost the sums lent on this occasion). This 
‘eligibility’ confers on public securities a particular attraction that normally 
affords them a special position, if not directly among the central bank’s 
own assets, at least among those of the institutions that find their 
refinancing through the central bank.  
In most developed countries, however, this privilege related to the 
issue of money plays only a relatively marginal role. The modernisation of 
means of payment has in fact considerably reduced the scale of the needs 
for central bank money. With the passage of time, the ratio to GDP of 
currency in circulation, in particular, has tended to decline. At the 
beginning of the 2010s, currency in circulation in the United States was 
equivalent to less than 7% of GDP, while in the eurozone it was 9%. For 
comparison, at the same date the ratio was still close to 15% in China. The 
demand for transaction balances – and also to a large extent the demand for 
precautionary balances – on the part of private agents have nevertheless 
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remained a source of structural demand for public debt securities. A large 
part, in fact, of these balances – money in the broad sense this time – is held 
in the form of deposits with commercial banks. Inasmuch as the banks are 
then the guarantors of their liquidity and integrity, they will do their best to 
manage the total mass of the risks they are taking, finding as the 
counterpart to the deposits investments that are relatively liquid and safe – 
such as public securities (or publicly-guaranteed securities). At the same 
time, at least until the introduction of Basel III, prudential rules – under 
which the credit-risk weighting of public debt securities of developed 
countries has been set at zero (meaning that they are considered as ‘non-
risky’) – have, in Europe in particular, propelled them in this direction.  
These securities, especially those issued by the largest developed 
countries, have therefore played a unique role in the functioning of the 
globalised financial system, namely that of a riskless asset. This 
particularity enabled them to benefit from constantly expanding demand 
from the banks, but also from the monetary authorities throughout the 
world seeking ‘risk-free’ assets. At the end of 2011, central banks’ foreign 
exchange reserves, largely invested in safe and liquid form, amounted to 
almost $11,000 billion (roughly 30% of the outstanding debt securities 
issued by developed-country governments).  
A government has enforcement powers 
The security and liquidity of public debt securities provide governments 
with substantial margins for ‘painless’ borrowing. The public authorities 
have another ‘privilege’, however, that they can use in order to place their 
debt more easily. They can, through regulation, create demand for 
government securities that is this time of an ‘artificial’ nature. They can 
achieve this directly by requiring financial institutions to hold specified 
amounts of these securities. For example, until around the end of the 1960s, 
French banks were obliged to hold public securities equivalent to a 
minimum proportion of their deposits, this proportion being set by the 
Banque de France. A similar result can be obtained indirectly. For example, 
by limiting the remuneration on bank deposits in the United States, 
Regulation Q resulted, among other things, in a search for alternative 
investments that were liquid and safe but better remunerated. The result of 
this, too, was increased demand for public securities. These various 
regulatory constraints – often described as ‘financial repression’ [Reinhart 
& Sbrancia, 2011] – took numerous forms. To a great extent, they were 
brought to an end through the liberalisation seen in the 1980s, in the 
developed countries at least.  
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This ‘repression’, preventing the prices of public debt securities from 
being determined by the market and enabling the government to borrow at 
lower rates, can take a form that is not dictated by regulations but by 
interventions on the part of the central bank. These interventions may be 
linked to a willingness to help the government to find finance or simply, 
given the role of public securities in the functioning of the financial system, 
to a concern to maintain the system’s stability.  
For example, during the 1940s and until 1951, the Federal Reserve 
systematically intervened to stabilise the prices of public securities, with 
the result that throughout a whole decade interest rates on long-term 
Treasury bonds remained close to 2.5%. These interventions had initially 
been carried out in order to facilitate the financing of the war effort, and 
later in a concern for financial stability. In 1945, the commercial banks held 
a substantial portfolio of public securities, so that an abrupt rise in interest 
rates, by reducing the value of this portfolio, could have eroded their 
shareholder equity to a dangerous extent [Eichengreen & Garber, 1991]. 
Nevertheless, these interventions did not prevent the Federal Reserve from 
adopting throughout this whole period a monetary stance aimed at 
maintaining price stability. If at any given time it was obliged, in order to 
purchase public securities, to issue more money than necessary, it 
systematically ‘froze’ the surplus by increasing the compulsory reserve 
ratio. On the one hand, the money base – the central bank’s liabilities – was 
increased, but on the other its velocity of circulation was reduced by the 
obligation to hold an increased proportion in reserves. This episode shows 
one of the advantages that a government can derive from a ‘monetisation’ 
of its debt, namely that it sets a ceiling on the yield on the bonds it issues. It 
also shows that, contrary to a widely held view, this monetisation does not 
necessarily imply the formation of inflationary pressures. 
For such pressures to emerge, it is necessary that the financial 
repression be taken a step further and to assume not only that the central 
bank finances the government but also that it neglects, deliberately or 
unintentionally, its objective of price stability. In that event it will enable 
the money base to increase by more than necessary, by keeping its policy 
rates low, at a time when the economic situation would require a tightening 
of monetary conditions. In this case, since its purchases of public debt 
prevent long-term rates from rising at a time when productive capacity is 
close to being fully employed, the necessary crowding-out of part of 
private demand can take place only through a rise in the price level. This 
inflation will be due, however, not to the ‘monetisation’ of the public debt 
itself but to an over-accommodating stance on the part of the central bank. 
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The same result could be attained through over-generous financing of 
private debt and through keeping borrowing costs too low. If inflation does 
indeed increase, the government will see its debt burden ease over time, as 
will all those who have borrowed at fixed rates (provided, obviously, that 
their income rises along with inflation). In the decades following the 
Second World War, a significant portion of the declines in the American 
and British public debt/GDP ratios was explained by an acceleration in the 
price rise. However, everything suggests that this inflation was due more 
to errors in the conduct of monetary policy than to any deliberate concern 
to ease the burden of public debt [Buiter, 1985].  
In most of the developed economies, central banks, now independent, 
pursue an objective of price stability. As a result, a budget deficit that takes 
total demand above the economy’s productive capacity will lead to a rise in 
policy interest rates and, as a consequence, in the general level of interest 
rates. This latter rise, by reducing the private demand for loans – and hence 
also loan-financed final demand – will prevent the formation of inflationary 
pressures. If, however, the economy is not in a state of full employment, the 
government will be able to borrow without any inflationary pressures 
emerging. Its deficit, whether due to investment, the need to boost activity 
or simply to neglect, will make it possible to absorb the excess private 
savings and prevent the level of activity from falling still further.  
In an economy where the response of private spending to low interest 
rates is insufficient, public debt will therefore play the regulating role 
described earlier, functioning as a ‘flywheel’ capable of absorbing and 
stockpiling private savings when this is in surplus and restoring it when 
there is a deficit. In an economy where the private sector is chronically in a 
situation of excess savings, the accumulation of debt via this ‘flywheel’ can 
nevertheless pose a problem. The fact that increases in public debt can be 
financed without a rise either in the interest rates at which the government 
can borrow or in inflation does not in fact mean that at some time in the 
future the government will not encounter problems in coping with its debt 
charges. The particular facilities enjoyed by the government in finding its 
finance are not without their dangers. Public borrowing may be painless 
today, but this does not mean that it may not turn out to be unsustainable 
tomorrow.  
1.2 The limits on public debt  
Unlike private agents, governments, as we have seen, are not obliged to 
repay their debts. To be more precise, they can, year after year, repay past 
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debt out of fresh borrowing, something that no private individual can do 
on a lasting basis. The only constraint they face is the need to pay the 
interest. Assessing the limits on public debt therefore amounts to assessing 
the governments’ future capacity to pay the debt service. A precise 
calculation of this capacity is not an easy matter, however, since it implies a 
fairly accurate projection of future public revenue and expenditure! In the 
absence of being able to define a limit on public debt on the basis of such a 
forecast, a more empirical attempt can be made, based in particular on past 
experience. Yet again, the fragility of the conclusions reached must be 
borne in mind.  
The theoretical approach  
The often-heard statement that every citizen ‘inherits’ at birth a debt of so 
many thousand euros or dollars is particularly misleading. In the first 
place, because in a developed economy the citizens ‘inherit’ not only a 
share of the public debt but also a share of the wide range of assets that the 
society has accumulated over the centuries. To talk of the inherited debt 
without simultaneously referring to this ‘social capital’ is fallacious: this 
capital largely determines future labour productivity and hence also the 
income accruing to tomorrow’s taxpayers. It is this income and this debt 
that have to be weighed in the balance. Second, and most importantly, 
those who are born today will not be obliged to repay the public debt; they 
will in their turn pass it on to their successors. They will be able to do this 
with a good conscience if, during their active lives, they have contributed, if 
not to developing, at least to maintaining, the social capital they inherited. 
As long as the economy continues to grow, what each generation will be 
called upon to provide is not the repayment of the public debt but only the 
service on the debt. Public debt will only cease to be ‘sustainable’ if it 
carries an interest burden that future generations are unable to cope with. 
It is important to correctly assess the annual contribution made by 
citizens to a country’s debt service. The figure corresponds to the difference 
between government revenue and total expenditure in the budget, 
excluding interest. This difference, known as the primary budget balance, 
measures the tax resources available to a government for transfer to its 
creditors in a given year. The amount of this transfer need not necessarily 
coincide with the total interest the government has in fact to pay in this 
same year. If its primary budget surplus is less than the interest due, the 
government will borrow in order to settle all or part of its debt service and 
its debt will increase. This will, a fortiori, be the case if its primary budget 
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balance shows a deficit, in which case it will be borrowing not only to pay 
its interest charges but also because its income is not sufficient to cover its 
other expenditure. The dynamics of public debt can therefore be seen to be 
crucially dependent on the annual primary balance. The debt will be stable 
if this is exactly equal to the interest due and it will decline if it exceeds this 
amount (in which case, part of the tax revenue will be used to wipe out past 
debt).  
If one accepts the idea that a State, unlike a private individual, has an 
infinite lifespan, it then becomes a simple matter, in theory at least, to 
define the limit on its sustainable debt. If the interest rate at which it 
borrows is higher than the growth rate of nominal income and hence, one 
must assume, its budget revenue, it cannot expect to go on for ever 
borrowing to pay its debt interest. If that were to be the case, its debt ratio 
would constantly increase and its creditors would at some stage finally 
refuse to continue lending to it. The limit on its sustainable debt is therefore 
set by the maximum amount of resources that future taxpayers will be prepared to 
see actually transferred, year after year, to the government’s creditors. This limit 
is a function of the projection, over a time-horizon that may not be infinite 
but may nevertheless be long, of several variables (Box 1). 
The first of these is obviously future tax revenue, which in turn will 
depend on growth in activity and in prices: the faster the growth in 
taxpayers’ nominal income in future decades, the easier it will be to service 
the interest on the accumulated debt; if, on the other hand, the taxable 
income declines rather than increases, the payment of the interest will 
become more difficult, everything else remaining unchanged. Tax revenue 
will also depend on the rates set: increasing tax rates significantly, with no 
particular justification, could rapidly be seen as unacceptable by those who 
will be paying the taxes tomorrow.  
However, the amount of future revenue is not the only variable one 
needs to project in order to calculate future primary balances. Projecting 
future government expenditure is just as important and this will depend on 
the government’s current operating costs, on the entirety of the 
commitments it has made with respect to national solidarity and also on 
the investments that may be needed to permit improvements in the 
standard of living and welfare, or at least prevent them from declining. The 
faster the increase in this needed spending in future decades, the lower the 
limit on today’s sustainable public debt – again, everything else remaining 
unchanged. One final variable should not be overlooked, namely the level 
of interest rates at which the government can borrow. It is in fact these 
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interest rates which, applied each year to the outstanding debt, will define 
the amount of interest that needs to be paid. Everything else remaining 
unchanged, the maximum amount of the government’s sustainable debt 
will move in the opposite direction to that of the interest rates at which it 
can borrow tomorrow. This ceiling may even disappear if the rates are 
permanently lower than the nominal GDP growth rate. 
Box 1. Assessing public debt sustainability* 
The equation for the accumulation of debt can be written simply as: 
 tttt PDiD  1)1(  (1) 
where tD  is the debt at date t; ti  is the average nominal interest rate paid on 
the debt in t; tP  is the primary balance (i.e., the budget balance excluding 
interest payments) at date t (if this is positive, there is a primary surplus and 
the debt will be reduced by this amount).  
The debt will be stable if the primary surplus is precisely equal to the 
interest paid (i.e. if 1 ttt DiP ).  
Dividing equation (1) by GDP for the period t, it can be shown that: 
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where g is the nominal GDP growth rate; p is the primary balance expressed 
as a proportion of GDP; and d is the public debt/GDP ratio. 
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 , one then has: 
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1. The ceiling on public debt 
In order that debt should be, in the narrowest sense, sustainable, the 
principal and interest must be capable – at some date – of being repaid. 
Today’s debt must therefore not exceed the net present value of the primary 
surpluses achieved by the budget in the future. Calling this ceiling sD , we 
therefore have: 

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If it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that t  is constant (  t ), 
one obtains: 
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In the favourable case in which 0  (meaning that nominal growth is 
permanently higher than the interest rate) and provided that p is positive, 
the sustainability constraint is always satisfied and there is no limit to the 
government’s sustainable debt.
 In the case in which 0  and assuming p to be constant, the solution 
of the equation is: 

pd s   
There is then a maximum limit on the sustainable debt ratio set by the 
maximum primary surplus p that the budget can generate on a lasting basis. 
Figure 1 (left-hand side) shows, as a function of (i-g), the sustainable 
debt levels for three values of p: the higher the interest rate in relation to the 
growth rate, the lower the sustainable debt level for a given value of p. 
Figure 1. Evolution of the debt/GDP ratio 
** The primary balance p is expressed in % of GDP. 
*** The values applied here are g=5 % and i=4 %. 
It can in fact be shown that when the intertemporal sustainability 
constraint is respected, the government cannot adopt a so-called ‘cavalry’ 
strategy, also known as a ‘Ponzi game’, involving indefinite borrowing not 
only to reimburse the capital but also to pay the interest due. In the long 
term, the net present value of its debt tends towards 0. The no-Ponzi 
condition can be written: 
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Furthermore, from equation (2), the following relation can be deduced: 
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Taking the limit of this equation when N , it can immediately be 
seen that if the no-Ponzi condition is satisfied, then the sustainability 
constraint must be respected. Similarly, if the sustainability constraint is 
respected, then the government cannot implement a Ponzi game. 
2. Primary balance needed to stabilise the debt ratio 
Equation (2) also makes it possible to calculate the primary balance tp  
needed to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio at its last achieved level ( 1td ) : 
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tt
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If nominal growth is higher than the interest rate on the debt ( 0 tt gi ), 
the government can run a primary deficit (equal to 1ttd  at most) and 
nevertheless see its debt ratio decline. This will be the case, a fortiori, if its 
primary balance is in equilibrium. Figure 1 (right hand side) illustrates, for 
constant g and i , the evolution in the debt ratio as a function of the primary 
balance p when nominal growth exceeds by one point the average interest 
rate on the debt. In the case of a primary balance in equilibrium, the 
debt/GDP ratio declines over time. 
If nominal growth is less than the interest rate ( 0 tt gi ), a primary 
surplus equal to at least 1tt d  is needed to stabilise the debt ratio. If this 
cannot be immediately achieved, the debt ratio will continue to increase and, 
along with it, the primary balance needed for its stabilisation. Note, in this 
case, the instability of the debt paths. When 0t , a primary surplus only 
very slightly below or above the level required to stabilise the debt can lead, 
in the long term, to a very different evolution in the debt: with an initial debt 
ratio of 60% and with %9,1  the debt ratio will tend towards 10% at the 
end of 150 years if the primary surplus is 1.2%, but will exceed 180% if the 
primary surplus is 1%! 
____________________ 
* This box is based on Escolano [2010].
 
This theoretical approach has the advantage of placing the problem of 
the sustainability of public debt in the right context, which, for developed 
countries at least, is the long term. However, its operational virtues are, for 
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precisely this reason, fairly limited. There will in fact be a strong 
temptation, when public debt increases to a worrying extent, to decide that 
it is nevertheless sustainable on the presumption that tax revenue will be 
increased in the near future or that there will be faster growth in activity or 
slower growth in public expenditure. In the final resort, it is obviously the 
government’s creditors who will decide on the plausibility of the scenarios 
being envisaged. Experience has nevertheless shown that their judgement 
could be dangerously imprecise. Complementing the theoretical approach 
by one that is more empirical therefore has its uses.  
The empirical approach 
For want of being able to calculate at all effectively the theoretical limit just 
defined, it is often considered that public debt is sustainable when it 
remains stable as a percentage of GDP. The reasoning here is directly 
derived from the previous one. If public debt remains stable as a 
percentage of GDP, this means that the debt increases at the same speed as 
taxpayers’ income (GDP). If the growth rate and the interest rate remain 
unchanged, the government will be able to cope with its debt service by 
achieving a primary surplus representing an unchanged proportion of 
GDP. The assumption that is implicitly made in regarding this situation as 
sustainable is a simple one: if the transfer of resources from taxpayers to 
creditors corresponding to this primary surplus is bearable today, there is 
no reason why it should not be bearable tomorrow!  
The limitations of this approach are obvious: it suggests that a given 
debt/GDP ratio can be sustainable regardless of its level, on the sole 
condition that it does not increase. However, if the net transfer – the 
primary surplus – that must be achieved in order to make the debt 
sustainable is substantial, it may be accepted for a brief period without 
necessarily being accepted indefinitely. Moreover, the risk of slipping onto 
an unsustainable path clearly increases with the size of the accumulated 
debt. If growth were to weaken in the future without interest rates falling 
by the same amount, it would be necessary, in order for the debt to remain 
sustainable, to increase the tax pressure or reduce the growth rate of public 
expenditure – the more so, the larger the size of the debt.  
The same would be true if the rate at which the government 
borrows were to rise. There would then be a risk of an even more abrupt 
slippage in that these evolutions can rapidly come to interact in a ‘vicious’ 
fashion: if growth weakens, the primary surplus will shrink; if, in reaction, 
interest rates were then to rise, an even-greater increase in the primary 
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surplus would become necessary and this in turn would threaten to curb 
growth even more, and so on. “When the debt ratio is high, the reaction of 
investors to negative news is likely to be highly nonlinear. Even relatively 
moderate economic, political, or debt shocks could prompt a fiscal crisis if 
investors think that the debt ratio may be about to cross the point of ‘non-
return’.” [Escolano, 2010, p. 11].  
Unfortunately, analysis of past experience in an attempt to determine 
the exact location of this ‘point of no-return’ beyond which a fiscal crisis 
becomes inevitable yields no clear-cut conclusions. Over the past two 
centuries there have admittedly been numerous situations of high public 
debt but the ways in which they were resolved differed widely. As 
Spaventa [1987, p. 375] points out: 
“There are important cases of painless re-entry to a more normal 
situation mostly in Anglo-Saxon countries; cases in which the 
overhang of a high debt stock became a primary cause of financial 
instability, leading eventually to inflation, which in turn provided 
a drastic remedy to the original problem … as in France in the 
1920s; cases in which a high debt stock was one of many factors 
producing conditions of hyperinflation, as in Germany and other 
countries after the first world war; … The one safe lesson one can 
draw from both facts and theory is that it is meaningless to look 
for a critical value of the ratio of debt to GDP beyond which the 
system breaks down and traumatic solutions become necessary: 
after all, the ratio was lower in France in the 1920s than in the 
United Kingdom between 1790 and 1840.” 
Recent studies have nevertheless attempted to approach the problem 
from a different standpoint. For want of being able to situate precisely the 
debt ceiling beyond which there is a serious chance that it will become 
unsustainable, these studies try to identify, still taking past experience as 
the starting point, the levels of public debt beyond which negative 
consequences for activity become clearly visible. This time the lessons to be 
learned seem to be more clear-cut. This is particularly true of the study by 
Reinhart & Rogoff [2010], published in the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Analysis of a sample covering 20 developed countries and 
the period 1946-2009 shows no significant link between debt levels and 
inflation, nor between debt and growth – at least, in this latter case, when 
public debt does not exceed 90% of GDP. When this ceiling is exceeded, 
however, the median growth rate is one percentage point lower than in the 
case of lower debt/GDP ratios. Other studies appearing at almost the same 
time, using more refined analysis, seem to confirm this critical value. 
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Published at a time when the public debt of many western countries was 
rapidly approaching this 90% threshold, these studies caused a 
considerable stir and often led to the conclusion that it was essential to 
stabilise public debt levels as soon as possible or even to bring them 
substantially below this threshold when it had been exceeded.  
It would be dangerous, however, to draw conclusions from these 
studies regarding the economic policy to be adopted in the face of the 
current evolution of public debt. In the first place, the mechanisms put 
forward to explain the link observed between high debt and growth are far 
from clear and, when they are, it is not obvious that their operation is 
necessarily unfavourable in the situation in which the western economies 
find themselves today. For example, the study by Checherita & Rother 
[2010], while highlighting an inverse relationship between public debt and 
growth, has difficulty in identifying the channels by which this mechanism 
would operate. In particular, the authors find a negative relationship 
between high public debt and the private savings ratio. If such a link were 
to come into operation in the very particular economic situation seen at the 
beginning of the 2010s, it would tend, not to curb growth, but, by reducing 
the private savings ratio, to ward off the risk of deflation hanging over the 
developed economies since the financial crisis! Moreover, these studies by 
no means dispel the uncertainty regarding the level beyond which there is 
a risk that public debt will become unsustainable. This threshold is a 
function of a wide set of variables, ranging for each country from its 
financial reputation to the quality of its institutions and obviously 
including, as we have seen, its economic growth prospects.  
It is highly likely therefore that the limit will be significantly different 
from one country to another. What is sure in any case is that the evolution 
of the country’s public debt has to be analysed over a longer period than 
the normal economic cycle. Its role, as we have seen, is to absorb the 
savings surplus that private agents tend to generate, especially at the 
bottom of the cycle, thereafter restoring it. Correctly assessing the storage 
capacity of the ‘regulating flywheel’ – consisting of the debt of the various 
governments – is of primordial importance. To what extent can the public 
debt of developed countries continue to be capable of absorbing the excess 
savings that the world economy will continue to generate in the coming 
years, possibly restoring it thereafter? Overestimating this capacity would 
inevitably lead to a succession of fiscal crises. But underestimating it would 
be tantamount to depriving the western economies of precious room for 
manoeuvre at a time when they are confronted with a particularly 
intractable economic crisis. 
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2. FROM ONE CRISIS TO ANOTHER 
he recent increase in the size of the public debt in the developed 
countries is directly linked to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. In 
the period to 2007, progress with international financial integration 
had enabled private agents in a few western economies to absorb unheard-
of amounts of savings generated in parts of the world economy where the 
spending propensity was relatively low. This meant that, despite the 
increasing share of these latter countries in world income, it was possible 
for activity to rise substantially everywhere. However, these transfers of 
savings were based mainly on a ‘globalised’ financial system that was 
fragile and inadequately supervised. Overburdened with risk and excessive 
lending, this system imploded in 2008. The almost instantaneous halt to 
credit growth, combined with the abrupt leap in the savings ratios of 
private agents whose growing spending propensity had previously been 
underpinning world demand, constituted a shock of unusual violence. 
There was indeed no reason why the fact that these agents had ceased 
to borrow should induce a rise in spending on the part of those whose 
savings they had previously been absorbing. In order to avoid a collapse in 
world activity, governments therefore had little choice and from one end to 
the other of the planet they used their budgets to underpin global demand 
[De Grauwe, 2010]. The decline in spending propensities of the savings-
importing regions was nevertheless so large that a deep recession in the 
western economies became inevitable: activity at the end of 2011 had in 
most of them still not regained its 2007 level! Since in most countries 
budgets had played their customary role of regulating ‘flywheel’ and 
absorbed the savings generated by the private sector, public debt rose 
substantially. Starting from a situation in which borrowing was already 
high in most western economies, this rise rapidly led to concern regarding 
the sustainability of the levels attained and to a general awareness of the 
need for better-balanced public finances. However, there is a danger that 
hasty imposition of a curb on public borrowing, unaccompanied by a rise 
T
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in spending propensities in regions that had until now always been 
exporters of savings, would lead to a gradual asphyxiation of world 
growth.  
2.1 A deflationary shock of extreme violence  
The expansion in the early 2000s of international transfers of savings 
tightened the links between the national circuits for spending and for 
income formation. These circuits were then abruptly and severely damaged 
by the crisis affecting globalised finance. The explosion of aversion to risk 
and the disorganisation of financial systems in fact led to the drying up of 
the credit flows which in many western economies were playing a central 
role in sustaining private spending. For example, net borrowing by 
American households, which at the beginning of 2007 was still equivalent 
to more than 10% of their disposable income, had become negative two 
years later, with net repayments exceeding 3% of their income (Figure 2). 
This turnaround was cushioned by a decline in their acquisition of financial 
assets. Households’ propensity to spend their disposable income 
nevertheless fell by 10 points. Whereas prior to the crisis American 
households had been spending each year 5% more than their income, after 
the crisis they were spending 5% less. This radical change in behaviour 
compounded an equally dramatic change in the financial savings ratio 
(savings ratio minus investment ratio) of American firms: the uncertainty 
generated by the crisis, combined with the difficulty of borrowing, led 
them to curb their investment spending, so that their financing 
requirement, which had amounted to just under 2 GDP points before the 
crisis, was replaced by a financing capacity of more than 5 GDP points. All 
in all, the spending propensity of American private agents collapsed, with 
their financing capacity rising in just a few quarters by roughly 13 GDP 
points. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the financial savings of American households, 1990-2011 
(% of disposable income, smoothed over one year) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
In certain other economies, the shock was more violent still. In Spain, 
between 2007 and 2009, the household financial savings ratio rose by 10 
GDP points and, with loans to real-estate promoters suddenly drying up, 
the corporate financing requirement fell in the space of two years by 8 GDP 
points (Figure 3). In total, Spanish private agents’ spending propensity fell 
sharply and their financing capacity rose by as much as 18 GDP points! 
Granted, the evolution for the eurozone as a whole was not nearly as 
dramatic, with private agents’ financing capacity rising on average by only 
around 6 GDP points. The explanation for this relative moderation is 
simple. The initial effect of the crisis was a decline in private borrowing 
flows and this decline was greatest in countries where these flows in 
previous years had risen most strongly: massive in the case of Spain and 
Ireland but non-existent in Germany, where private agents’ net borrowing 
had shown no rise.  
The evolution in the spending propensity of private agents in the 
eurozone is therefore to be seen as an average, spanning countries where 
this propensity fell sharply after rising substantially until the crisis and 
others where it had been stable before the crisis and remained so thereafter. 
The German case is not unique. Other countries that had been in 
substantial surplus before the crisis, such as China or Saudi Arabia, 
experienced similar evolutions: with their financial systems not directly 
affected, their private agents’ spending propensities remained practically 
unchanged. Even so, these countries were not sheltered from the 
contractionary demand shock induced by the crisis. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of private agents’ financial savings in the eurozone, 2000-11 
(% of GDP, smoothed over one year) 
 
* Adjusted, in 2000, for the acquisition of UMTS licences. 
Sources: ECB, Banco de España, Bundesbank and Banque de France. 
The shock wave originating in the deficit economies then spread 
rapidly, helped by trade integration, to all their trading partners [Bussière 
et al., 2011]. Since the spending of one country contributes to income 
formation in others, the decline in the spending propensity of private 
agents in countries where borrowing had until then been underpinning 
world demand led to a decline in income in countries whose growth had 
been based on this demand. In this way, the shock affected more or less 
directly all countries participating in international trade.  
The threat of a free fall in activity 
The world economy then found itself facing deflationary pressures of 
unprecedented force. A simple calculation serves to indicate their size (see 
Box 2). For this purpose, the world economy is divided into two blocs: 
countries that had built up rising current-account deficits before the crisis, 
reflecting mainly a rise in private borrowing, and the rest. The spending 
and income formation behaviour in each of these two groups can be 
summed up, for the private agents, by their propensity to spend their 
disposable income and, for governments, by the ratio of public levies to 
GDP on the one hand and the volume of public spending on the other. Two 
market-share figures describe the trade between the two groups. The deficit 
zone accounted in 2007 for slightly more than half of world GDP and in the 
same year differed from the surplus zone in one essential respect, namely 
that its private agents had a propensity to spend their income that was in 
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excess of unity (1.05), in contrast to the figure of less than unity (0.93) in the 
surplus zone. The impact of the shock related to the crisis can then be 
calculated by assuming that – with everything else remaining equal – the 
evolution between 2007 and 2009 in spending propensities in the first 
group of countries was the one actually observed. This amounted in fact to 
a fall from 1.05 to 0.89.  
The result is spectacular: if nothing else had emerged to compensate 
for the collapse in the spending propensity of private agents in the deficit 
countries, nominal income would have slumped by 18% in these countries 
and by 7% in the rest of the world. This calculation somewhat exaggerates 
the scale of the shock, inasmuch as a fall in activity to this extent could be 
expected to provoke a partially-compensating rise in private agents’ 
spending propensities. It nevertheless reflects reality: following the shock, 
the world economy had in fact to find a new equilibrium, with private 
agents – in both regions this time – not spending all their income.  
The only possible outcome of this new configuration of private 
spending propensities was a widening of public deficits on a sufficient 
scale to absorb the private savings. If, for the sake of simplicity, it is 
assumed that the level of government spending is fixed, the adjustment 
could only come from a decline in budget revenue, determined for the most 
part by tax rates (on incomes or on private spending). World income would 
therefore have had to decline to the point at which the induced fall in 
income produced public deficits equal to the savings generated, at this level 
of income, by private agents. If no other mechanism had come into play, 
world activity, and especially activity in the deficit economies, would 
therefore have been in free fall and government budgets would have found 
themselves in substantial deficit. In practice, a certain number of 
mechanisms and policies – fortunately – were on hand to cushion this 
shock. Public deficits indeed widened, but in a way that made it possible to 
avoid activity posting the huge drop that was threatening. 
Box 2. An evaluation of the scale of the 2007-09 recessionary shock* 
In order to shed light on the effects of the 2007-09 shock, a simple framework 
can be used in which the world economy is divided into two regions. 
Region 1 comprises all the countries running a current-account deficit in 
2007; region 2 consists of all the countries with a current-account surplus. 
The formation of income in each region, it is assumed, can be written as 
follows: 
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where iY  is the income of region i; iD  is the private spending of region i; im  
is the proportion of private spending of region i that is met out of imports 
(the imports of one region being by definition equal to the exports of the 
other, 22Dm  represents either the imports of region 2 or the exports of 
region 1); iG  is public spending in region i (its import content is assumed to 
be zero) .  
Let it  be the average ratio of taxes to income of region i and i  be the 
spending propensity as a share of income of the private sector in region i. 
Private spending in region i can then be written:  
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Using equations (1) and (2), the level of activity of region 1 can be 
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The IMF’s World Economic Outlook database makes it possible to 
calibrate the spending propensities and the tax ratios for the two regions in 
2007 and in 2009. Region 1 accounted for 55% of the world economy in 2007. 
Between 2007 and 2009, the spending propensity of the region’s private 
agents fell sharply from 1.05 to 0.89, whereas that of region 2 fell from 0.93 to 
0.89.** This shock was cushioned in both regions by a decline in the tax 
ratios and a rise in public spending (Table 1). 
What would have happened if this had not been the case? Reasoning in 
a framework of partial equilibrium, the model provides an answer. In the 
absence of a modification in spending behaviour or in the revenue of the 
public sector (in other words, assuming no built-in stabilisers), the fall in the 
spending propensity of region 1 would have meant, everything else 
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remaining equal, a contraction in the region’s nominal activity of as much as 
18%. For region 2, the consequences would also have been significant, with a 
fall in income of 7% (case 1).  
Table 1. Simulations of the 2007-09 shock 
 
In order to maintain activity at its 2007 level in region 1, it would have 
been necessary to increase public spending by as much as 23% (case 2). The 
shock for region 2 would then have been smaller. Since public spending has 
here no import content, this increase in spending in region 1 would 
nevertheless not have enabled region 2 to maintain its 2007 level of activity 
(its income falls by 3.5% in this simulation). Alternatively, one can calculate 
the decline in the tax ratio in region 1 that would have enabled activity to 
stabilise there: from around 36% to 25% (case 3)! 
In reality, both regions adopted support measures. In all countries 
public spending was increased and the tax ratio reduced: between 2007 and 
2009, despite the decline in private agents’ spending propensity, the fiscal 
support measures almost made it possible to stabilise nominal income in 
region 1, while that of region 2 rose by 10%, a distinct slowdown, however, 
compared with the 24% rise seen between 2005 and 2007. 
____________________ 
* The reasoning here is that used in Aglietta et al. [1990]. 
** These propensities are not equal to those of the averages for each group of 
countries: private agents’ financing capacity being calculated by difference 
between the bloc’s current-account balance and its budget balance, it is affected 
by various national and international statistical adjustments. The current-
account balances of the two zones have been adjusted to achieve equality 
between current-account surpluses and deficits at world level. 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 1 Region 2 Region 1 Region 2 Region 1 Region 2 Region 1 Region 2
δi : private-sector       
spending propensity
1.05 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
ti : tax ratio                                
(% of GDP)
35.8 34.7 24.7 33.8 33.5
Gi : public spending      
(billion dollars)
11 715 8 187 14 428 13 291 10 307
Yi : nominal GDP                            
(billion dollars)
30 892 24 788 25 350 23 054 30 892 23 939 30 892 24 788 30 396 27 334
Budget balance              
of region i (% of GDP)
-2.1 1.6 -10.4 -0.8 -10.9 0.5 -13.2 1.6 -9.9 -4.2
Current-account balance 
of region i (% of GDP)
-5.1 6.4 -3.6 3.9 -4.0 5.2 -5.1 6.4 -2.8 3.2
Simulated cases for 2009
2007,                   
observed
2009,                   
observed(1) Decline in δ1
(2) Decline in δ1         
and increase in G1
(3) Decline in δ1         
and decline in t1
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Successful stabilisation 
The developed economies in fact have at their disposal ‘built-in’ fiscal 
stabilisers whose role is precisely to prevent such a free fall in activity. 
When a recession starts to make itself felt, these stabilisers automatically 
come into play (such as allowances paid to laid-off workers, adding to 
public spending, or declines in effective rates of public levies, which are in 
most cases progressive). Their operation in 2008-09 helped to cushion the 
shock. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, governments 
aware of the risks for activity took deliberate fiscal support measures: 
stimulus packages in the form of tax cuts and increased spending were 
rapidly set in place in a simultaneous, if not truly coordinated, attempt to 
prevent a new Great Depression. These efforts were often proportional to 
the shock that the country concerned directly faced so that, in general, the 
deterioration in the budget balance was greatest in countries where the 
decline in private agents’ spending propensity was also greatest.  
The authorities in the emerging economies (which account for a 
major portion of the surplus country group identified above) did not stay 
passive in the face of the shock originating in the developed economies. 
Unlike the latter, their financial systems had not been directly shaken by 
the crisis. By relaxing monetary policy, they could hope to stimulate the 
demand for credit and in this way raise the spending propensity of their 
private agents. Many countries made use of this instrument. In China, to 
take just one example, the distribution of lending to both private agents 
and local authorities exploded between 2007 and 2009, with a rise of 
roughly 4,000 billion yuan in 2007 and 2008 followed by one of more than 
10,000 billion yuan in 2009, equivalent to roughly 30 GDP points. These 
monetary policy measures were supplemented by massive fiscal stimuli. 
The built-in stabilisers available to the emerging economies being less 
powerful than those of the developed economies, the bulk of the fiscal 
support was provided through discretionary measures. In relation to the 
size of the economies concerned, the fiscal impulse provided – 3 GDP 
points over 2008-09 – was comparable to the average observed in the 
developed economies. This support made a major contribution to 
underpinning spending in the emerging regions and hence world spending 
as a whole. 
These stabilisation efforts had their effect. Admittedly, they did not 
prevent growth from slowing down substantially and the western 
economies experienced their deepest recession since the Great Depression. 
However, this shock bore no relationship to the one that threatened. In the 
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countries of the first group – those directly affected by the contraction of 
lending flows – the nominal level of activity fell only slightly (by 1.6%) 
between 2007 and 2009, while in the rest of the world it continued to make 
progress (+10%), albeit at only half the pace seen in previous years. This 
result has to be credited to the international cooperation efforts launched in 
Washington in the autumn of 2008, at the height of the crisis, in the G20 
framework [Cabrillac & Jaillet, 2011]. This was at the cost of a sharp 
deterioration in fiscal equilibrium in the leading developed economies (as 
well as, in the emerging regions, a surge in inflation linked in large part to a 
rise in commodity prices). 
2.2 The need to restore fiscal equilibrium in the developed 
economies 
As shown in the previous chapter, it is in fact the public debt that makes it 
possible to absorb the savings surpluses that the private sector can generate 
in certain economic conditions. From this point of view, what happened 
from 2008 on was exemplary. The crisis in fact suddenly forced private 
agents to save a much larger proportion of their income. In response, 
governments increased their financing requirements and in this way a 
collapse in world activity was avoided. This widening of budget deficits 
nevertheless took place at a time when the slippage in public borrowing 
was already giving rise to concern – in many developed economies at least. 
Once the immediate emergency was over, however, governments made no 
attempt to agree on the manner in which the fiscal stimulus was to be 
withdrawn. Instead of drawing up, within the cooperation framework that 
had just been introduced, coordinated ‘exit strategies’, each of them rapidly 
began acting independently again and defining its fiscal policy in the light 
of its own priorities: underpinning growth in some cases, restoring fiscal 
equilibrium in others. Given this disunity and given also the resulting 
weakening of the recovery, developed-country governments’ capacity for 
keeping their borrowing under control was called into doubt for the first 
time since the Second World War.  
The developed economies dangerously placed 
It should come as no surprise that these doubts were concentrated on the 
developed economies. Over the preceding decades, most of them had built 
up substantial levels of public debt. Few of them in 2009 had public 
debt/GDP levels of less than 50% and in some cases the level exceeded 
100%. In the emerging regions, or at least in the largest countries, the 
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situation was precisely the reverse: for most of them, the public debt/GDP 
ratios were substantially below 50% (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Public debt in developed and emerging countries in 2009 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF. 
Developed and emerging regions also differ in terms of their inflation 
and growth prospects. A slowdown in labour force growth, combined with 
slower productivity gains, is in fact a feature common to almost all the 
developed countries but not one that is shared by the emerging countries. 
Even those where the demographic tendencies are set to become less 
dynamic, such as China in particular, still have sufficient potential for 
productivity gains to fuel growth. And, as was shown in the previous 
chapter, growth in future decades is a determining factor for the 
sustainability of public debt.  
With relatively high public borrowing and with poor prospects for 
growth in nominal income, the developed regions in the aftermath of the 
crisis are therefore clearly less well-placed than the emerging countries to 
confront the deterioration in their public finances – especially as their 
future capacity for generating the primary surpluses which, along with 
growth, are essential for them to be able to service their debt, is being 
impaired by commitments that are largely absent in the emerging 
economies. Many developed countries in fact have social welfare systems 
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that are imposing, over a fairly long time-horizon, substantial budget 
spending increases simply because of the ageing of the population and the 
rise in healthcare costs. These commitments set a floor on the possible 
compression of budget spending. At the same time, the level of taxes and 
social contributions is already high and this sets another limit, this time on 
their capacity to increase revenue further. The room for manoeuvre 
available in the aftermath of the crisis to many developed countries for 
managing the evolution in their public finances is therefore much more 
restricted than that of the emerging regions. 
In the summer of 2009, when the first signs of stabilisation of activity 
started to appear, governments in the developed countries were 
everywhere confronted with the same problem. Regardless of the desired 
level of their public borrowing, their first priority was to stem the increase 
and hence to decide how fast and in what manner fiscal stimulus would 
give way to fiscal tightening. Clearly, the size of the improvement needed 
in the primary balance to achieve stabilisation of public debt differed from 
one country to another.  
Simple arithmetic indicates that this effort must be greater, the 
greater the deterioration in the primary balance but also the higher the 
existing burden of public borrowing and the wider the expected difference 
between the rate at which the accumulated debt is remunerated and the 
future growth rate (Box 1). Figure 5 (left-hand side) gives a measure of the 
efforts required from the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
various eurozone members, depending on the state of public finances for 
each country and its growth and financing prospects at the end of 2009. The 
scale of the effort required from each of the economies is explained mainly 
by its 2009 primary balance, with the burden of the accumulated debt and 
the difference between interest rate and the growth rate playing in most 
cases only a marginal role. The link mentioned earlier between the financial 
crisis and disequilibria in the public finances then takes on greater clarity. 
For the most part, the deterioration in primary balances seen in each country 
between 2007 and 2009 was proportional to, albeit of lower intensity than, the 
increase in their private agents’ saving propensities (Figure 5, right-hand side).  
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Figure 5. Comparison of deficits and required budgetary consolidation efforts 
 
* Reduction in the primary budget deficit over the period 2010-15 needed, at the 
end of 2009, to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio in 2015. 
Sources: IMF, OECD and authors’ calculations. 
Uncoordinated exit strategies 
The situation of countries where the fiscal consolidation needed is greatest 
takes on an even more worrying aspect in that the concern not to depress 
activity still further would normally dissuade them from reducing too 
rapidly the deficits that had emerged. Such a widening of deficits was 
needed to avoid a slump in activity in response to the abrupt fall in private 
agents’ spending propensities. Attempting to eliminate the deficits to 
which this response had led before these propensities had started to rise 
again would induce a further fall in activity and hence a further 
deterioration in the public deficits [Wolf, 2010]. In order for growth in the 
developed countries, and especially in those running a current-account 
deficit, to have a chance of reviving, it is necessary to maintain substantial 
public deficits over a certain period and hence accept a significant rise in 
public debt.  
The consequences, it should be noted, are not necessarily dramatic. 
Adding 15 or even 20 GDP points to the public debt implies only a very 
marginal modification in the improvement in the primary balance needed 
in order later to stabilise the burden (although an additional effort will 
obviously be required to cancel out this rise in debt). In addition, the 
evolution in the rates at which governments can borrow following the crisis 
Variation in private agents' financial 
savings (2007-2009, % of GDP)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Ir
el
an
d
G
re
ec
e
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
U
.K
.
Ja
pa
n
Fr
an
ce
Eu
ro
zo
ne
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Be
lg
iu
m
Ita
ly
A
us
tr
ia
G
er
m
an
y
Fi
nl
an
d
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 5 10 15 20
IE
ES
U.S.
GR
U.K.FI
PT JPBE
IT
FR
AT
DE Eurozone
Budgetary consolidation efforts*
(% of GDP)
Budget balances and private 
agents' financial savings
V
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
bu
dg
et
de
fic
it 
(2
00
7-
20
09
, %
 o
f G
D
P)
Ir
el
an
d
G
re
ec
e
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
U
.K
.
Ja
pa
n
Fr
an
ce
Eu
ro
zo
ne
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Be
lg
iu
m
Ita
ly
A
us
tr
ia
G
er
m
an
y
Fi
nl
an
d V
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
bu
dg
et
de
fic
it 
(2
00
7-
20
09
, %
 o
f G
D
P)
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  33 
has been extremely favourable. Sovereign debt of western countries has for 
many decades taken on the particularity of being considered ‘riskless’ and 
acting as a safe haven in times of crisis. Government borrowing rates have 
a tendency to decline in times of economic slowdown and the late-2000s 
were no exception in this respect. The decline in government borrowing 
costs has served to cushion the rise in interest charges related to the 
upsurge in debt and hence to reduce the effort needed subsequently to 
stem the upsurge.  
Confronted with the same problem, the developed economies do not, 
for all that, share the same analysis of the dangers related to the evolution 
in public borrowing. For some, the fact of allowing public debt to exceed a 
given absolute percentage of GDP – 90%, or even 60% – is in itself cause for 
concern and stemming the upsurge in government borrowing becomes a 
priority. For others, this upsurge has to be accepted until the upturn in 
activity is assured. Germany, which in June 2009 wrote a ‘debt brake’ 
clause into its constitution, clearly falls into the first category, as does the 
United Kingdom, where the Conservative-led coalition government 
introduced an austerity budget shortly after its election. Equally clearly, 
Japan and the United States fall into the second category, having decided to 
maintain huge public deficits. This lack of coordination of exit strategies 
can only be weakening the upturn in the world economy. It would have 
been logical that the countries with the shortest road to travel in order to 
stabilise their debt ratios would not be the first to set out on it. And yet this 
is what happened. It was the countries of the eurozone whose situations 
showed, on average, the smallest deterioration that launched all-out drives 
to reduce their budget deficits. Admittedly, these countries had been the 
first to come under pressure from the markets. Because of a failure to set 
out clearly the modalities of their solidarity, the solvency of those whose 
financial equilibria seemed the most fragile was called into question.  
Having cooperated in the introduction of the fiscal stimulus that 
prevented a collapse of the world economy, the developed countries from 
2010 on drew up their exit strategies in a spirit of “every man for himself”. 
And yet, in September 2009, at the Pittsburgh G20 Summit, a “Framework 
for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” had been sketched out. 
Individual national problems and priorities resulted, however, in this 
framework remaining no more than a sketch. This absence of international 
coordination is all the more disquieting in that the reduction in public 
deficits launched in all countries will for several years have major 
consequences for the equilibrium between savings and investment at world 
level. The drawing up of exit strategies in the G20 framework and their 
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articulation with the policies implemented to stimulate spending in the 
emerging economies could have considerably reduced the risk of seeing at 
some future date an excess of savings asphyxiating world growth. 
2.3 Dangerous implications for world growth 
Since the end of the 2000s, public deficits, and especially those of the 
western countries, have been absorbing much of the world economy’s 
surplus savings. What impact will a reduction in these deficits have over 
the coming years? This will depend on the evolution in the spending 
propensities of other agents and, in the first place, those of private agents in 
countries where these efforts are going to be made. If, at a time when their 
government is borrowing less, private agents are saving less, the country’s 
overall savings will remain unchanged and putting public borrowing back 
on a sustainable path will generate no macroeconomic tension. Note that 
this would correspond to a ‘Ricardian’ adjustment in private spending: 
with public finances improving, private agents expect to have to pay less 
tax in the future and so spend more today (Box 3). Their financing capacity 
then fluctuates in phase with the public deficits. During the decades 
preceding the 2007-09 crisis, there would seem indeed to have been 
synchronisation of this kind, for example in the case of the American 
economy (Figure 6).  
Figure 6. Evolution in the financial savings of the private and public sectors in the 
United States, 1961-2011 (% of GDP, smoothed over one year) 
 
Source: Thomson Datastream. 
This conclusion can be deceptive, however. An evolution in private 
saving, that is in phase with that of public deficits can be explained just as 
easily by the cyclical character of both variables. In an economy where 
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economic regulation has been implemented largely through monetary 
policy and where fiscal impulses (the measures taken explicitly to boost or 
to curb activity) have been significant only for brief periods – as was the 
case in the United States for several decades – it is something of a tautology 
to see a close relationship between public deficits and private savings 
surpluses. Phases of slowdown in activity are triggered by a rise in interest 
rates that reduces private agents’ spending propensity and so leads to a 
slowdown in activity and a deterioration in the budget balance. 
Conversely, activity is stimulated by a fall in rates, which by increasing 
private agents’ spending propensities, stimulates activity and allows the 
budget balance to improve. Noting that, in this case, reduction of public 
deficits and a rise in private agents’ spending propensity go hand in hand 
in this manner tells us nothing about the way in which these two variables 
are set to behave in the coming years. 
A non-Ricardian world 
The situation of the western economies in the early part of the 2010s – and 
that of the United States, in particular – is in fact very different from that 
seen in earlier decades. These economies are going to be subjected to a 
negative fiscal impulse at a time when monetary policy has lost most of its power 
to stimulate [Blanchard & Milesi-Ferretti, 2011]. There is then good reason 
for private agents’ spending behaviour not to be Ricardian. In the first 
place, it should be noted that central banks’ policy rates have already 
reached their lower limit at a time when private agents’ spending 
propensities are also exceptionally low. In these circumstances, a cut in 
interest rates cannot be used to stimulate private spending. Second, the 
crisis has intensified a tendency that has been present since the early 2000s 
in developed countries, namely that the corporate financing requirement 
has continually declined and even turned into a significant financing 
capacity. Taken together, firms are now net lenders, not net borrowers, and 
are likely to remain so as long as the weak growth prospects prompt them 
not to invest more!  
An increase in the spending propensities of private agents in the 
developed countries therefore implies, in most cases, an upturn in 
household borrowing. This upturn will be all the slower in that the banking 
systems of the developed countries are far from having recovered from the 
shocks to which they have been subjected. The conclusion is 
straightforward: a possible increase in private agents’ spending propensity 
will for some years to come be subjected to severe constraints. Such a rise is 
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therefore unlikely to compensate for the reduction in public deficits needed 
to stabilise debt/GDP ratios, especially if the reduction were to be 
relatively fast. 
A recent study by Guajardo et al. [2011] comes to a similar 
conclusion, based on an analysis of the past. This study starts by 
identifying, for all countries for which the necessary data are available, the 
episodes during which explicit efforts at fiscal consolidation were 
implemented (those in which, along the lines of what will be seen in many 
developed countries, the budget has been a lasting source of negative 
impulse for activity). This means that episodes in which a cyclically-related 
improvement in the public deficit can be seen are eliminated.1 The study 
then goes on to examine the way in which private spending responded to 
this consolidation effort. The results are unambiguous.  
Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, careful analysis of past 
experience clearly shows that fiscal austerity does not stimulate private 
spending. A 1-GDP-point reduction in the primary deficit is associated 
with a 1% contraction in domestic demand. The induced fall in activity is 
nevertheless smaller: the contraction in domestic demand reduces imports 
and improves the current-account balance by 0.6 GDP points. As this 
balance is the sum of private agents’ financing capacity and the public 
balance, the result of this IMF study confirms that past efforts to bring 
public finances more into balance are far from being entirely compensated 
by a decline in private agents’ saving. In fact, the decline in their financing 
capacity associated with a 1% reduction in the primary deficit has in these 
past episodes been only 0.4%. 
                                                   
1 The authors stress the shortcomings of the ‘traditional’ approach to assessing the 
consequences of efforts to improve fiscal equilibrium and the reasons why this 
approach can misleadingly suggest that fiscal austerity has stimulatory virtues. In 
order to identify and measure the effort, the traditional approach takes the 
cyclically-adjusted variation in the primary balance. However, this adjustment 
never takes into account all the possible impacts of the cycle on the fiscal balance. 
For example, the sharp rise in the United States stock market in the late 1990s 
contributed to an improvement in the fiscal balance – and in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary revenue – without any fiscal consolidation measures being adopted. The 
authors also eliminate episodes where the tightening was associated with the 
desire, not to balance the budget, but to curb activity. 
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Growth increasingly constrained by indebtedness 
The consequences for developed-economy growth of debt-reduction 
constraints affecting private and public agents are clear. If the financing 
capacity of the private agents falls more slowly than the financing 
requirement of the public agents, the overall financing requirement of the 
economy is bound to decline. In other words, if private and public agents 
each make an adjustment, desired or imposed, in their financial balances, 
the current-account balance of the economy must improve. During this 
adjustment period, total domestic spending – and hence domestic demand – 
will have to increase more slowly than their income – GDP. The external 
contribution to income growth will have to be positive. The improvement 
in the current-account balance implied by the adjustment in public and 
private balances therefore determines the contribution of the external sector 
to the growth of the economy needed for this adjustment to take place.  
The resulting constraint on the domestic growth rate will depend on 
the evolution of the spending of the rest of the world and on the evolution 
of the country’s market share: the more rapid the growth in demand from 
the rest of the world, the greater the improvement in the economy’s market 
shares and the more a high growth rate of its domestic demand will be 
compatible with the improvement required in its current-account balance – 
and the greater will be the growth in its GDP. If, on the other hand, 
demand from its trading partners grows slowly or if the economy loses 
market share, the same improvement on the current-account balance will 
be obtained only at the cost of weaker growth in its imports and hence in 
its domestic spending. Since the contribution of the external sector remains 
unchanged, by construction, GDP growth will be correspondingly reduced 
(Box 3). 
Box 3. Public and private debt reduction and growth 
The consolidation of public finances and the reduction of private-sector debt 
are going to hold back growth in numerous developed economies. As 
illustration, it is assumed here that the government wants to reduce its 
deficit and that, given the need for debt reduction, the financial savings 
behaviour of the private sector cannot be Ricardian: far from reducing its 
financial savings ratio at the same time as the government is improving its 
budget balance, the private sector maintains an unchanged financing 
capacity. Figure 7 describes this situation (for the period between 2000 and 
2011 the data are for the eurozone).  
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Given that the sum of the financing requirements or capacities of 
domestic agents is equal to the current-account balance, this behaviour on 
the part of public and private agents implies, as one can see, an 
improvement in the current-account balance. But with what consequences 
for growth? 
Figure 7. Net lending (+) or borrowing (-), 2000-2015 (% of GDP) 
 
Let private , public  and country , respectively, represent the financing 
requirements or capacities of the private sector, the public sector and the 
country. The financing capacity of the public sector corresponds to the 
budget balance and that of the country to the current-account balance ca (all 
magnitudes are expressed here as proportions of GDP). 
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domestic demand must grow less fast than GDP. 
It then remains to calculate the growth rate of Y compatible with the 
improvement in the current-account balance implied by the behaviour of 
each country’s agents. If, for the sake of simplification, transfers and 
investment income are ignored, the current-account balance can be written: 
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same real effective exchange rate – it is possible to calculate the growth rate 
of domestic demand that permits the attainment of the targeted current-
account balance, for given evolutions in the exchange rate and demand from 
the rest of the world. The more rapid the growth in exports, the more a 
given improvement in the current-account balance can be compatible with 
rapid growth in domestic demand and hence also in GDP. 
This highly simplistic approach will be applied systematically in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The time-horizon for the simulations is five years. For 
each country, two relationships for the simulation of exports and imports of 
goods and services have been estimated, as well as a block of equations 
making it possible to calculate the net investment income and transfers. The 
financing requirements or capacities of the private agents are projected, 
often as a function of the constraints relating to their individual financial 
situations. It is then possible to estimate several paths for the consolidation 
of budget balances and to see what economic growth rates can be associated 
with them. 
 
The simultaneous adjustment of the balance sheets of public and 
private agents in the developed economies will therefore, for several years 
to come, be a source of deflationary pressure for the world economy. The 
current-account deficits of a certain number of these economies – the 
United States and Spain, for example – had previously made it possible to 
absorb the savings surpluses of the rest of the world. Their reduction – 
implied by this adjustment – will tend to depress world activity. If these 
countries spend less without others spending more, the deflationary force 
whose effect had been partly cushioned in 2008 will again come into play. 
The difference is that this time it will take the form not of a shock but of 
continual pressure.  
Given that most of the developed countries are being subjected to the 
same adjustment constraints, their growth, if it is to remain firm, has to be 
based on the expansion of demand in the emerging economies. Many of 
these have in fact already adopted strategies to boost their domestic 
demand. However, the available projections suggest that these strategies 
will be insufficient, especially if the fiscal adjustment in the developed 
regions is relatively rapid. Accordingly, at the beginning of 2012, the IMF 
was continuing to predict the maintenance of substantial surpluses for the 
emerging regions. This is not compatible with a marked reduction in the 
public deficits of developing countries over this same time horizon. In these 
circumstances, some of them run the risk of being caught in a perverse 
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spiral that will lead them full tilt into fiscal crisis, given that contraction in 
activity and widening of the public deficit go hand-in-hand. Preventing the 
triggering of such spirals implies that the developed countries do not all 
simultaneously try to bring their budgets too rapidly back towards 
equilibrium. Using in the best way possible the room for manoeuvre 
available to each party in contributing to the outcome is therefore essential. 
The examination of the public finance situations in Japan, the United States 
and the eurozone is from this point of view enlightening. It gives an idea of 
these margins but also of the risks confronting these countries. 
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3. THE TRAP CLOSING ON JAPAN 
he developed economies whose private savings are going to remain 
in surplus for several years to come can learn a lot from the evolution 
of Japanese public finances. In no other country has the budget 
played to the same extent the role of ‘flywheel’, making it possible to store 
excess savings. Starting in the 1970s, with Japan’s investment requirements 
declining, there emerged a surplus of private savings that was first 
exported to the rest of the world. When in the early 1990s the bursting of 
the stock-market and real-estate bubbles further reduced domestic 
investment, the public deficit became the only possible outlet for still 
overabundant savings. In order to attenuate the deflationary forces at work, 
the government had no choice but to allow its own debt to increase. Had it 
not done so, Japanese private agents would not have been able to 
accumulate their present financial wealth. This particularity, combined 
with the original features of the Japanese financial system, explains why, at 
a time when the country’s debt has reached the equivalent of twice its GDP, 
the government is still borrowing at low interest rates.  
This reassuring conclusion, however, should not be allowed to mask 
the problems facing Japan today. The level of interest rates may be low, but 
the rate of increase in nominal incomes has for several years now been 
lower still. And if the Japanese private sector is today still generating a 
substantial financing capacity, this emanates to an increasing extent from 
firms and no longer from households. At the same time, the financial 
system is evolving in a direction that could make the market for Japanese 
public debt more vulnerable to any doubts that might arise concerning the 
government’s creditworthiness. And, in the case of Japan, the problem of 
creditworthiness can be summed up in a single concrete question: will the 
government, whose deficit has until now enabled households to continue 
to save at a time when firms were paying off their debts, be able when the 
time comes to achieve the surpluses needed in order to restore their savings 
to them without eroding their purchasing power?  
T
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3.1 Debt ‘without tears’ until now  
As a proportion of GDP, Japanese public debt was as much as 200% at the 
end of 2010, twice the level for the rest of the OECD countries (Figure 8). 
Above all, the trajectory followed for two decades is spectacular: between 
1992 and 2010, the burden of this debt more than trebled. In Japan, 
however, even more than elsewhere, looking at just one part of the 
government’s balance sheet – its liabilities, in this case – is deceptive. 
Although heavily in debt, the Japanese government at the same time has at 
its disposal a substantial stock of financial assets (Figure 8), which at the 
end of 2010 totalled nearly 100% of GDP, or 80% if one excludes the public 
bonds held by central and local administration (this item does not appear 
in the figure for gross public debt, either). Roughly one-fifth of this was 
held by local authorities, half by the central administration and the 
remaining third by Social Security. Japan stands out in this respect from the 
other major developed countries, notably those of the eurozone and the 
United States, for the size of the reserves held by the public retirement 
pension scheme (equivalent to 25% of GDP in 2010, excluding its claims on 
the government) and for that of its foreign exchange reserves (almost 20% 
of GDP in 2010). This means that Japan’s net public debt is much smaller 
than its gross debt. Even so, at the end of 2010 it was close to 120% of GDP.  
Figure 8. Public debt and financial assets held by Japanese public agents, 
1980-2010 (% of GDP) 
 
* Excluding foreign-exchange reserves. 
Sources: OECD, Bank of Japan and Thomson Datastream. 
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The 1990s shock  
This high level of indebtedness is the result of a continual build-up of 
substantial deficits since the mid-1990s. It is worth recalling the 
mechanisms leading to this result. Initially at least, these were the same as 
can now be seen operating in many developed economies. As in these latter 
economies today, Japanese private agents were heavily indebted at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Between 1980 and 1989, household debt rose from 
90% of their disposable income to almost 140% and that of non-financial 
enterprises from 170% of GDP to over 210%. Taking advantage of abundant 
credit, firms borrowed throughout the 1980s to finance a surfeit of 
investment. Between 1987 and 1990, their investment rose from 19% to 25% 
of GDP. The return on this investment turned out to be low, owing to 
inappropriate sectoral allocation: the share of purchases of building land, 
by real estate promoters but also by small firms, rose from 10% to 30% 
during the 1980s.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, with both households and firms 
heavily in debt, the bursting of the real-estate and stock-market bubbles 
was inevitably accompanied by a rise in their savings propensities. 
Households’ financing capacity in fact rose briefly, from 9% of GDP in 1989 
to 11% in 1991 (Figure 9). Despite a continued high level of debt, it then fell 
back, but only gradually, with the ageing of the population becoming a 
long-term downward influence on the household savings ratio. 
Households reduced their debt, but only slowly, so that at the end of 2010, 
as a proportion of income, it was barely back to its admittedly high level of 
the end of the 1980s. The abrupt rise in Japanese private agents’ financing 
capacity in the early 1990s is therefore essentially due to the behaviour of 
the non-financial enterprises: between 1991 and 1993, their financing 
requirement declined by more than 9 GDP points. The shock was violent. 
In order to underpin activity, it was the government that then had to 
borrow instead of firms. The budget balance accordingly continued to 
deteriorate constantly between 1992 and 1996, from a surplus of 0.8% of 
GDP to a deficit of 5%.  
The effort to consolidate public finances launched in 1997 turned out 
to be short-lived, with the Asian crisis arriving on the scene to deprive 
Japan of the buoyant external demand it would have needed in order to 
compensate for the impact of a restrictive fiscal policy on its domestic 
demand. In 1998, with the economy again plunging into recession, the 
public deficit widened abruptly, reaching 11% of GDP, and, despite a slight 
improvement in 1999, it was to remain around 8% of GDP until 2002. 
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During the following years, the decline in private agents’ savings 
propensity – in reality, that of firms – enabled the government to reduce its 
deficit somewhat – especially as the intensification of international financial 
integration was facilitating the absorption by the rest of the world of part of 
the excess private savings. Having been close to 2% of GDP in 2001, Japan’s 
current-account surplus rose to 5% in 2007, on the eve of the financial crisis. 
As in most of the other developed economies, the 2007-09 shock brought 
about an abrupt fall in private agents’ spending propensity and forced the 
government to respond with a further deterioration of its budget balance. 
At the end of 2011, the public deficit was again approaching 10% of GDP. 
Figure 9. Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) by sector*, 1980-2010 (% of GDP) 
 
* The statistical error has been added to firms’ financing balance (and is therefore 
also included in the private sector). 
Sources: Bank of Japan and Thomson Datastream. 
Public debt in the hands of residents 
This review of the sequence of events explaining the deterioration in 
Japanese public finances illustrates the risks faced by economies that are 
today in a similar situation to that of Japan in the early 1990s. It also 
highlights one particularity, namely Japan’s excess of private savings. Since 
the mid-1990s, the financing capacity of Japan’s private sector has oscillated 
between 5 and 10 GDP points, and has even reached 12 GDP points since 
2009, one of the highest levels for any developed country. With the 
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the hands of residents at the beginning of 2011. For the most part, it was 
held by a financial system whose practices were relatively stable and 
‘controllable’. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) held slightly less than one-tenth of 
this amount. If one adds the bonds held by the Japan Post Bank and the 
Fiscal Loan Fund – a public investment fund created to replace the Trust 
Fund Bureau – roughly half of the government debt was in the hands of 
public institutions (Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Purchases and holding of Japanese central government bonds 
(% of GDP) 
 
* The stock of public securities held by the Japan Post Bank includes both the 
securities held by the Japan Post Bank and those held by Japan Post Insurance. 
Source: Bank of Japan. 
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deregulation that took place during the 1980s failed to produce any 
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savings therefore constitutes a virtually ‘captive’ source of finance for the 
Japanese government.  
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It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this ‘captivity’ as 
meaning a crowding-out by the government of other possible borrowers. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it is only the accumulation of public debt 
that has enabled households’ financial wealth to continue to increase 
(Figure 11). Failing this, Japanese economic activity would have had to 
contract to the point at which, with private agents’ income diminishing, 
their financing capacity had declined to match the financing requirement of 
the rest of the world (in other words, the Japanese current-account 
surplus). 
Figure 11. Households’ financial investments and net worth 
 
* In the graph on the left, the risk-free assets comprise deposits (including postal 
savings), life insurance investments and public securities. 
Source: Bank of Japan. 
3.2 A debt dynamic impossible to stem at all rapidly 
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A gradual transformation of public borrowing conditions 
The drying up of the flow of household savings associated with the 
continued ageing of the population and the decline in the size of the labour 
force threatens to complicate the financing of the public deficits. Between 
1990 and 2010, the flow of financial investments by households in fact fell 
from 10% of GDP to less than 3%. This slowdown was reflected in a halt to 
the growth of the balance sheets of the institutions traditionally responsible 
for collecting household savings. Since 2003, almost every year has seen a 
decline in the balance sheet of the Post Bank, in particular. Moreover, 
everything indicates that this tendency will intensify [Horioka et al., 2007].  
The nature of those doing the saving is also undergoing a change, 
with the financing capacity of firms gradually replacing that of households. 
This substitution is being accompanied by a change in the nature of the 
purchasers of the public debt. Since 2009 it is the banks – and not the public 
institutions with which households deposit their savings (Figure 10) – that 
have been taking up virtually the totality of new issues. With the increasing 
financing capacity of firms leading to a contraction in the volume of loans 
outstanding, the banks, and especially the regional banks, have regarded 
the purchase of public securities as a means of pursuing their 
transformation activities. With the government the only agent whose 
outstanding debt has increased, public securities have little by little been 
replacing loans to households and firms in their balance sheets. At the end 
of 2011 the public securities held by the regional banks accordingly 
amounted to almost 15% of their assets. This evolution is liable to reach its 
limits, however, inasmuch as it makes the banks more sensitive to 
variations in the market prices of the public securities and exposes them to 
the possibility of losses that are even greater in that the stocks they buy 
tend to be long-dated [Bank of Japan, 2011]. 
In addition to this change in the agents doing the saving, which is 
leading the banks to hold increasing amounts of public securities, a 
modification – so far very gradual – is taking place in the structure of the 
investment by the institutions that traditionally had been investing in 
public securities, namely the public pension fund and the Post Bank. Prior 
to 2001, the reserves of the public pension fund had to be deposited with 
the Trust Fund Bureau, to be used, like the postal savings, to finance 
priority investment. Following a transition period that ended in 2007, this 
requirement was dropped. And while, until now, the assets of the pension 
fund and the Post Bank are still composed for the most part of public 
securities, the investment structure, notably that of the Fund, has changed 
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over time, with a gradual increase in the share of foreign securities. 
Statements by the managers of these institutions indicate that this tendency 
is set to continue, with the share of financial assets invested in emerging 
countries likely to increase at the expense of Japanese public securities. 
In combination with the drying up of the flow of household savings, 
such a shift, even if only gradual, will modify the pattern of the bond 
market’s equilibrium. The consequences may be all the more significant in 
that the government’s refinancing requirements are considerable. In these 
circumstances, upward pressure on the interest rates on public bonds can 
no longer be ruled out. In order to cope with this possibility and continue 
to borrow at the lowest possible rates, the government could, on the lines of 
what it had done at the end of the 1990s, shorten the maturity of its debt. It 
could, as in 2010, issue fixed-rate bonds but with shorter maturities (three 
years) or, alternatively, as in 2003, develop new products aimed at private 
individuals such as ten-year floating-rate bonds.  
Relieving investors of part of the risk that they do not want to take, or 
are no longer in a position to take, is not the only possibility, however. A 
return to greater ‘financial repression’ is also conceivable. Whereas since 
the mid-1980s, in order to encourage the development of the financial 
markets, the government has made special efforts to lift regulatory bans 
one by one, it could tomorrow reverse the process, for example by limiting 
the tendency to diversification recently launched by the public pension 
fund. Finally, if there were the threat of a sharp rise in bond rates, the Bank 
of Japan could increase its purchases of public securities. One thing is 
certain, in any case: the regional banks cannot, as they have since the 
beginning of the 2010s, continue to absorb the quasi-totality of public issues 
without dangerously weakening their balance sheets.  
Fiscal consolidation posing a risk to growth 
The shock imposed by the financial crisis of the end-2000s thus came at a 
time when the financial environment in which the Japanese government 
was borrowing was very different from those seen at the beginning of the 
1990s. One remark can serve to summarise the situation: if the tendencies 
associated with the ageing of the population persist, households’ financing 
capacity will disappear around the middle of the decade. If nothing is done 
to reduce the budget deficit, the volume of public securities needing to be 
held, for its part, will continue to increase. The Japanese government is in 
fact confronted with a situation that no other developed country has had to 
face until now. In the coming decades, the nominal GDP growth rate could 
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well remain negative at a time when the government’s borrowing rates 
remain positive. This means that, in order simply to stem the rise in the 
public debt ratio, the government, if one takes an average borrowing rate 
130 basis points higher than the nominal growth rate as was the case in 
2011, has to improve its budget balance by around 10 GDP points. In other 
words, the primary deficit of 7.5% of GDP in 2011 would have to be 
replaced by a surplus of roughly 2% in 2016. If the effort is gradual, net 
debt will continue to climb, before stabilising at a high level of close to 
150% of GDP within this time horizon. And if tomorrow the cost of 
borrowing were to rise or nominal activity were to contract more strongly, 
the effort required would be greater still. Remaining for any considerable 
period with such a high level of debt at a time when household wealth will 
be starting to decline and when the role of public agents on the demand 
side of the bond market is also declining would be dangerous. It will not be 
easy, however, to avoid this scenario.  
Alongside efforts to stabilise the burden of its public debt, Japan must 
at the same time prevent its economy from sliding into deflation. At what 
rate can the adjustment in the primary balance be achieved without 
excessively depressing activity? Clearly, the answer depends in the first 
place on the expected evolution in the financing capacity of domestic 
agents (Box 3). As regards households, this evolution could, as we have 
seen, be relatively favourable to a rebalancing of the budget. The ageing of 
the population – by 2020 more than 25% will be aged over 65, compared 
with less than 10% at the beginning of the 1980s – will in fact continue to 
depress the household financial savings ratio (Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Changes in private agents’ net lending (+) or borrowing (-), 1980-2016 
(% of GDP) 
 
Sources: Cabinet Office and authors’ calculations. 
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
1980 1990 2000 2010
Net saving
Net investment
Net purchases of building land
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1980 1990 2000 2010
Net lending (+) or 
borrowing (-)
Net investment
Net saving
Households Non-financial corporations
Net lending (+) or 
borrowing (-)
50  THE TRAP CLOSING ON JAPAN 
At the end of 2014, this ratio would be zero, later turning negative. 
Compared with the 2% positive financing capacity achieved by households 
over the period of the 2000s, this shift will help to underpin growth in 
domestic demand, everything else remaining equal. The evolution in the 
financing capacity of firms is likely to work in the same direction.  
Since the middle of the 2000s, Japanese non-financial firms have each 
year posted net savings of the order of 5% of GDP (Figure 12). Given that 
their net investment was virtually nil, this meant that their financing 
capacity also oscillated around this level. By contrast, the financing 
capacity of financial firms recorded a marked fall, from around 3% of GDP 
in 2000 to 0% in 2010, this being largely explained by a rise in capital 
transfers, linked notably to transfers of pension funds from the private 
sector to the public sector or to transfers of assets from public financial 
firms to the central government. In order to make a projection of firms’ 
total financing requirements, account was taken of the fact that their 
primary income in relation to GDP tended to fluctuate with activity. It was 
then assumed that the rate of tax on these incomes remains stable. Finally, 
it was assumed that their investment was such as to ensure 0.8% annual 
growth of potential GDP between now and 2016.2 On these assumptions, 
the financing capacity of Japanese firms, after rising to around 10% of GDP 
during the financial crisis, would gradually fall back to 6% by the end of 
2016, equivalent to the average level for the 2000s. 
What would be the consequences of a relatively rapid effort – say, 
between now and 2016 – to stabilise the public debt/GDP ratio? Despite the 
favourable nature of the expected evolution in the financing capacities of 
private agents, such an effort would nonetheless imply an appreciable 
improvement in the current account, from 2.2% of GDP in 2011 to 4.5% in 
2016. In a world economy where many other developed countries will 
themselves be seeking to increase the external contribution to their growth, 
such an increase in the Japanese surplus is hard to envisage, except if it 
were to be obtained by a sharp decline in domestic demand. With an 
unchanged exchange rate and adopting the IMF’s September 2011 growth 
assumptions for demand from the rest of the world, GDP should in this 
case fall by 0.8% a year on average until 2016. On the other hand, 
                                                   
2 More precisely, with global factor productivity rising by 0.9% per year – the 
observed average for the period 1991 to 2007 – and with the number of hours 
worked declining by 0.5% per year, the required growth in investment is around 
2% per year. 
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stabilisation at a later date, i.e. 2020 – a target date close to that contained in 
the government’s June 2010 budget consolidation plan [Cabinet Office, 
2010] – would permit higher real growth of close to 1% a year. In that case, 
the implied current-account surplus, instead of increasing, would 
disappear by 2016.  
The fact that this growth would be relatively satisfactory, all things 
considered, is attributable to the dynamism shown by Japan’s trading 
partners. Between 2000 and 2010, the structure of exports has in fact shifted 
in favour of emerging regions with rapidly expanding demand. For 
example, the share of exports going to China rose from 5% to almost 20%, 
while the corresponding proportions for the United States and Europe fell 
from 30% to less than 15% and from 17% to 11%, respectively. If one adds 
in a depreciation of roughly 10% in the real effective exchange rate between 
now and the end of 2015, the attainable growth rate would even approach 
1.4% a year. The dynamic could in fact be a virtuous one. With the 
acceleration in demand combined with the depreciation of the yen 
prompting firms to invest somewhat more, their financing capacity would 
decline more rapidly and growth would be speeded up as a result.  
However, these projections do not take into account the possible 
consequences of the earthquake and nuclear accident that took place in 
March 2011. The study published by the Japan Center for Economic 
Research in June 2011 [JCER, 2011] indicates that these events could 
severely complicate the task of future governments. And even if it were 
possible to restart the quasi-totality of the nuclear power stations, Japan’s 
dependence on fossil fuels is going to increase. This rise in the propensity 
to import will, for a given fiscal tightening and unchanged growth in 
demand on the part of trading partners, weaken its growth. 
Action eternally postponed 
These prospects lead to an initial conclusion: as long as firms achieve a 
substantial financing capacity, putting Japanese public finances back on a 
sustainable path is bound to be very gradual or risk asphyxiating activity. 
This gradualism, it should be noted, was already an underlying principle of 
the government’s June 2010 plan. Not only was the consolidation effort 
envisaged in the plan relatively slow, but provision was made to suspend it 
temporarily in the event of exceptional disturbance, even at the risk of 
delaying the stabilisation of the debt ratio. Japanese net debt is therefore set 
to continue to climb until around the end of the decade and substantially 
exceed 150% of GDP. The financing of this additional public debt will still 
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not necessarily involve the crowding out of other borrowers. If the 
government has to continue to borrow, this is precisely because there are 
not sufficient borrowers ready to take its place. Upward pressure on bond 
rates cannot be excluded, even so. If at some time in the future the savers or 
the collectors of savings lose confidence in the government’s capacity to 
keep its debt situation under control, they may no longer wish to buy 
government issues. 
The trap the Japanese government has to avoid therefore becomes 
clearer. Over the next few years, the requirements of macroeconomic 
management will prompt it to carry out a slow reduction in its budget 
deficit and allow the burden of public debt to continue to rise. Looking 
further ahead, however, it will nevertheless have first to stabilise and later 
reduce the debt burden. From the end of the 2010s, Japanese households’ 
financial wealth will in fact start to decline. Continuing to allow public debt 
to increase would then place the Japanese government in a situation of 
growing vulnerability. Both Japanese firms and the institutions with which 
they place their assets could at some stage prefer to hold claims on the rest 
of the world rather than Japanese public securities. In order to prevent this 
risk, the government will have to reduce its borrowing just when 
households’ financial wealth will also be declining. A very simple 
mechanical calculation, taking into account only the effect of population 
ageing on households’ financial savings ratio, indicates a decline in their 
financial wealth of roughly 120 GDP points by 2060. The government will 
then not only have to rebalance its budget but also maintain a lasting 
primary surplus sufficient to reduce the debt/GDP ratio. This surplus will 
have to be all the greater, it should be noted, the more substantial the 
difference between the interest rate at which the government borrows and 
the nominal economic growth rate. 
 For the purpose of clarification, if the difference seen today were to 
remain unchanged, a primary surplus of more than 4 GDP points would 
have to be maintained through to 2060, if the net debt is to fall at that date 
to 40% of GDP (Figure 13). Starting from a primary deficit of close to 10 
GDP points seen at the beginning of 2010, achieving in practice such an 
improvement in the budget balance – and then maintaining this surplus for 
several decades – is no easy matter (even if a significant part of the initial 
deficit was cyclical in nature). This gives an idea of the amount that the 
Japanese government will have to levy on future generations if it wants to 
meet its commitments to those who were yesterday’s savers. 
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Figure 13. The dynamics of public debt 
 
Note: i is the average nominal interest rate paid (%), p is the primary balance as % 
of GDP and g is the nominal growth rate of the economy (%). 
Sources: Thomson Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
3.3 An increasingly daunting challenge 
At some time in the next few years, the Japanese government is going to 
have to take a stand on a political question to which it has so far failed to 
give an answer: how in practice will the adjustment of the primary balance 
needed to stem and then reverse the tendency in public debt be 
implemented? What expenditure will be reduced, what taxes will be raised 
to achieve in the future the transfer of resources implied by the repayment 
of at least part of the debt already built up ? The problem of 
intergenerational equity this poses is a complex one and the forces at work 
could lead to a calling into question of the Japanese ‘social model’, notably 
its healthcare and pension systems, long regarded as particularly 
egalitarian (Box 4). 
The past evolutions in budgetary revenue and expenditure give a 
first idea of the choices made so far: revenue as a share of GDP has 
remained stable since the early 1990s, while expenditure has constantly 
increased. The evolution of the budget balance broken down into main 
functions gives a more precise picture of these choices (Figure 14). Since the 
beginning of the 1980s, the public deficit has been due mainly to the 
deterioration in the social accounts (pensions and healthcare). The 
remainder of the budget – comprising ‘regalian’ functions such as defence, 
law and order, etc., but also education – has been close to equilibrium. Net 
interest payments have, so far at least, played only a marginal role.  
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Figure 14. Formation of budget balance (% of GDP) 
 
Sources: OECD and Cabinet Office. 
Since the mid-1990s, with the ageing of the population, social 
benefits, pushed upward by a rapid rise in healthcare spending and 
pensions, have risen distinctly more rapidly than the contributions 
provided by either employers or employees, the result being a steady 
deterioration in the equilibrium of the social accounts (Figure 14). Faced 
with the problem posed to the budget by the population ageing, Japan is 
nevertheless currently better placed than the average of the other 
developed countries. Admittedly, in the coming years the proportion of the 
population aged over 65 is set to continue to climb, but at a distinctly 
slower rate than that seen since 1995. To judge by various available studies, 
the bulk of the rise in social spending as a proportion of GDP now seems to 
be over. However, it would be an illusion to hope that it might be reduced. 
Even if the nominal growth in healthcare spending could be limited to 1-
1.5% per year over a decade – it was 3% a year over the past three years – 
this would cut spending as a share of GDP, assuming rapid nominal 
growth of 2% a year, by 1 point at best [IMF, 2010]. 
Box 4. Social benefits central to the rise in Japanese public spending 
According to the OECD, the Japanese health system is one of the world’s 
best performers, in terms of access to healthcare (it is one of the most 
egalitarian), of cost (private and public spending together amount to only 
8.5% of GDP, compared with the OECD average of 9.5%) and of 
effectiveness (the Japanese population’s state of health is one of the best in 
the world). Health insurance is universal (covering the quasi-totality of the 
population), patients are free to choose their doctors and the cost per 
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inhabitant is low in view of the country’s level of development. In 2007, 50% 
of the spending was financed out of social contributions (generally a fixed 
percentage of salary, paid in equal amounts by employers and employees), 
37% by the government (25% by central government and 12% by local 
authorities) and 14% by a co-payment from patients [NIPSSR, 2011]. 
Furthermore, competition between insurers is forbidden (insurers normally 
offer the same services at the same price), as also is profit-making. Over the 
past three decades, growth in healthcare spending has therefore been fairly 
small, rising as a share of GDP by barely 2 points compared with more than 
7 points in the United States, and this at a time when the ageing of the 
population was much faster in Japan. In the coming years, growth in public 
healthcare spending could remain limited. According to the IMF [2011], it 
should rise by 1 GDP point between now and 2030, compared with more 
than 5 points in the United States. Other studies are more cautious, 
expecting a somewhat faster growth in healthcare costs. 
The Japanese healthcare system is far from problem-free, however. 
There are increasing shortages of specialists and substantial delays in the 
marketing of new drugs. Above all, the upward drift in healthcare spending 
poses a problem of intergenerational equity. If Japan wants to keep benefits 
at their present level despite the population ageing, contributions, 
particularly those levied on the younger generations, are going to have to 
increase. A calculation made by the Japanese government in 2005 already 
showed a total net gain (meaning that benefits received over a lifetime 
exceeded contributions) for the generations born before 1943 of the order of 
¥48,750,000 per household ($640,000 at the mid-2011 exchange rate), but a 
net loss for the generations born after 1983 of the order of ¥45,850,000 
($600,000). The increase at the end of the 2000s in the co-payments due from 
the oldest age group was partly aimed at correcting intergenerational 
inequalities.  
Population ageing poses a similar problem for the retirement pension 
system. Here again, Japan’s system is fairly redistributive. It is universal and 
comprises a basic regime (National Pension, NP) giving entitlement to a 
fixed sum, combined with a complementary public system giving 
entitlement to an additional income based on past salary (Employee’s 
Pension Insurance, EPI). The replacement rate is lower than in other OECD 
countries, but the coverage is broad and the security for the lower-income 
households is greater. In order to cope with the increase in costs due to 
population ageing, Japan reformed its system in 2004. Contribution rates 
were raised – the monthly contribution to the basic system is due to rise 
from ¥13,300 in 2004 to ¥16,900 in 2017 (expressed in constant 2004 yen) and 
the contribution to the EPI will rise gradually over the same period from 
56  THE TRAP CLOSING ON JAPAN 
13.6% to 18.3%, with the replacement rates reduced. For an average 
household, this rate will be gradually reduced from 59.3% in 2004 to 50% in 
2023. This reform should enable the government to draw only gradually on 
its reserves, as these are theoretically sufficient to maintain pension 
spending in balance for the next hundred years! [Horioka et al., 2007] This 
rise in contribution rates means that the cost for the central budget between 
2010 and 2030 will be nil, compared with a developed-country average 
exceeding one GDP point [IMF, 2011].  
However, the erosion of public confidence in the system could at some 
stage threaten its financial equilibrium. In August 2008, only 20% of those 
questioned said they had confidence in the system (for comparison, the 
corresponding figures for Denmark and Finland were 74% and 66%, 
respectively). Young people, in particular, are contributing less and less, 
either because they do not think they can meet the minimum conditions of 
25 years of contributions to the basic system or because they regard the 
system as too expensive. As a result, half the workers aged less than 35 no 
longer pay their contributions, despite the fact that this is in principle 
compulsory. In 2009 the ratio between pension contributions collected and 
the amount expected was only 60% [NIPSSR, 2011]. Unlike the social 
contributions of full-time workers, those of the self-employed, farmers, part-
time workers and the unemployed are not in fact automatically deducted 
from wages and salaries and with the financial sanctions in the event of non-
payment – loss of rights excepted – not dissuasive, non-salaried workers 
increasingly frequently fail to pay their pension contributions [Suzuki & 
Zhou, 2010]. Moreover, with the rise in the number of temporary contracts – 
46% of young people aged between 15 and 24 in 2010 were in this situation, 
compared with 17% in 1988 – an increasing number of young people are 
often not covered by the EPI system. Here again, a Japanese government 
study has shown that in 2005 there was marked intergenerational inequality, 
with the younger generations contributing more to the system than they can 
expect to get out of it.  
 
Making significant cuts in other areas of public spending would be 
just as difficult. In 2009, net public investment was nil (and the Fukushima 
nuclear accident is likely to push this spending up, at least temporarily), 
education spending was low (at less than 3.5% of GDP in 2008, it was the 
lowest of all the OECD countries) and the remaining budgetary 
expenditure also seemed hard to compress. A 10-year freeze on nominal 
growth in all non-social expenditure would at best reduce the deficit by 2.5 
GDP points [IMF, 2011]. And if education expenditure is excluded, the 
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freeze would reduce the deficit by only 2 GDP points, while excluding 
investment brings the figure to 1.5 points. It will thus be difficult to 
improve the budget balance by some 10 GDP points by curbing public 
expenditure. In the absence of substantial room for manoeuvre on the 
expenditure side, the elimination of the budget deficit is bound to mean an 
increase in revenue. 
Higher tax revenue or the return of inflation? 
Here lies the nub of the problem. Deciding on the modalities of a rise in 
public levies is precisely what successive governments in the 1990s and 
2000s failed to do. To a large extent the transfer of resources that took place 
during these two decades was to the benefit of the older citizens. It was 
they in fact who benefited most from the social spending financed in large 
part by the active labour force and, to an increasing extent, out of 
borrowing. The Japanese electoral system, which leads to an over-
representation of older citizens living outside the large towns, makes it 
extremely difficult to adopt measures aimed at reducing this transfer, 
especially if they tend to increase the tax pressure on this part of the 
electorate [Eichengreen et al., 2011]. 
However, increasing revenue (Figure 15) should be made easier by 
the fact that the burden of taxes in Japan is the lowest of all the major 
developed countries. With taxes equivalent to less than 17% of GDP 
compared with more than 25% of GDP in France and almost 30% in the 
United Kingdom and Italy, Japan is situated far below most of the other G7 
countries. In particular, the VAT rate is extremely low [IMF, 2011]. Even 
after a rise from 3% to 5% in 1997, it remains well below the average 2010 
rate of 18% for the OECD countries that have adopted this form of tax. 
Moreover, the IMF stresses that, because of the ageing of the population, 
the tax base can be expected to grow more rapidly for VAT than for taxes 
based on earned income [IMF, 2011]. In addition, raising the VAT rate 
would somewhat reduce intergenerational inequalities, as the burden 
would be spread over the whole of the population, both inside and outside 
the active labour force. A progressive rise from 5% to 15% would bring in, 
everything else remaining unchanged, around 5 GDP points, which would 
be a significant proportion of the needed budgetary improvement. It 
should be noted, however, that such a measure remains highly unpopular, 
as demonstrated by the strong reactions from politicians and the 
population when at the end of 2011 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 
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proposed a gradual rise in the rate of consumption tax from 5% to 10% 
between now and 2015.  
Figure 15. Budgetary expenditure and revenue (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Cabinet Office. 
Another measure that might be considered is an increase in 
corporation tax. Firms, as we have seen, are today the principal source of 
the savings surplus. However, room for manoeuvre in this respect is 
limited. With a tax rate of close to 40% and a total levy of the order of 4 
GDP points (prior to the drop related to the 2007-09 financial crisis), 
Japanese firms already pay more taxes than firms in most of the other 
OECD countries. An increase would certainly meet strong resistance from 
firms, whose representatives traditionally maintain close relations with the 
political parties. The obvious final possibility is to increase social 
contributions, whose relative stability is at the origin of the widening of the 
public deficit. A rise in employers’ contributions, inasmuch as it would eat 
into corporate profits, would meet opposition similar to that towards a rise 
in taxes. On the other hand, a rise affecting only employees’ contributions 
would merely aggravate the existing problem of intergenerational inequity 
and intensify still further the phenomenon of attempts to evade paying 
social contributions seen for several years now (Box 4). Such a rise would 
have to affect pensioners as well, so that they too would contribute to the 
efforts made by the government, in part to preserve the purchasing power 
of their savings. 
The fiscal consolidation needed in the coming decades if the Japanese 
government is going to be able to meet its debt commitments is not 
impossible, but the effort implied has become considerable. For lack of 
political agreement, the public deficit threatens to persist at the very time 
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when households, probably as soon as the end of this decade, will be 
starting to dis-save. In that event, domestic demand would rise faster than 
potential production and the long period of deflation that Japan has 
experienced since the beginning of the 1990s would come to an end. 
Admittedly, its foreign exchange reserves should enable it for a time to 
finance a possible current-account deficit. Fairly rapidly, however, 
inflationary pressure would be bound to emerge, in which case the 
Japanese government, rather than meeting its debts, would allow their 
value to be eroded. Clearly, it could not do this without the collaboration of 
the Bank of Japan, which, by maintaining an accommodating stance or even 
by purchasing public securities, would prevent any crowding-out 
mechanism via interest rates from coming into play. The problem is that 
the mere anticipation of such an evolution could fairly rapidly lead those 
who currently are holders of Japanese bonds to look for more remunerative 
investments elsewhere. 
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4. THE AMERICAN GAMBLE 
he American public finance situation differs from that of Japan in 
many respects. In particular, it is difficult to say that public 
borrowing in this case played the role of ‘flywheel’ making it 
possible to store up domestic savings. For more than 20 years, the United 
States has been a massive importer of savings from the rest of the world. 
And yet, as in Japan, for a decade or more the maintenance of a substantial 
public deficit has played a key role in underpinning economic activity. 
Admittedly, the measures taken in the past decade have still been far from 
strictly Keynesian: the aim of the tax cuts introduced by George W. Bush in 
2001 was not to boost expenditure, but to stimulate supply. Even so, this 
fiscal stance was decisive in helping the economy to absorb a succession of 
severely recessive shocks, from the bursting of the stock market bubble in 
2000 to the financial crisis of 2007-09. The accumulation of budget deficits 
that resulted has had huge consequences: the debt/GDP ratio at the 
beginning of the 2010s was the highest ever, apart from the war years 
(Figure 16).  
Faced with this spectacular deterioration, the ‘benign neglect’ shown 
so far by the United States may seem surprising. In the immediate 
aftermath of the latest financial crisis, the government clearly gave priority 
to a return to growth over a reduction in the public deficit: at the end of 
2011, the latter, at close to 9% of GDP, was almost as high as it was in 2009. 
The reasoning underlying this American strategy is fairly simple: 
tightening the fiscal screw before growth has picked up, at a time when 
monetary policy is impotent, would be suicidal; however, once the upturn 
is assured, the deficit can and must be reduced. The gamble taken is that 
doubts will not surface too soon in the meantime regarding the 
sustainability of US public debt. For the gamble to come off, growth must 
pick up before a new shock arrives to disturb it. At the same time, a 
credible political agreement has to be reached that sets out how public 
borrowing will gradually be put back on a sustainable path. The fact is that, 
T
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even before this episode, the budget balance was already seriously 
threatened by the prospect of distinctly more rapid growth in spending 
than in revenues, notably under the impact of the evolution in healthcare 
costs. 
Figure 16. Federal government debt and budget balance (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
4.1 A decade of widening public deficits  
At the end of 2011, American gross public debt was close to 95% of GDP 
(78% for the federal government and 16% for states and local government), 
compared with 55% in 2001, implying almost a doubling in just 10 years. 
Net debt posted a similar evolution, also doubling between 2001 and 2011, 
from 35% to more than 70% of GDP. This tendency, much the same as that 
seen in other OECD countries, mainly reflects that of the federal 
government debt: despite the difficulties encountered by states and local 
government, their gross debt rose by barely 4 GDP points between 2001 
and 2011. In fact, only a handful of states – California in particular – had 
recourse to the issuance of short-term debt in order to finance current 
expenditure, most of the others being prohibited from doing so by law. In 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, in order to compensate for the states’ 
and local governments’ lost tax revenues and to avoid their having to 
introduce excessively tight policies, the federal government as early as 2009 
made massive transfers in their favour as part of its stimulus package – the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. These transfers covered 
roughly one-third of the states’ current financing needs in 2009 and 2010 
and also enabled them to finance infrastructure expenditure. 
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The deterioration in the federal finances was by no means the 
consequence only of the 2007-09 financial crisis, however. Between the 
beginning and the middle of the 2000s, the ratio of government revenue to 
GDP, adjusted for the cycle, fell by three points, while that of its 
expenditure rose by one point (Figure 17). Over this period, the structural 
primary budget balance slipped from a surplus of 3% of GDP to a deficit of 
1.5%, making a deterioration of more than 4 points, much the same as that 
seen in the second half of the 2000s. Seen in a longer-term perspective, 
therefore, the accumulation of deficits has been continuous since the 
beginning of the 2000s. How could this have come about?  
Figure 17. Federal government’s structural budget balance, 1999-2011 
(% of potential GDP) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Fuzzy fiscal discipline 
The ‘windfall revenues’ due to the firm growth of the latter 1990s were also 
at the heart of the 2000 electoral debate. Whereas Vice President Al Gore 
wanted to lock these surpluses away in order to be able to help meet future 
pension requirements, George W. Bush, for his part, wanted to “give 
people their money back” in the form of tax cuts, as duly took place 
following his inauguration and the adoption, as early as June 2001, of the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, and later in May 2003 
of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. These two 
programmes could not have been voted through, however, but for the 
expiration of the budget rules introduced in the second half of the 1980s.  
Persistent high public deficits in the early part of the decade had in 
fact prompted the legislators in 1985 to pass a law known as the Gramm-
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Rudman-Hollings Act, which imposed year-by-year reductions in the 
deficit and a return to equilibrium in 1991. In the event of failure to observe 
the ceilings set, automatic cuts were to be imposed on most programmes. In 
order to circumvent this automaticity, the President and the Congress 
rapidly became highly ‘creative’, however, positing growth assumptions 
that were so favourable that it was easy – on paper – to reach the objectives 
set [Reischauer, 1993]. Not only were these objectives never actually 
attained – at 3.9% of GDP, the deficit posted in 1990 substantially overshot 
the initial target of 0.6% – but the deficit barely declined over the second 
half of the 1980s. The approach contained in the 1990 Budget Enforcement 
Act was less ambitious but more effective, the objective being not so much 
to reduce the deficit as to impose on the President and the Congress the 
systematic respect of the budget on which they had agreed. By setting a cap 
on discretionary expenditure and introducing a ‘pay-as-you-go’ rule, 
requiring that any measure that increased the cost of social programmes or 
reduced taxes had to be ‘deficit-neutral’, in other words financed ex ante by 
a reduction in other expenditure or a rise in other taxes, the Budget 
Enforcement Act, combined with a robust political will to reduce the 
deficits,3 permitted a return to budgetary equilibrium in 1998. Thanks to 
the exceptional economic conditions of the late 1990s, the Budget was even 
in surplus by more than 2% of GDP in 2000. The voting of the promised tax 
cuts and the expiration in 2002 of the rules set out in the Budget 
Enforcement Act, as well as the rise in defence spending linked to the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, would soon rapidly reverse the 
tendency (Figure 16).  
By underpinning domestic demand at a time when a succession of 
shocks (stock market slump, the attacks of 9/11, rise in the oil price, etc.) 
each posed a threat to activity, the fiscal policy decisions taken at the 
beginning of the 2000s had an appreciable positive effect on the economic 
situation. Even though, in part, they had been intended not to stimulate 
expenditure but to encourage saving by households, the tax cuts – like the 
rise in defence spending – helped to prevent the start of a deflationary 
spiral. On the other hand, the impact on the budget balance was 
substantial. Despite a return to growth of better than 3%, the federal deficit 
                                                   
3 In summer 1990, President George H. Bush finally accepted the principle of a tax 
rise that he had rejected during his electoral campaign and in 1993 President Bill 
Clinton succeeded in putting through by a small majority a rise in the marginal tax 
rates on the highest incomes. 
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declined by only one-and-a-half GDP points between 2003 and 2006, partly 
because of the lost revenue resulting from the tax cuts. While, thanks to the 
recovery, the debt/GDP ratio rose relatively little, the size of the structural 
deficit was making the American budget particularly vulnerable to a 
slowdown in growth and, a fortiori, to a contraction in activity. On the basis 
of cyclically-adjusted data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it 
can be estimated that half the rise of some 30 GDP points in debt between 
2008 and 2011 was due to the stimulus packages introduced in 2008 
(Emergency Economic Stabilization Act) and then in 2009 with the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, but half was also due to the 
severe recession in 2007 and the ensuing slackness of growth. 
In September 2011, two years after the start of the upturn, activity in 
fact remained distinctly more depressed than in a ‘normal’ cycle, with GDP 
around 7 points lower than indicated by the median of the post-war 
recoveries. This should not come as much of a surprise. Typically, upturns 
in the American economy are driven initially by residential investment and 
consumption of durable goods, with corporate investment in productive 
capital following after a time-lag normally exceeding one year. By 
stimulating the sectors most sensitive to interest rates – residential 
investment and consumption – the easing of monetary policy normally 
contributes to re-boosting growth. However, a high stock of unsold 
housing, substantial household indebtedness and falling real estate prices, 
among other things, deprived the 2009 upturn of its usual driving forces: 
following a sharp contraction, residential investment had still not picked 
up again at the beginning of 2012. Without the support of the budgetary 
stabilisation plans but also of the exceptional contribution of demand from 
the rest of the world, there is no doubt that the economic recovery would 
have been more sluggish still. The slackness of the recovery explains at the 
same time that of job creation. Unlike the ‘jobless recovery’ of 2003-04, the 
2009 upturn was in the first place an upturn (almost) without growth! 
The United States therefore entered the decade of the 2010s with a 
high unemployment rate and a badly misshapen social pyramid: at almost 
14%, the poverty rate4 for the 18-64 age group was the highest since 1966 
(when the series began) and the proportion of those living below half the 
poverty threshold had just reached the record level of 6.7%. At the same 
                                                   
4 The poverty threshold for a four-person family unit was $22,314 in 2010 ($11,139 
for one individual). 
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time, the deterioration in public finances was manifest, with a deficit of 
close to 10% (including those of states and local government) and 
substantial debt. At the end of 2011, the most frequently used indicator – 
the federal debt held by the public – stood at 68% of GDP. And even this 
did not take into account the off-balance-sheet commitments of the federal 
government, which had since September 2008 taken into conservatorship 
the two large mortgage securitisation agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac). The situation is all the more worrying in that households are deeply 
in debt, the upturn is fragile and potential growth is probably lastingly 
weaker than at the end of the 1990s.  
4.2 A slow return to budget equilibrium  
Nonetheless, the projections made in March 2011 by the CBO could be seen 
as reassuring. Assuming no change in legislation, the CBO at that time was 
expecting a gradual reduction in the public deficit by 2015, followed by its 
maintenance at around 3% until 2021. Better still, including the effects of 
the agreement reached in August 2011 in connection with the raising of the 
debt ceiling [CBO, 2011a], the deficit would fall to 1% as early as 2015 
(Figure 18). The Budget Control Act passed at that time in fact provided for 
the introduction of a cap on discretionary spending that was intended to 
provide economies amounting to $900 billion over the next 10 years, with, 
as necessary, automatic spending cuts for a total of $1,200 billion by 2021, 
in the discretionary spending or the social programmes – with the 
exception of Social Security (the public retirement pension system) and 
Medicaid (the health insurance programme for the most disadvantaged). 
On these assumptions, and adopting the CBO’s view that the average 
borrowing rate would rise only gradually to the nominal growth rate, the 
federal debt/GDP ratio would rise from 68% to 73% in 2013 before falling 
back towards 60% in 2021 (Figure 18).  
These results obtained by the CBO are not a forecast, however, but 
the outcome of a projection exercise. It is in fact unlikely that, in accordance 
with the CBO’s assumption, the threshold for the alternative minimum tax 
(AMT5) will fall back abruptly in 2012 to its 2001 level and then not be 
                                                   
5 Introduced at the end of the 1960s, this ‘alternative’ system for the taxation of 
income was intended to prevent taxpayers benefiting from various deductions, tax 
credits and tax loopholes from paying too little tax in relation to their actual 
incomes. Initially seen as a supplementary tax, it was transformed in 1982 under 
President Ronald Reagan into a parallel taxation system. Taxpayers today declare 
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regularly adjusted for inflation, leading to a passive rise in tax pressure. 
Between 2011 and 2021, the regular adjustment of the AMT threshold 
would add roughly 0.4 of a GDP point to the annual deficits. Above all, 
there is no guarantee that the ‘Bush tax cuts’ will in fact expire at the end of 
2012. These cuts have already been prolonged for two years at the end of 
2010 and the Republicans would like to make them permanent. Even 
supposing that the 2011 Budget Control Act is applied to the letter, this 
prolongation, in combination with the inflation-adjustment of the AMT 
threshold, would already place debt on a more worrying trajectory, 
bringing it above 80% of GDP at the end of 2021.  
Figure 18. Federal government’s deficit and debt: CBO projections, 2011-21 
(% of GDP) 
 
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and authors’ calculations. 
Also, it is worth recalling the CBO’s growth assumptions, namely 
that over 2013-16 growth returns to a firm rate of 3.6% per year that enables 
the unemployment rate to fall back to 5.3% in 2016. Admittedly, these 
forecasts were more cautious than those of the White House (Office of 
Management and Budget), but they were still optimistic. Counting on a 
                                                                                                                                 
under both systems, the basic and the alternative, paying whichever results in the 
greater liability. In order to protect the least-well-off, an exemption threshold has 
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lasting acceleration in growth as early as in the middle of this decade was 
all the more audacious in that the attempts to reduce the public deficit 
would in all likelihood place a significant curb on activity. In order to attain 
the objectives in the CBO’s scenario and bring the debt/GDP ratio back to 
around 60% by 2021, the primary deficit has to be reduced by slightly more 
than 7 GDP points. Such an improvement would not be unprecedented; in 
the 1990s, the primary balance improved by 6 GDP points from a deficit of 
1% of GDP to a surplus of 5%, but this improvement was helped by the 
firm growth posted towards the end of the 1990s. The improvement 
expected this time by the CBO – assuming unchanged legislation – has to 
be achieved by 2014, in other words twice as fast, and will involve 
substantial restriction that is bound to hold back growth.  
Re-balancing the budget 
It is therefore essential to estimate the rate at which the adjustment in the 
primary balance can take place without excessively depressing activity. The 
answer will obviously depend partly on the nature of the measures taken, 
but it will also depend on the expected evolution in the financing capacity 
of American private agents. In the case of households, there is little chance 
that this evolution will be favourable to growth; the need for them to cut 
back their excessive debt is likely to keep their financial savings ratio close 
to 3% of GDP in 2016 (Figure 19). Their net borrowing is likely to remain 
low – barely 1.5% of their income in 2016 – in order to permit their debt 
service, which had reached 14% of their income in mid-2007, to stabilise at 
around 11%. Firms, meanwhile, are in a much better financial situation. In 
2011 their net interest payments were equivalent to 5% of operating 
income, the lowest level seen in the mid-1960s, while at the same time, 
whereas they normally post a financing requirement, at the end of 2011 
they still had a positive financing capacity of almost 4% of GDP. Assuming 
that their investment is at the level needed to ensure annual potential GDP 
growth of close to 2.5% between now and 2016 and taking into account the 
persistent high proportion of profits to GDP, their financing capacity, like 
that of households, is likely to decline only marginally in the coming years, 
to slightly below 2% of GDP at the end of 2016 (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19. Financing capacities and requirements by sector, 1952-2016 
(% of GDP) 
 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve and authors’ calculations. 
This being said, what would be the consequences of a relatively rapid 
stabilisation – say, by 2016 – of the public debt/GDP ratio? Still keeping the 
CBO’s assumption of a progressive convergence between the average cost 
of borrowing and the nominal growth rate, consolidation at this rate 
implies that the public deficit falls back to around 3.5% of GDP. Taking 
account of the expected evolution in private agents’ financing capacities, 
and assuming them to be unaffected by the fiscal measures, this 
improvement in the public deficit implies a return to equilibrium on current 
account in 2016. The growth in domestic demand compatible with such an 
evolution will in turn depend on demand from the rest of the world and on 
the dollar’s real effective exchange rate. Adopting the IMF’s September 
2011 projections for growth in the United States’ trading partners, the 
elimination of the current-account deficit can only be achieved, at an 
unchanged real exchange rate for the dollar, at the price of relatively weak 
growth in domestic demand. GDP could hence only grow by slightly more 
than 2% a year, while at the end of 2016 the unemployment rate would be 
only just below 8% – and well above the 5.3% expected by the CBO. A fall 
in the dollar could ease the constraint hampering American growth. A 
depreciation of around 15% in the dollar’s real effective exchange rate 
would permit GDP growth in excess of 3% a year until 2016, while the 
unemployment rate could fall back to 6.4%. These calculations are 
enlightening: as long as households and firms post a substantial financing 
capacity, putting American public finances back on a sustainable path with 
an unchanged dollar exchange rate is bound to be very gradual – except at 
the risk of keeping unemployment durably high.  
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Keeping growth going, if possible 
Allowing the tax cuts to expire at the end of 2012 for only the better-off 
households would be one way of easing the constraint imposed by fiscal 
consolidation. By restraining savings rather than expenditure, it would 
make it possible to reduce the public deficit at the expense of households’ 
financing capacity. Since the beginning of the 1990s, income inequality has 
in fact risen sharply: at the end of 2007 the share of the upper quintile in 
pre-tax income was 56% and that of the top percentile was over 19%, i.e. as 
much as the entire fourth quintile! This deformation has meant a 
spectacular rise in the share of income tax paid by the wealthiest: at the end 
of 2007 it was 86% in the case of the upper quintile, compared with 65% in 
1979, and that of the highest-income 5% (those who earned over $140,000 in 
2007) was 61% (Figure 20). In these conditions, the cost to the budget of a 
partial prolongation of the Bush tax cuts in favour of the least-well-off 
households would therefore be relatively modest. Whereas an across-the-
board ending of the tax cuts would mean a lasting increase in tax revenue 
amounting to 1.4 GDP points, application to only the upper quintile would 
increase it by 1.1 GDP points and to only the richest 5% an increase of 0.8 of 
a point, at the same time probably having little impact on activity. The fall 
in the dollar needed for the maintenance of firm growth would be reduced 
accordingly. 
Figure 20. Income inequality between households, 1979-2007 (%) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Increasing the rate of taxation on corporate profits could also permit a 
reduction in the budget deficit without excessively curbing growth. Since 
the beginning of the 1950s, the apparent rate of corporation tax has fallen 
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from 50% to 20%. Admittedly, part of this fall is due to a rise in the 
proportion of so-called ‘S corporations’, which are not liable to this tax, 
their shareholders being taxed individually (regardless of whether profits 
are distributed or not). Having been very small prior to the 1986 tax reform, 
the share of these corporations in total profits was 30% in 2008. Adjusting 
the apparent rate of corporation tax for this evolution puts the observed fall 
in a slightly different perspective (Figure 21) but does not eliminate it. Such 
falls are in fact common to most of the developed countries. Markle & 
Shackelford [2010], on the basis of company data, show that the effective 
rate of taxation on companies fell by around 10 points in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom and by 5 points in the United States. Raising the 
rate of corporate tax or eliminating certain concessions – these cost the 
budget some $100 billion annually [Kocieniewski, 2011] – could contribute, 
temporarily at least, to restoring budget equilibrium without having too 
great an impact on activity.  
Like those in other countries, American firms are today making 
substantial profits which the slackness of demand discourages them from 
investing in their totality. At the end of 2011, financial assets accumulated 
in liquid form by non-financial firms alone exceeded 14% of GDP ($2,000 
billion), twice the amount seen at the beginning of the 1990s. Admittedly, 
corporation tax is not a large revenue earner, bringing in only 1.2% of GDP 
in 2011 (Figure 21). An increase in the effective rate from 24% in 2007, prior 
to the financial crisis, to the standard rate of 35% would still increase 
revenue by between 0.5 and 1 GDP point.  
Figure 21. Corporate income tax and budget revenue 
 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Internal Revenue Service. 
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Arithmetically, a return to balance in the American budget by the end 
of the decade, at the latest, is far from impossible. The expiration of the 
Bush tax cuts for only the better-off households, combined with a reduction 
in the burden of defence expenditure6 would be almost sufficient, assuming 
no other change in budget legislation, to bring the deficit back to 2% as 
early as 2014. However, this evolution would not enable the United States 
to reach its other objective, namely to reduce unemployment substantially 
over the same time horizon. A trajectory more compatible with this 
objective would consist, in a favourable international environment and 
with a decline of roughly 10% in the dollar’s real exchange rate, of bringing 
the deficit down to around 3.5% in the middle of the decade and then to 2% 
by 2021. After rising to 80%, the debt/GDP ratio would then fall back to 
75% in 2021.  
However, seen from the standpoint of early 2012, the political process 
by which the federal budget would be placed – and kept – on this 
reasonnable path is not nearly as clear. The stalemate seen in Congress in 
the summer of 2011, due mainly to the intransigence of Tea Party 
Republicans towards any rise in tax rates, was a clear illustration of this. 
This political paralysis, which led to the loss of the United States’ AAA 
status with Standard and Poor’s, is all the more damaging in that it also 
makes it impossible to say how the key budgetary problem of the following 
decade, namely the financing of social programmes, will be resolved. And 
the fact is that, the sooner the United States is able to say how it intends to 
reform these programmes in order to deal with the problem, the more time 
it will have at its disposal during this decade to put the public debt back on 
a sustainable path.  
4.3 A calculated risk?  
The evolution in the composition of budgetary spending over recent 
decades gives a first impression of the tendencies at work and of the 
questions on which the Administration and Congress are going to have to 
reach a decision. With the creation in the mid-1960s of the public healthcare 
programmes (Medicare for those aged over 65 and Medicaid for the most 
                                                   
6 In 2010, the CBO estimated that bringing down from 215,000 the total number of 
military personnel deployed (essentially in Iraq and Afghanistan) to 45,000 in 2015 
would bring savings of $1,100 billion over the period 2012-21 (0.7% of GDP per 
year). 
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disadvantaged), the share of social programmes in the budget increased 
rapidly, from less than 5% of GDP in 1965 to almost 10% in 1975. The 
relative stability seen between the mid-1970s and 2000 masks a constant 
rise in the share of the budget devoted to Medicare and Medicaid. This 
increase has accelerated in the past 10 years or so (Figure 22). As a result, 
between 2000 and 2010, healthcare spending as a share of GDP rose by two 
additional points, as much as in the preceding 20 years.  
Figure 22. Evolution in federal government spending (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
The need for reform of social programmes 
The United States is today confronted, like other countries, with the 
problem of reforming the public pension and healthcare systems and this is 
no easier than elsewhere. In the United States, as in most developed 
countries, the ageing of the population gives increased political power to 
the principal beneficiaries of these programmes. Aware of the problem, 
Tip O’Neill, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, had as 
early as the 1980s commented, in referring to Social Security, “touch it and 
you die”. The reform of the health insurance system signed by President 
Obama in March 2010 gave an example of the political energy consumed in 
negotiating these reforms.  
Others of a similar nature will nevertheless be necessary in order to 
contain the rise in the burden of social programmes or to ensure their 
financing. In its June 2011 long-term projection, the CBO [2011b] 
accordingly predicted a continuous upward tendency in the cost of these 
programmes in the coming decades, notably due to rising healthcare costs. 
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retirement age by the baby-boom generation would increase social security 
benefits to 6.1 GDP points in 2035, a rise of 1.6 points. In particular, under 
the combined impact of the ageing of the population and medical progress, 
the cost of healthcare programmes would increase substantially and 
durably, from 5.6% of GDP in 2011 to almost 7% in 2021 and 9% in 2035. 
The three main social programmes (Social Security, Medicare and 
Medicaid) would account for slightly more than 15% of GDP in 2035, 
compared with 12% in 2021 and 10% today (Figure 23)! 7 
All in all, in the absence of major reform, the upward tendency in 
spending on social programmes will increase the primary budget deficit by 
more than 5 GDP points, of which 3 points in the period between 2021 and 
2035. Entering the next decade with an unbalanced primary budget would 
then be all the more dangerous in that the margins for reducing other 
expenditure headings would have narrowed. In 2021, discretionary 
spending would account for only 5.7% of GDP, compared with 9.0% as 
recently as 2011. It would therefore be necessary to halve this ratio over the 
following 15 years to compensate for the rise in spending on social 
programmes! The prospect of a gradual deterioration in the primary 
budget balance of the order of 2 or 3 GDP points starting in 2021 might at 
first sight seem to be little cause for concern. However, given the burden of 
accumulated debt at this date, the debt dynamic generated could rapidly 
become uncontrollable: with a deficit of ‘only’ 2% of GDP in 2021, the 
federal debt/GDP ratio would already rise from around 75% of GDP in 
2021 to 85% in 2035, and with a deficit of 5% it would soar to 150%. 
The challenge facing the United States can therefore be summarised 
as follows. Far-reaching reform of the social programmes is needed in 
order to eliminate, either by reductions in expenditure or increases in 
financing, the disequilibrium that will keep growing after 2020. It would 
                                                   
7 Moreover, spending commitments of a social nature by state and local 
governments are also substantial and their pension fund reserves are insufficient. 
Some observers believe that the under-capitalisation amounts to $700 billion, 
others that it is even more than $3,000 billion [Lav & McNichol, 2011]. And to these 
amounts there should be added $500 billion relating to healthcare programmes. 
While the problem is severe in certain states, Illinois and California for example, it 
is on average much less serious than these impressive sums might suggest: for the 
state and local governments as a whole, contributions to pension funds account for 
less than 4% of the current budget and bringing them up to 6% would probably be 
sufficient to eliminate the imbalance being evoked [Munnell et al., 2010].  
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nevertheless be unrealistic to think that such reforms could provide 
additional primary resources for the rest of the budget. Common prudence 
hence requires that the United States enter the next decade with, at the very 
minimum, a public deficit below 2% of GDP (i.e. a balanced primary budget). 
Otherwise, increasingly substantial tax rises would be necessary to stabilise 
the debt ratio. The reasonable trajectory outlined above, reconciling decline in 
unemployment and reduction in the deficit, almost brings them to this point.  
Figure 23. Projections of federal government spending and revenue (% of GDP) 
 
Note: The budgetary revenue is projected on the assumption that the Bush tax cuts 
come to an end in 2013 and that the AMT is regularly inflation-adjusted. 
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and authors’ calculations. 
The difficulties involved in this return of American public debt to 
sustainability must nevertheless not be underestimated. Given that the 
return would be gradual, the United States will remain for several years 
vulnerable to forces or to shocks that would restrain growth more than has 
been envisaged so far. This would be the case if the international 
environment were to turn sour. If, for example, there were to be an oil 
shock in the next few years or if growth in the emerging regions were to 
slow down substantially, the American authorities would be faced with 
difficult choices. The same would be true if the needed depreciation of the 
dollar were not to take place. Moreover, with the debt/GDP ratio 
continuing to climb for some years yet, doubts could surface, at one time or 
another, concerning the government’s creditworthiness, and this could 
jeopardise the equilibrium of the entire American bond market. 
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Bond market balance ensured by the outside world – or by the Fed 
The pattern of demand on the Treasury securities market has already 
altered substantially. Whereas between 1995 and 2007 the “rest of the 
world” took up most of the issues, these purchases accounted for only half 
the total between 2008 and 2010 (equivalent, each year, to 5 GDP points) 
before falling back to 2 GDP points in 2011. Since 2008, domestic agents – 
the financial sector in 2008, the household sector in 2009-10 and then the 
Federal Reserve in 2011 – therefore partly took up the running from the rest 
of the world (Figure 24). This change has, so far at least, taken place 
without exerting pressure on the level of interest rates. 
Figure 24. Purchases and holding of Treasury bonds 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
Can this situation persist, however? In a recent study, Celasun & 
Sommer [2010] express their doubts. Highlighting the unlikelihood that 
foreign demand will increase at the same rate as issues of US Treasury 
paper, the authors conclude that real interest rates must rise if domestic 
agents are to absorb in the future an increased share of the issues of public 
securities. A broader look at the equilibrium of the bond market as a whole 
nevertheless leads to somewhat different conclusions. While, expressed as a 
share of GDP, issues of Treasury paper have increased substantially since 
2007, total bond issues, for their part, have fallen by more than half: 
companies and the mortgage securitisation agencies (Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) have not been net issuers since 2009 (Figure 25). This is not 
surprising in itself, of course: as elsewhere, the government has simply 
stepped in to replace the missing private borrowers. As long as this 
situation persists, there will be no crowding-out by the government of any 
other borrower and no reason to expect a resulting rise in real interest rates. 
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Figure 25. Net bond issues, 1985-2011 (% of GDP) 
 
* Debt securities issued by the US Treasury, state and local governments, mortgage 
agencies and enterprises. 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
If one now looks at the evolution in the position occupied by the 
outside world on the whole American bond market, it turns out that this has 
barely changed. Admittedly, there has been a modification in the 
composition of its bond purchases: on average since 2008, the rest of the 
world has been a net seller of bonds issued by firms and mortgage 
securitisation agencies and has purchased, each year, distinctly more 
Treasury paper than in the previous decade. However, since 2007, the share 
of the total stock of American debt securities held by foreigners has 
remained remarkably stable: taking one year with another, they absorbed 
roughly one-quarter of American issues (Figure 25) and at the end of 2011 
still held almost half the stock of US Treasury securities (Figure 24).  
If the US budget follows the trajectory outlined above (public deficit 
equivalent to 3.5% of GDP in 2016, and then 2% in 2021), the world demand 
for foreign exchange reserves should continue to ensure a sufficient outlet 
for Treasury issues. On this same trajectory, these issues would average 
$650 billion per year. If the share of the dollar in foreign exchange reserves 
remains close to 65% and if these continue to be held up to 80% in the form 
of securities, the demand for Treasury securities on their own – or for 
securities issued by the mortgage securitisation agencies – from foreign 
monetary authorities would rise by more than $600 billion per year8 – much 
the same as the supply of Treasury securities.  
                                                   
8 This calculation is based on the IMF’s (probably excessive) autumn 2011 projected 
current-account surpluses of emerging countries in Asia and the Middle East. 
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Throughout this first phase of return to sustainability, which should 
bring the deficit to 3.5% in the middle of the decade, there is obviously a 
possibility that tensions may emerge: the issues would be substantial in 
volume and the reduction in the budget deficit cannot be taken for granted. 
If, however, there were to be the threat of a steep rise in bond rates, the Fed 
would not hesitate, at least as long as the recovery remains fragile, to 
ensure the equilibrium of the market. The Federal Reserve Act in fact gives 
it this explicit responsibility, stipulating that the central bank must seek “to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates.” The Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke [2010], 
recently reaffirmed this, saying: “The goal of moderate long-term interest 
rates is frequently dropped from statements of the Federal Reserve’s 
mandate not because the goal is unimportant, but because moderate long-
term interest rates are generally the by-product of price stability.” 
The risks attendant on American budget strategy therefore seem to be 
of a fairly calculated nature. While the threat of a rapid rise in public 
borrowing costs seems to be containable, the consequences for American 
society of persistently weak growth and persistently high unemployment 
could be dramatic. This means that maintaining growth is seen as more 
urgent than rapid consolidation of the public finances, with the Federal 
Reserve possibly intervening to keep interest rates low until such time as 
recovery is assured.  
Obviously, this strategy does not exempt the United States from the 
substantial effort to reduce the deficit that is needed to stem the rise in the 
public debt ratio; it simply leads it to spread the effort over time. This in 
turn exposes the country at any moment to increasing doubts regarding its 
creditworthiness and these doubts can be expected to lead, if not to a rise in 
interest rates, at least to a decline in the dollar. Foreign holders of 
US Treasury securities would be quite likely to want to sell them, more or 
less suddenly. This risk of a loss of confidence could be significantly 
reduced if reform of the healthcare programmes were to rapidly eliminate 
the prospect of a constant deterioration in the budget imbalance starting 
from the beginning of the next decade – and if a clear-cut political 
agreement were to emerge concerning the way in which public debt should 
be placed on a sustainable trajectory in the meantime. 
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5. THE EUROZONE DRAMA 
t may seem surprising at first sight that it was in the eurozone that the 
sovereign debt crisis broke out. Admittedly, for some time the public 
finances of the European countries have been the subject of particular 
attention. For one thing, the burden of government spending in these 
countries, especially in the social field, is higher than in the United States or 
Japan. However, when they created the single currency, the European 
countries had taken care to put in place rules aimed at limiting public 
deficits and public debt, precisely to prevent any risk of budgetary crisis. 
Unfortunately, not only were these rules not respected, but the monetary 
integration led to an unexpected divergence in the borrowing behaviour of 
the various countries’ private agents. The 2007-09 crisis put a sudden stop 
to this tendency. As elsewhere in the world, budget balances deteriorated 
and some countries found themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation.  
Having wanted each country to remain responsible for its own debt, 
the eurozone members then found themselves faced with an unexpected 
situation in which there was nothing to prevent doubt regarding the 
creditworthiness of one country from affecting those whose financial 
positions threatened to raise similar doubts. They were accordingly unable 
to prevent a particularly perverse form of market dynamic to exert knock-
on effects on all those whose debts or deficits might give rise to concern. 
This dynamic in fact gradually came to be used by those governments – 
Germany’s, in particular – that wanted to induce all the eurozone states to 
achieve rapid reductions in their deficits and to strengthen the 
arrangements aimed at containing their future borrowing. These evolutions 
will for several years to come act as a curb on growth and, by increasing 
social and political tensions, threaten the very existence of monetary union.  
I
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5.1 Europe’s weakness 
Towards the end of 2006, on the eve of the financial crisis, the gross public 
debt of the eurozone countries was close to 75% of their GDP, compared 
with barely 60% for the United States. Within the zone, the ratios varied 
widely, from Ireland at one extreme, with only around 30%, to Greece and 
Italy at the other, with 120%. To have a better idea of the burden imposed 
by these debt levels, one can also compare them with the budget revenue 
available to service them. On this basis, the gross public debt of the 
eurozone countries, again in 2006, at the equivalent of slightly less than two 
years’ tax revenue, was comparable to that of the United States. If the debt 
is now measured on a net basis, the eurozone figure falls to only around 
one year’s tax revenue, compared with a figure of slightly over one year for 
the United States. On this same net basis, the differences between eurozone 
countries were spectacular, with Finland having accumulated net assets in 
2006 equivalent to more than one year’s tax revenue and Greece and Italy, 
for their part, posting net liabilities amounting to more than 2 years’ 
revenue, not far off the figure for Japan (Figure 26)! 
Figure 26. Public debt in 2006 
 
Source: OECD. 
The feature that clearly distinguishes the public finances of the 
eurozone from those of the United States and Japan is the size of the 
budgets concerned. Taking the average for the period 1999-2006, public 
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spending was equivalent to almost 50% of GDP in the eurozone, compared 
with slightly less than 40% for Japan and around 35% for the United States. 
For the most part, this difference is explained by a much higher level of 
social spending in the eurozone, on average half as much again as in the 
United States, with the difference due not so much to healthcare spending 
as to other social programmes, notably pensions and unemployment 
benefits.  
Here again, there were wide differences among European countries. 
These were all the more worrying in that social spending is, as we have 
seen, the source of off-balance-sheet commitments which population 
ageing and medical progress are liable to render particularly costly. In an 
exercise carried out in 2008, the European Commission [2009] calculated 
the amount of additional spending to be expected in future decades, 
assuming no changes in legislation. Taking the average of all the eurozone 
countries, the ratio of this spending to GDP could be expected because of 
ageing to rise by more than 3 points by 2035 (a slightly smaller order of 
magnitude than the corresponding figure mentioned earlier for the United 
States), with most of the increase explained by greater spending on 
pensions. Here too, however, there were significant differences among 
countries, with the addition amounting to roughly 4 GDP points in Ireland 
and Spain, 6 points in Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands and more 
than 9 points in Greece (Figure 27).  
Figure 27. Social spending (% of GDP) 
 
Sources: OECD and European Commission. 
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Longstanding neglect of fiscal discipline 
Aware of the potential for destabilisation related to possible disequilibria in 
their public finances, the countries signing the Maastricht Treaty had made 
arrangements aimed at ensuring a minimum of fiscal discipline. For 
example, in Article 104B, the Treaty specified that each country would 
remain solely responsible for its debts. This principle was later erroneously 
interpreted as a ban on governments providing financial aid to each other 
[Pisani-Ferry, 2011]. In order to give its full weight to this responsibility, the 
Treaty also specified (Article 104) that the Central Bank could not directly 
finance participating governments through overdraft facilities or any other 
type of credit, while “the purchase directly… of debt instruments” was also 
forbidden. On top of these general principles, there were also certain 
numerical criteria to be respected in order to be able to join the single 
currency: a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP and gross debt not 
exceeding 60% of GDP (if the figure were higher, it had to have “declined 
substantially and continuously”).  
The years preceding the creation of the single currency therefore saw 
impressive reductions (in the direction of the stipulated threshold) in the 
public deficits of candidate countries, while at the same time their public 
debt ratios were stabilising or declining. Once having joined the single 
currency, participating governments were called on to observe the rules 
laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact, which combined these same 
criteria with arrangements for their monitoring. Its ineffectiveness soon 
became apparent: the “excessive deficit procedure” was difficult to 
implement in the case of the large countries and the European 
Commission’s constraining powers were weak, regardless of country size.  
Excessive deficit procedures were launched against Portugal and 
Germany at the end of 2002, against France at the beginning of 2003 and 
then against the Netherlands in the spring of 2004. All were subsequently 
abandoned. Only in the case of Greece, against which a similar procedure 
was initiated in May 2004 (mainly because of the authorities’ incapability to 
provide reliable budget data) was the result, in 2005, a formal notice of 
proceedings. Having shown itself impotent to ensure observance of the 
letter of the Pact, the Commission had even less success in imposing its 
spirit. In order to be able in periods of slowdown to make use of the budget 
to underpin activity, a country should normally take advantage of upswing 
periods in order to consolidate its finances. Until the mid-2000s, however, 
few countries in fact did so and in 2005 the prevailing rules were relaxed 
(notably by broadening the notion of ‘exceptional occurrences’).  
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Figure 28. Evolutions in public balances and public debt and the Maastricht 
criteria (% of GDP) 
 
Note: In the diagram on the right, the areas of the circles are proportional to the 
countries’ nominal GDPs. 
Source: OECD. 
Figure 28 summarises these various episodes, taking the eurozone as 
a whole. Despite a relative lack of fiscal discipline, its public deficit in 2007, 
when the financial crisis broke out, was less than one GDP point and its 
public debt ratio, close to 65% of GDP, had fallen by 10 points in the space 
of a decade. This positive observation, all things considered, has to be 
complemented by one that is less positive. While certain countries had 
clearly been respecting the Maastricht criteria, this was only approximately 
true of the two largest, France and Germany, while Greece was a long way 
from observance – to judge by the currently available figures, at least. In the 
summer of 2007, the Commission, on being told that the public deficit had 
fallen from 8% of GDP in 2004 to 2.6% in 2006, had suspended the 
procedure initiated against the country. It now turns out that the true 
figure for the Greek deficit at the time was in excess of 6% of GDP! 
The unexpected divergence in the financial behaviour of private 
agents 
What the signatories to the Treaty saw less clearly – and even less 
attempted to contain – was the potential for destabilisation related to the 
implementation of a single monetary policy in a zone where there was still 
a high degree of financial heterogeneity. The same monetary policy can in 
fact lead to evolutions in private borrowing that differ widely from one 
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country to another. This will be the case, as has often been highlighted, if 
expected inflation rates lead to considerable divergences in real interest 
rates as perceived by economic agents. It will also be the case, however, if 
financial practices remain different as between countries. This was 
precisely the situation in the years following the creation of the euro. While 
currency unification was accompanied by an integration of the markets in 
which the large firms find their finance, the same was not true of the retail 
banking sector, with the conditions for borrowing by households and small 
firms remaining national. This was especially true of mortgage lending, 
which is the main source of financing for households. For example, given 
the importance of variable-rate loans in Spain, the average apparent 
interest rate on Spanish households’ outstanding mortgage debt fell 
between 2003 and 2004 by 100 basis points more than in Germany, where 
fixed-rate loans predominate. 
On top of this difference in the evolution in the cost of borrowing, 
there was also the difference in the levels of indebtedness at the time of 
entry into the euro. In the latter half of the 1990s, private European agents, 
households in particular, were far from having a homogeneous ‘financial 
past’. German and Dutch households were already owing substantial debt 
(100% and 120% of disposable income, respectively). Meanwhile, Spanish 
households were carrying relatively little debt (barely more than 50% of 
income – like French households, in fact). This raft of differences led to 
substantial divergences in behaviour throughout the period preceding the 
financial crisis. Divergences in the pace of borrowing by households 
explain, during this period, much of the divergences in the growth rates of 
domestic demand. Given that European countries are commercially wide 
open to one another, the evolutions in their current-account balances 
largely reflected the different rates of growth in their domestic demand. 
While Germany during this period posted an improvement in its current-
account balance, this was in large part because its domestic demand grew 
more slowly than those of all the other eurozone countries. Meanwhile, 
those of Spain, Ireland and Greece were growing faster than the rest 
(Figure 29).  
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Figure 29. Household net increase in liabilities, domestic demand and balance on 
goods and services, 2002-07 
 
Sources: Eurostat, Thomson Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
From the beginning of the 2000s, therefore, the pattern of transfers of 
savings between eurozone countries was based on the same considerations 
as those governing transfers at world level. For example, as in China, 
households in Germany posted growth in their net lending (even though at 
the time the share of wages in GDP was falling). This was possible because 
elsewhere in Europe, notably in Spain and echoing the US experience, 
private borrowing was rising sufficiently fast to absorb the savings 
generated. The 2007-09 financial crisis then, as elsewhere, abruptly called 
this ‘equilibrium’ into question (Box 5). With private borrowing contracting 
violently, public borrowing then took up the running everywhere. In the 
space of two years, the public finances of eurozone countries deteriorated 
substantially (although generally less than in the United States or Japan). 
At the end of 2009, the public debt/GDP ratio rose on average by almost 15 
points and the budget deficit ratio from 1% to 6%. Certain countries, i.e. 
those where private borrowing had increased most or whose budget 
situations had already deteriorated, nevertheless found themselves in a 
much more disturbing situation than the average. Ireland and Spain were 
violently ejected from the good-pupil group to which they had previously 
belonged (Figure 28), while Greece found itself even more remotely 
excluded, with its public debt close to 130% of GDP and its deficit 16%!  
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Box 5. Capital flows, Target 2 balances and current-account balances 
Target 2, which replaced Target* in 2008, is a system enabling banks in the 
eurozone to carry out large-scale payments among themselves. It is based on 
a common platform constructed and managed on behalf of the Eurosystem 
by three central banks, Banque de France, Bundesbank and Banca d’Italia. 
The principle is relatively simple. When, for example, a Spanish commercial 
bank transfers funds to a German commercial bank, the Bundesbank credits 
the account of the German bank in its books and the Bank of Spain debits the 
account of the Spanish bank. Simultaneously, the Bundesbank acquires a 
claim on the Bank of Spain. The credits and debits of the national central 
banks are cleared at the level of the ECB: if the Spanish commercial banks 
make larger payments to the rest of the zone than they receive, the Bank of 
Spain will accumulate debts towards the ECB; if the German banks receive 
more than they pay, the Bundesbank will accumulate claims on the ECB. As 
long as the ECB through its refinancing operations provides the necessary 
liquidity, there are no limits on these balances. The amount of refinancing, 
for its part, is limited by that of the eligible collateral at the banks’ disposal, 
however. The ECB has lengthened the list of this collateral and, by engaging 
in Emergency Lending Assistance, the Greek and Irish central banks have 
lengthened the list still further. 
Figure 30 illustrates, for two countries, the key role played by Target 
and the Eurosystem.  
Figure 30. Spanish and German payments balances, 2005-11 (€ billion) 
 
Sources: Banco de España and Bundesbank. 
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and portfolio investment – were sufficient to cover the deficit on goods and 
services account. Once the crisis broke out, and despite the reduction seen in 
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the current-account balance, these capital inflows became insufficient or 
even – in the case of interbank flows, notably – reversed direction. The Bank 
of Spain’s debit balance in Target then took over, so that at the end of 2011 
the Bank had a ‘Target debt’ of around €130 billion. Conversely, the German 
banks were meanwhile benefiting from an inflow of deposits and were less 
inclined to lend directly to banks in the peripheral countries, so that their net 
private capital outflows were replaced by an accumulation of ‘Target claims’ 
– amounting to €480 billion at the end of 2011 – on the asset side of the 
Bundesbank’s balance sheet.  
In this way, the Eurosystem has enabled banks in the peripheral 
countries to avoid a liquidity crisis of the kind seen, for example, during the 
Asian crisis, at the cost, however, of increasing Target imbalances. This 
phenomenon, highlighted by Sinn & Wollmershäuser [2011], has been a 
source of controversy, notably concerning the risks involved for the 
Bundesbank. In fact, losses related to the functioning of the Target system 
would normally be distributed among all the participating central banks 
according to a set scale, independent of their balances in the system. Were 
the eurozone to break up, however, things would become more uncertain… 
_____________________ 
* Target is the acronym for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer system. 
 
5.2 A devilish spiral  
At the end of 2009, in the aftermath of the financial shock, the budgets of 
the eurozone countries, like those of most other developed countries, were 
on an unsustainable path. In the absence of an improvement in their 
primary balances, public debt ratios were set to continue to rise. This 
situation was not dramatic in itself. In order to stem the rise by 2015, the 
eurozone, taken as a whole, would have had to reduce its primary deficit 
by around 4 GDP points over this period, half as much as in the case of the 
United States (Figure 5). Spread over 5 or 6 years, this consolidation effort 
need not have curbed growth excessively. For example, simply by allowing 
their primary spending to rise slightly less quickly than their nominal GDP, 
countries in the eurozone could, on average, practically achieve the effort 
required.  
Spreading the consolidation effort in this way would obviously have 
certain inconveniences. For one thing, during this time the debt ratio would 
continue to rise and, for those countries starting from an already high level 
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of debt, such a rise could be cause for concern, especially if the effort 
having to be made exceeded the average. Moreover, on the bond markets, 
the borrowing is not done by the ‘average’ of the eurozone, but by the 
individual participating countries. It would emerge at this time just how 
much the rules members had imposed on themselves made them 
vulnerable to doubts regarding their creditworthiness. No public authority 
was capable of withstanding pressures originating on the sovereign debt 
market. This situation had in fact been deliberately created because market 
pressure had been seen as one of the forces capable of imposing fiscal 
discipline on governments.  
First, a Greek crisis 
This vision is unrealistic, however. The bond markets, far from having the 
clairvoyance they are often credited with, are, like the equity markets, 
short-sighted and pusillanimous [Brender & Pisani, 2001]. The way in 
which the eurozone drama was triggered off was yet another 
demonstration of this point. In the autumn of 2009, despite the fact that the 
deplorable state of Greek finances had been made clear for all to see by a 
sharp upward revision in the public deficit, Greece was still borrowing at 
interest rates barely higher than those paid by other European countries. 
The attitude of the markets towards sovereign risk was then suddenly 
changed by an external event. At the end of November, the Dubai Emirate 
let it be known that it might request the restructuring of a debt it had 
guaranteed.  
The idea that the debt of a member of a union of rich countries (the 
United Arab Emirates) might be restructured led to a radical change in the 
mindset of market operators, so that in just a few days Greek 10-year 
borrowing rates rose by 100 basis points. A rise on this scale would be 
sufficient to add more than one GDP point to the effort – already well 
above 10 GDP points – that Greece would have to make to stabilise its debt 
ratio. This being so, Greek borrowing rates rose further, putting the effort 
needed simply to stabilise the debt burden at some stage that much more 
out of reach. At the same time, it increased the potential losses of those 
holding Greek securities. At the end of January 2010, despite the 
announcement of ambitious austerity packages, Greek five-year rates came 
close to 7% (Figure 31), a rate at which further borrowing would rapidly 
become suicidal.  
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Figure 31. Public interest rate contagion 
 
Sources: Thomson Datastream and Bloomberg. 
The choice facing eurozone participants is then a simple one. If Greek 
debt is no longer sustainable, allowing Greece to default seems a logical 
solution. However, it would have serious implications. Since the Second 
World War, no developed country has ever defaulted. In the eyes of 
markets whose reasoning is based largely on memory of the past, a default 
is therefore highly improbable. But if an event seen as improbable then in 
fact occurs, the probability of similar events occurring is revised upwards. 
This means that if Greece defaults, the perceived probability that countries 
in a similar situation will do the same will increase – and so will their 
borrowing rates. The perverse dynamic by which Greece found itself in the 
space of a few weeks cut off from market finance therefore would then 
threaten to affect Ireland, Portugal and even Spain, these being countries 
which, for various reasons, find themselves in a difficult situation. The risk 
is all the greater in that eurozone countries have no means of halting such a 
dynamic once launched. Neither the ECB nor the other eurozone countries 
can in normal circumstances buy the debt of a member state on the 
secondary market in order to stabilise its price.  
Default is not the only possible solution, however. A programme of 
financial support could make it avoidable, with the other countries 
borrowing in order to lend to Greece the sums needed to repay its 
maturing bonds but also to finance its substantial budget deficit. This 
solution, too, is not without its dangers. If the conditions attached to the aid 
are too favourable, Greece may be tempted to relax its efforts and other 
countries in difficulty could want to be similarly treated. If, on the other 
hand, the conditions are too tough – interest rate too high and budget 
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consolidation effort too exacting – this could mean a deterioration in the 
growth prospects for the Greek economy and hence in the outlook for a 
return to sustainable levels of debt. At the beginning of April 2010, a 
support package was finally put in place. European countries agreed to put 
some €30 billion at the disposal of the Greek government… if it asked for it. 
In the following days, Greek interest rates rose above 8% and on 23 April 
the programme was activated. Being substantially insufficient, it was 
unable to prevent the continuing slump in Greek bond prices, which was 
accompanied by that of the prices of the two countries whose situations 
were currently looking most fragile, namely Ireland and Portugal. A few 
days later, there was the first of what would turn out to be a long series of 
European summit meetings. The aid package for Greece was raised to €110 
billion, one-third of this to come from the IMF, and a new institution – the 
European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) – was created in order to 
finance, with the other member countries acting as guarantors, those which 
no longer had access to the market. The Facility’s declared firepower was 
€440 billion, but it turned out a few days later that at first at least it would 
not be able to lend more than €250 billion at most.  
And then a euro crisis 
From the start therefore, the inherent defect in governments’ response to 
the crisis then entering its acute phase became clear. They were attempting 
to implement aid programmes, not to stem a market dynamic (Box 6). To 
prevent the risk of moral hazard, the conditions on EFSF loans were, 
initially at least, tough, dissuading countries from taking them up as long 
as their access to the market was not completely blocked. In the meantime, 
however, prices of their debt securities would have collapsed, generating 
through a knock-on effect the erosion of prices of debt securities of 
governments seen to be in a similar situation – and losses for all the holders 
of those securities. Above all, not being authorised to buy securities on the 
secondary market, the EFSF is unable to intervene directly in order to nip 
market movements in the bud. In fact, governments implicitly left this task 
to the central bank.  
Immediately after the May 2010 summit, taking as its pretext “the 
severe tensions in certain market segments which are hampering the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism”, the ECB launched a 
programme of purchases of public debt securities. In the space of a few 
weeks it purchased some €50 billion worth of Greek, Irish and Portuguese 
securities (slightly less than 10% of the outstanding amounts). But this 
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action had to remain limited: even before it began, Axel Weber, Governor 
of the Bundesbank, had expressed the opinion that such purchases did not 
form part of the Bank’s remit (he would resign from the ECB Governing 
Council a few weeks later). 
Box 6. Speculation… or a simple market dynamic? 
Identifying the nature of the forces that have in turn affected the bond 
markets of the various vulnerable countries makes it possible to understand 
why the European authorities have been unable to stem this contagion. 
Public bonds issued by developed countries are normally held by the 
‘collectors of long-term savings’ – insurance companies, pension funds, 
mutual funds, but also sovereign wealth funds – wanting to have on their 
balance sheets stocks that are relatively liquid, regarded as free of credit risk 
and carrying a long-term interest rate. But public bonds are also held by 
banks and more generally ‘risk-takers’ (hedge funds, for example), which 
borrow short-term when money market rates are low in order to purchase 
stocks carrying a higher interest rate (Figure 32).  
Figure 32. Holding of eurozone public debt, by agent group, September 2011 
 
* Money market funds are included in “monetary financial institutions” and not 
in “investment funds”. 
** The “other” issuers of public debt are Austria (€185 billion), Portugal (€140 
billion), Ireland (€89 billion), Finland (€72 billion), Slovakia (€23 billion), 
Slovenia (€14 billion), Cyprus (€9 billion), Malta (€4 billion) and Luxembourg (€4 
billion). 
Source: European Central Bank. 
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Now let us imagine that default on the part of the Greek government is 
no longer regarded as totally improbable. The more risk-averse collectors of 
savings and risk-takers will want to reduce their exposure and will sell part 
of their holdings. Fairly soon, however, certain risk-takers, noting that a 
downward trend has begun, will bet on its continuation, borrowing stocks in 
order to sell them or trading in derivative products such as Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS). The decline will then accelerate, prompting the collectors of 
long-term savings and the risk-takers into further selling. The movement 
will be all the more abrupt in that the collectors of liquid savings (deposit-
rich banks, money market funds) will want to reduce their lending to the 
risk-takers holding Greek bonds, thus forcing them to reduce their positions, 
and so on. In this movement, speculation can act as accelerator, but the 
movement would take place even without it. It is the result of the sudden 
reassessment of the Greek risk by the financial system as a whole – finding 
that it is holding too much of it – and of the absence of a public authority 
prepared to buy the securities of which the private operators then become 
sellers. The only way of stemming the movement would have been to make 
the risk of default by the Greek government again improbable, with the 
other governments guaranteeing Greek debt unconditionally and for an 
unlimited amount. By not doing so, for fear of moral hazard and in order not 
to jeopardise their own budgets, European governments have allowed the 
Greek problem to contaminate other countries in vulnerable situations, 
notably Ireland and Portugal.  
If the European countries are not actually guarantors of the debts of 
participants in the single currency, then default on the part of Ireland and 
Portugal can no longer be ruled out and the price of these countries’ debt 
securities will therefore start to fall. Collectors of savings, ‘once bitten’ by the 
experience with Greek securities, will reduce their positions even more 
rapidly, as will the risk-takers – all the more so as the banks, which 
constitute a substantial part of this group, will have increasing difficulties in 
finding the financing they need in order to preserve their positions. Unlike 
American banks, European banks are on average heavily dependent on the 
wholesale markets (interbank and bond) for their financing. Unfortunately, 
at the same time as the credit risk of each government was being reassessed, 
the aversion to risk of all operators in the financial system was increasing 
and the deposit-rich banks, especially the German banks, began to hesitate 
to lend to those they knew held stocks whose prices were falling (Box 5). In 
this way a market dynamic was launched that would rapidly affect Spain 
and then Italy and at the beginning of December 2011 pose a threat to the 
totality of European countries.  
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It in fact constitutes an archetypal example of endogenous risk, in other 
words, “a risk from shocks that are generated and ampliﬁed within the 
[financial] system” [Danielsson & Shin, 2002]. The only way to halt such a 
dynamic, as was seen back in 2008 following the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
is to help the financial system to regain stability by allowing it to eliminate 
part of the risk it is no longer able to bear [Brender & Pisani, 2009]. The ECB 
took such a step starting in May 2010. By purchasing the public debt 
securities of the countries that were most in jeopardy, it withdrew credit risk 
and liquidity risk from the system. The scale of its purchases nevertheless 
remained small (around €60 billion between May and July 2010 and €140 
billion in the 2nd half of 2011). At end-2011, however, the nature of its 
interventions changed and it launched two large-scale three-year refinancing 
operations – in December and February – each worth almost €500 billion. 
This relieved the system of a large part of the liquidity risk it was no longer 
able to bear, but without at the same time relieving it of the credit risk on the 
securities refinanced in this way. 
 
The caution and hesitation shown by governments are perfectly 
understandable. They have to convince their taxpayers of the need to take 
the risk of having to pay their neighbours’ debts. Moreover, the sums 
involved are far from negligible. Full use of the EFSF in 2012 would by 
itself imply the transfer to German or to French taxpayers of credit risk 
amounting to roughly 8 GDP points. This caution and hesitation may be 
understandable, but they nevertheless deprived governments’ response of 
much of its effectiveness and, as the months passed, the market dynamic 
continually grew in strength. In the wake of Greece, Ireland and then 
Portugal asked the other countries for assistance.  
In the spring of 2011, the crisis entered a new phase. The budgetary 
restrictions introduced in Greece, as part of the programme negotiated in 
the preceding year, led to a severe contraction in activity and the country’s 
economic and social disorganisation was manifest. It became clear that 
Greece would not be able, as had been foreseen a year earlier, to return in 
mid-2012 to the markets for its financing. In order to meet its commitments 
after this date, it would therefore need additional public financing. The 
idea that the private sector could be asked to contribute to the financing of 
the government receiving assistance, by wiping out part of its claims, was 
then raised and introduced, in principle, in the draft treaty creating the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was intended to replace the 
EFSF in mid-2013 (later brought forward to mid-2012).  
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While the principle is logical, so is its impact on the market dynamic. 
By further strengthening the likelihood of seeing not only Greece but also 
the other assisted countries restructure their debt, it led to a further surge 
in Portuguese and Irish interest rates. Following the July 2011 summit 
meeting, the first occasion on which figures were given for the possible 
involvement of the private sector in the Greek case,9 Italian and Spanish 
interest rates soared and only a further wave of ECB purchases was able for 
a few weeks to curb the movement (although at the price of a further 
German resignation, that of Jürgen Stark, the Bank’s chief economist). 
Having failed collectively to stem the market dynamic – in many 
cases they even helped to stimulate it – governments had no other strategy 
than to attempt individually to make themselves less vulnerable to its 
effects. One by one, they decided to accelerate their return to budget 
equilibrium. 
5.3 A dangerous strategy 
As early as 2010, in order to put their public finances back on more 
sustainable paths, the European countries had decided to consolidate their 
budget situations. Regardless of the initial situation, most of them included 
return to budget equilibrium in 2015 in their Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs). The intensity of the efforts certain countries would 
have to make was considerable and the negative link between budgetary 
restrictions and growth rapidly became apparent (Figure 33). Taking the 
years 2010-11, there is a clear distinction between three groups of countries. 
In the first group, which includes Germany and France, the budgetary 
tightening was relatively moderate and growth remained reasonably firm. 
In the second group – Spain, Portugal and Ireland – the effort was 
significant and growth stagnated. Lastly, Greece made a budgetary effort of 
                                                   
9 It took about a year for the private sector involvement to be implemented: in 
March 2012, private debtors ‘voluntarily’ swapped their Greek public bonds for 
new securities taking a nominal haircut of more than 50%. The new securities were 
such that the loss in terms of net present value was close to 75%. This was putting 
the Greek deal on par with the 2005 Argentinean one. With one key difference: the 
amount exchanged this time ($260 billion) was four times bigger! The fact that 
developed countries sovereign debt is credit-risk free had clearly been challenged. 
In order to minimize the consequences European authorities explained that the 
Greek case would remain an exception. But this only the future will tell… 
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rare brutality (restriction amounting to more than 10 GDP points in just 
two years) and activity contracted sharply. 
The impact of the European ‘strategy’ on growth was all the greater 
because of its generality. Within a monetary union, trade links are close 
and if all the members try at the same time to achieve a rapid return to 
budgetary equilibrium, the task of each individual becomes that much 
more difficult. Admittedly, Germany, which had substantial room for 
manoeuvre – achieving budgetary equilibrium could easily have been 
postponed by a few years (Box 7) – continued to stimulate its activity in 
2010, but ceased doing so in 2011. Above all, from summer 2011 on, the 
slowdown in economic growth, the growing impact of the market dynamic, 
as well as the pressure exerted by other governments and even by the ECB, 
led most countries, one after another, to post objectives whose ambitions 
were the greater, the more vulnerable they felt. Within a few months, Italy 
made substantial revisions in its target for the primary surplus. Starting 
from a situation close to equilibrium, it initially aimed at a surplus of 5.2% 
of GDP by 2014 but later decided that this should be attained as early as 
2013. To stem the rise in its debt/GDP ratio, a surplus of 3.5 GDP points in 
2015 would have been quite sufficient (Figure 33).  
Figure 33. Fiscal efforts and growth 
 
* Fiscal restraint is measured for this purpose as the change in the primary 
structural balance.  
** Stability and Convergence Programme. 
Sources: European Commission, IMF and Italian Treasury. 
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All in all, the European countries were induced to attempt budget 
consolidation on a much more ambitious scale than that initially envisaged. 
Being directly exposed to market pressures, governments little by little not 
only accepted a strengthening of budgetary discipline and surveillance, but 
also set themselves the target of reducing their debt ratios. These 
commitments, taken at the time of the ‘fiscal compact’ agreed at the 
December 2011 summit, were regarded as sufficiently reassuring for the 
ECB to decide to launch a massive operation which, for the first time, was 
able to derail a market dynamic which until then had constantly been 
growing in strength. By enabling the banks to borrow from it for three years 
as much as they wished, the ECB substantially reduced their liquidity 
problem, thus eliminating one of the reasons that had been prompting 
them to sell their public debt securities, namely the difficulty of financing 
their holdings (Box 6).  
Box 7. What next for German public debt? 
Between 2007 and 2010, the German budget balance moved from 
equilibrium to a deficit of more than 4% of GDP. At the same time, gross 
public debt in the Maastricht sense increased from 65% to almost 85% of 
GDP. This rise was due in part to the support amounting to 11 GDP points 
provided to the financial sector, notably the transfer of the assets of Hypo 
Real Estate to a public defeasance structure [IMF, 2011]. Over the same 
period, net public debt therefore increased by slightly less than 10 GDP 
points, reaching a ratio of 52% in 2010. This rise, in a country with an ageing 
population, is possible cause for concern. Much as in Japan, the share of the 
population aged over 65 is set to increase rapidly until 2035 before 
stabilising, while the share of the over-80s will even continue to increase 
until 2050. Also as in Japan, the nominal growth rate has constantly declined 
since the beginning of the 1990s, stabilising in this case at around 2% 
(Figure 34).  
The problem facing Germany, like other developed countries, is first 
and foremost a medium-term problem linked to the upward drift in social 
spending. Between now and 2035, the rise in public pension and healthcare 
spending is expected to amount to 2.5 GDP points [European Commission, 
2009]. However, failing an effort to reduce this spending or to finance it, the 
debt/GDP ratio, after remaining stable until 2020, would then rise 
continuously to reach 100% in 2035. To prevent Germany from falling into 
the ‘Japanese trap’ (low nominal growth and upward tendency in social 
spending), the Bundesrat on 12 June 2009, passed a constitutional 
amendment known as the ‘debt brake’ which in principle prohibits the 
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government from voting through a budget showing a deficit. The law also 
provides for a progressive reduction, starting in 2011, in recourse to 
borrowing. In the absence of a natural catastrophe or “exceptional 
occurrences”, the structural deficit of the federal government will not be 
allowed, starting in 2016 at the latest, to exceed 0.35% of GDP. A transitional 
period is granted to the Länder, whose budgets will not have to be in 
balance until 2020. This law has the merit of obliging the German authorities 
to make the efforts needed to avoid a continuous rise in the debt ratio. 
However, it also requires them to return relatively rapidly to equilibrium on 
public account, a move that is far from obligatory in view of the situation of 
German public finances… 
Figure 34. Population ageing, nominal growth and public debt 
 
* Nominal growth is the observed annual average over the last 10 years (%). 
** The figures for public debt are net debt as a proportion of GDP. 
Sources: United Nations and Thomson Datastream. 
Given the scale of the effort already accomplished – and even in the 
highly unfavourable case of an average yield on the debt 1 point above the 
nominal growth rate – merely keeping the primary surplus at its end-2011 
level (0.8% of GDP) would be sufficient to stabilise public debt at slightly 
below 85% of GDP. In the case of an average yield equal to the nominal 
growth rate, the ratio would even fall to 65% of GDP in 2035. Lastly, if 
Germany were in fact, in accordance with the law, to bring its budget 
balance into equilibrium in 2020, the ratio would fall below 55% in 2035.  
The beginning of 2012, therefore, finds Germany with room for 
manoeuvre. Given that it is today the reference country for the eurozone, 
delaying its return to budget equilibrium could enable the other countries to 
take longer over their own return and thus avoid excessive restriction for all.  
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The return of the external constraint 
By reducing in this way the economic governance of the eurozone to 
simply a rapid rebalancing of budgets, governments nevertheless took the 
risk of placing their economies on a dangerously weak growth path. As for 
Japan and the United States, the constraints which this evolution would 
impose on European growth can be seen in the framework described in 
Chapter 2. The budgetary efforts assumed here for the seven countries 
examined – the four largest (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and the 
three most affected by the crisis (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) – are those 
set out in the Stability and Convergence Programmes for 2011, adjusted to 
take into account the additional measures announced during the year. The 
evolutions in private agents’ financial balances were projected, country by 
country, taking into account their respective debt levels (Figure 35).  
The results are not surprising. Portugal and Greece are by far the 
economies whose growth prospects are the most constrained. Both the 
specialisation and the geographic pattern of their trade are unfavourable. 
Portugal bears the full brunt of competition from low-income countries, 
while, apart from tourism and transport services, Greece has few 
advantages to exploit in international trade. Nearly one-third of Portugal’s 
exports go to Spain and more than one-third of Greek exports to Eastern 
European countries and these are economies whose growth is set to be 
much weaker in the coming years than it was prior to the crisis. There is 
therefore very little chance that export growth for either Greece or Portugal 
will be sufficient to compensate for the impact of the ongoing fiscal 
tightening. Given the expected behaviour of their private agents, this 
tightening implies a continuation of the contraction in their domestic 
demand and in their activity. Averaged over the period 2012-16, GDP can 
be expected to fall further by more than 1% a year in Greece and by 0.5% in 
Portugal. To give an idea of the tensions that these adjustments imply, it 
can be noted that, at the end of 2016, domestic demand would be more than 
25% lower than in 2007 in the case of Greece and almost 15% lower in the case of 
Portugal.  
For the other countries, the constraints on growth are less dramatic. 
GDP could show a year-on-year rise of 0.5% in Italy, 1.2% in France, 1.6% in 
Spain and almost 3% in Ireland. In this last case, the strong rise in its 
exports made possible by the country’s specialisation (IT, pharmaceuticals) 
would enable its current-account balance to improve without any 
additional contraction in domestic demand. Even so, at the end of 2016, this 
would still be almost 20% below its 2007 level.  
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Figure 35. Debt reduction by the private and public sectors  
 
* Effort needed between 2012 and 2016 to stabilise the public debt/GDP ratio. 
Sources: Eurostat, European Central Bank and authors’ calculations. 
Germany is a special case: the problem here is not the level of the 
constraint on growth but the economy’s capacity to ‘saturate’ it. In contrast 
to the other countries mentioned here, Germany could in fact see its 
surplus on goods and services fall slightly between now and 2016. With 
private agents no longer having any debt reduction constraint, the decline 
in their financing capacity could exceed that of the public deficit (already 
largely achieved by the end of 2011). A rise in domestic demand of 1.5% per 
year would enable GDP to grow by 1.2% over the period. However, there is 
nothing to guarantee such a growth in German domestic demand: over the past 
decade, its growth rate has remained below 1% a year. In the absence of a 
distinct acceleration, growth in activity in Germany and in the rest of the 
zone would be weaker still. 
The combination of these results is enlightening. With the decline in 
the private sector’s financial savings ratio expected between now and 2016 
only partly compensating for the announced reduction in public deficits, 
the eurozone’s current-account balance is set to improve over the period, 
from virtual equilibrium in 2011 to a surplus of around 2% in 2016 
(Figure 35). For this to be achieved, growth in domestic demand must 
remain weak and growth in activity cannot exceed an annual average rate 
of 1% (implying an unemployment rate of close to 11%). A slower return to 
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budget equilibrium – with the current account being just in balance in 2016 
and no longer showing a surplus of 2 GDP points – would be compatible 
with stronger eurozone growth averaging 1.7% a year until 2016. The 
unemployment rate could then fall back to 9%, its mid-2000s level. It 
should be noted that a 10% reduction in the euro’s real effective exchange 
rate could produce an almost identical growth rate for the zone’s GDP 
(1.5%, on average). 
Crude though it is, the calculation nevertheless shows the limitations 
of the strategy adopted. In the absence of a decline in the euro, the 
consolidation effort being targeted condemns most of the countries in the 
eurozone to extremely weak growth, at best. In so doing, Europe has 
placed itself in a position of great vulnerability. If growth in the eurozone 
weakens, the markets will not fail to call into question the capacity of 
certain countries to cope with their indebtedness and even raise doubts 
regarding their continued partnership in the euro. If Europe wishes to 
avoid this risk, it has little choice. It must as soon as possible take on board 
all the implications of the solidarity that the euro has established de facto 
between its members.  
This implies, first and foremost, the unequivocal and generalised 
acceptance of budget discipline. In the second place, it implies the 
introduction of the means required both to provide those that might need it 
with the necessary financial support and to master the market movements 
threatening all of them. Lastly, it implies, if the eurozone does not wish to 
see its growth rate dependent solely on the rest of the world, a slower and 
more concerted return to budget equilibrium. Rarely has the remark by 
Jean Monnet, recalled by the former Governor of the ECB, been as pertinent 
as it is today: “No one can (yet) tell what form our Europe of tomorrow will 
take, as change born of change is unpredictable” [Trichet, 2004]. 
Attempting to manage this change for the best and to do so in close relation 
with the rest of the world is nevertheless essential. This is because the crisis 
the eurozone countries are going through is not a matter for them alone. 
Their banks occupy a central place in the globalised financial system and 
their governments’ debts are a reserve asset for the whole of the world. 
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6. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND 
MONETARY SYSTEM CAUGHT IN THE 
TURBULENCE 
overeign debt issued by developed-country governments has until 
recently occupied a special place in the functioning of the ‘globalised’ 
financial system, namely that of a ‘riskless’ asset. If this debt now 
shifts, more or less gradually, from ‘riskless’ to ‘risky’ status without any 
change meanwhile in the investment behaviour of savers, the financial 
system’s capacity for intermediation will be reduced. The problem will be 
even more real if this change takes place at a time when, as was the case at 
the beginning of the 2010s, financial agents’ attitude towards risk is 
tending, either by a spontaneous reaction to past excesses or under the 
constraint of new regulations, to become more prudent. The calling into 
question of the status of riskless asset accorded to public debt securities is 
obviously not yet general to all the developed countries. For the moment it 
has affected the debt only of certain eurozone countries. But the globalised 
financial system’s capacity for intermediation has largely been based on 
banks in the eurozone. The reduction in their capacity for risk-taking will 
impose an additional constraint on macroeconomic equilibrium at world 
level.  
At the same time, given that developed-country public debt securities 
are the preferred vehicle for holding as foreign exchange reserves, the 
functioning of the international monetary system and the stability of the 
exchange rates formed by the system could also be called into question. The 
sovereign debt crisis in this way merely strengthens the need for 
international economic cooperation, which is the only means of preventing 
the crisis from leading to currency turmoil and a prolonged slowdown in 
world growth.  
S
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6.1 Financial system, riskless assets and activity  
The loss of riskless-asset status for some of the public debt securities of 
developed countries will have an even more significant impact on world 
growth in that it has taken place after a financial crisis which, for a time at 
least, has made financial regulators and operators more vigilant. In order to 
understand the mechanisms at work, a brief digression is necessary. It is 
important to recall the limits that a financial system’s intermediation 
capacity – the mass of risks it is able to bear – imposes on the level of 
activity of the economy it serves. These limits, it will be shown in very 
summary fashion, are over and above those resulting from the interaction 
merely of the savings and investment behaviour of the non-financial 
agents.  
Savings and risk-taking behaviours 
Let us base our reasoning initially on a particularly simple closed economy 
functioning during only one period (Model 1). Financial intermediation is 
handled by the banks, households are the only savers and firms are the 
only agents borrowing and investing. The savings behaviour of households is 
summarised by the wealth they wish to hold when their income is that 
associated with the full employment of the available production capacity. 
The actual capacity utilisation – the level of activity – is determined by the 
size of firms’ aggregate balance sheets. Firms must demonstrate a 
minimum equity ratio. The only assets on their balance sheets consist of the 
productive capital stock they are going to acquire. Their liabilities, in 
addition to the equity, consist of bank loans and the bonds they have 
issued. The asset side of the banks’ balance sheets comprises solely their 
loans to firms, while the liability side consists of deposits, bond issues and 
equity capital. As in the case of the firms, the size of the banks’ balance 
sheets is constrained by the size of their equity capital.  
The risk-taking behaviour of households consists of deciding the 
amount of shares and bonds they wish to hold when their income is that 
associated with full employment. The remainder of their wealth, placed on 
deposit with the banks, will depend on the amount of their actual income 
and will therefore be a function of the level of activity. For the economy to 
be at full employment, firms must have sufficient equity capital to be able 
to operate the entirety of the productive capital available and to borrow, 
either from the banks or on the bond market, the sums needed for its 
acquisition. Their investment behaviour is encapsulated by the amount of 
capital stock acquired. 
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Model 1. Balance sheets of financial and non-financial agents 
 
where K is the productive capital stock, Eb and Ec are the equities issued by the 
banks and the non-financial enterprises, respectively, Bb and Bc are the bonds 
issued by the banks and the non-financial enterprises, respectively, W is the 
household wealth, E is the equities held by households, B is the bonds held by 
households, DEP is the deposits by households and L is the loans made by banks to 
enterprises. 
Now suppose households’ savings behaviour to be such that, at full 
employment, they wish to hold wealth equal to the value of the capital 
stock available. If their aversion to risk is low, arriving at full employment 
can be a simple matter. This would be the case if households accept to place 
all their wealth in a risky form and directly hold the shares and bonds 
which firms have to issue in order to acquire and operate all the capital 
stock. Full employment can then be achieved for the economy without the 
intervention of financial intermediaries. However, this behaviour resembles 
more that of the capitalists of the 19th century than that of today’s wage-
earners/savers, who, being more prudent, are looking mainly for safe 
investments. In this case, full employment cannot be achieved in the 
absence of a financial system that takes on the risks that the savers do not 
take directly; the system is reduced to the banks, whose attitude towards 
risk is defined by the prudential rules decided by them or imposed on 
them. Their capacity for taking credit risk is limited, as we have seen, by 
their equity ratio and their capacity for taking liquidity risk by a minimum 
ratio between their long-term resources – the shares and bonds they have 
issued – and their long-term assets (in this case, the total of their balance 
sheet, as their loans are assumed to be long-term). In all that follows, the 
interest-rate risk is ignored, for the sake of simplicity. 
This simple framework makes it possible to highlight an important 
feature of a real-life economy, namely that the level of activity is 
constrained by the risks that the interplay of savers’ behaviour and the 
behaviour of the financial system makes it possible to bear (Box 8). If, given 
the prudence shown by the banks, the amount of shares and bonds that 
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households are prepared to hold is not sufficient to enable firms to acquire 
and operate the totality of the capital stock, the economy will not be able to 
reach full employment even when households’ savings behaviour would 
make this possible (it has in fact been assumed that the ‘full employment’ 
savings and investment ratios are equal).  
The role played by prudential rules deserves a brief comment. The 
liquidity constraint will ‘bite’ if borrowers obtain their finance mainly at 
long term whereas savers invest mainly at short term. The more prudent 
the behaviour of the banks – the closer the amount of long-term loans 
granted remains to that of their long-term resources – the ‘tougher’ the 
liquidity constraint. The economy may then be in a state of under-
employment not because borrowers are not prepared to borrow the entire 
amount that savers wish to save, but because the financial system and 
households, taken together, are unable or disinclined to bear the liquidity 
risk that this amount of borrowing implies. If one assumes household 
behaviour to be invariable, the economy can only be brought closer to full 
employment if the behaviour of the financial system – in this case, the 
banks – is made or becomes less prudent. The liquidity constraint will be 
lifted if the financial system lends (long-term) what is necessary to bring 
the economy to full employment by taking the risk of borrowing (short-
term) the full amount necessary, in the form of deposits. A similar analysis 
can be made of the operation of the equity ratio: the lower the ratio desired 
– or required – the weaker the constraint imposed on activity.  
There is one intriguing point here: if prudential rules can be relaxed 
in order to bring the economy close to full employment, this should always 
be attainable without difficulty. As the only holders of wealth, households 
are nevertheless also the only agents bearing, directly or indirectly, the 
totality of the risks associated with the functioning of the economy. If the 
financial system takes on an excessive degree of risk, its stability at any 
given moment can only be maintained with the help of an ‘external’ 
intervention, meaning that a public authority entrusted with ensuring 
financial stability – namely, the government – must take on the risks that 
the financial system is no longer capable of bearing. Its intervention will 
re-place on the shoulders of households (the only source of tax revenue, in 
fact) the risks – and the possible losses – to which the imprudence of the 
financial system has exposed them. 
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Box 8. Risk-taking and level of activity 
Balance sheets are those of Model 1. Household behaviour is rigid; the risks 
they are prepared to take are defined by the amount of equities and bonds 
they accept to hold if their income corresponds to the full employment of the 
available capital stock. What constraint does this behaviour impose, in 
conjunction with that of the financial system, on the level of activity, in this 
case the capital stock that can actually be exploited?  
To operate an amount of productive capital K, firms must have at their 
disposal equity equivalent to 1  of this amount and borrow long-term from 
the banks the resources L they still need to acquire it. Banks have to respect 
an equity ratio, i.e. equity must be equivalent to 1  of their outstanding 
debts. They are also subject to a liquidity constraint: their long-term 
resources (Eb + Bb) must be equivalent to 1  of their debts L. The constraints 
to which our agents are subjected can therefore be written as follows:  
- for the non-financial enterprises: cEK  ; 
- for the banks: bEL   (capital constraint) and )( bb BEL   (liquidity 
constraint) with    and 1 . 
What level of activity, defined by the amount of capital K being utilised, 
can this economy achieve at most? Let us suppose, first, that the banks’ 
liquidity constraint is inoperative and that there are no bond issues. Let E~  
be the amount of equities households are willing to hold: there is an 
allocation of equity between the banks and the firms that maximises the 
level of activity. To understand this, the simplest way is to reason 
successively on the basis of the balance sheets of these two agents. Let Ec and 
Eb be the respective equity of the enterprises and the banks (obviously, 
bc EEE ~ ). The amount of capital K that firms can utilise cannot exceed 
cE . To obtain it, they nevertheless need to borrow cE)1(  . To lend this 
sum, the banks must have at their disposal equity capital at least equal to 
 cE)1(  . To make the most of the amount E~  of shares that households 
are prepared to purchase, the distribution of equity must then be such that:  
)1( 



b
c
E
E  
The amount of capital that can then be utilised is then:  
E
βα
αβK ~
1
~

  
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This is an increasing function of the amount of shares that households 
are prepared to hold and is higher than could be obtained in the absence of 
the banks (in which case, the maximum level of activity would be 
KEK ~~  ). 
Now let us suppose that bonds are issued and that the liquidity 
constraint comes into play. In order to explore the properties of the system, 
B , the quantity of bond risk that households are prepared to take, is 
regarded as fixed. The maximum level of activity will vary solely as a 
function of the quantity of equity risk they are also prepared to bear.  
When this quantity is low in relation to B  ( BE
1
1~



), the maximum 
amount of capital that can be utilised is:  
EK ~~   
A portion of the bonds that households had been ready to hold cannot 
be issued and the presence of the banks does not make it possible to attain a 
level of activity higher than that attainable in their absence. 
Let us assume that the quantity of equity risk accepted by households is 
now higher and such that BEB
)1)((
)1(~
1
1



 


. The banks’ capital 
constraint is more difficult to satisfy than their liquidity constraint 
( )( bbb BEE   ). The maximum amount of capital that can be utilised now 
becomes:  





)(
~)1()~(~ EBEKcap  
This amount capK
~  increases with the total quantity of risky assets BE ~  
that households are prepared to hold and will increase with E~ . capK
~  is also 
an increasing function of β: the more relaxed the banks’ capital constraint 
(the higher the value of β), the larger the amount of capital utilised.  
If households now accept an even higher equity risk, we have 
BE
)1)((
)1(~




  and the banks’ liquidity constraint will become more 
difficult to meet than their capital constraint ( bbb EBE   )( ). In order to 
ease to the maximum this liquidity constraint, the banks will mobilise all the 
bond placings ( BBb  ) and the capital utilised can be as much as: 
1
)~(~




 BEKliq  
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This level depends only on the total amount of risky assets ( BE ~ ) that 
households are prepared to acquire. It should be noted that it is higher than 
that attained previously. It is also an increasing function of γ: the more 
relaxed the banks’ liquidity constraint (the higher the value of γ), the larger 
the capital stock that can be utilised.  
Figure 36 illustrates these three cases: to the left of point E1, E is ‘rare’ in 
relation to B , and the maximum level of activity K is that of an economy 
without banks. Between E1 and E2, the rise in E relaxes the capital constraint 
of the banks, which are able to issue bonds, and the attainable level of 
activity will rise fairly rapidly with E. Finally, if E exceeds E2, the liquidity 
constraint bites and the possible level of activity will continue to rise with E, 
but somewhat less rapidly than in the previous case, as all potential bond 
resources will have been mobilised by the banks.  
Figure 36. Numerical illustration 
 
taking α=3.7, β =10, γ =1.5, 700B .  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Let us now introduce public bonds gB  (Model 2). If these are regarded 
as riskless, the banks absorb them, if necessary, without difficulty and as a 
counterpart ‘create’ deposits. Their introduction does not modify the 
attainable level of activity. Things are different, however, if the public bonds 
are regarded as risky. If they have the same characteristics as the debt issued 
by enterprises, the liquidity and capital constraints in fact become: 
bg EBL   and )( bbg BEBL   .  
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Model 2. Balance sheets of private agents and government 
 
  
The attainable levels of activity are then lower than in the previous 
cases. It can be shown, reasoning as before, that the capital stock that can be 
utilised is now, at best, depending on the values of E~ : 



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
)(
~)1()~(~ ' EBBEK
g
cap  or 
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
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 g
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BBEK  
It can easily be seen that these levels of activity are, assuming unchanged 
risk-taking behaviours on the part of households and banks, below what they were 
previously. 
Riskless stocks and risky stocks 
Let us now introduce sovereign bonds, considered initially to be riskless. 
Because these bonds are safe and liquid, their holding by the financial 
system has no need to be subjected to the prudential rules applied to 
private securities. The existence of assets of this kind is particularly 
important for the management of macroeconomic equilibrium. To 
understand this, suppose that savers’ behaviour is structurally deflationary 
– as seen in China or Japan, for example. At full employment, the desired 
savings ratio exceeds the economy’s maximum investment ratio 
(corresponding here to the utilisation of the entire available capital stock). 
Because the economy still being postulated here is closed, full employment 
can only be achieved if public borrowing is added to borrowing by firms, 
as seen in the past two decades in Japan.  
If the public securities are indeed riskless, this additional borrowing 
will not be a source of tension, however, even if the capacity of the system 
is saturated by the taking of the risks associated with private borrowing 
alone. By issuing public debt, the government will be providing the 
missing assets needed for savers’ wealth to attain its full-employment level. 
And inasmuch as it is riskless (remembering that the interest-rate risk is 
ignored), this debt can always be held. If the savers – in this case the 
households – wish to hold this part of their wealth in the form of deposits, 
these will be created by the banks through the purchase of public securities.  
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
K Ec Eb E W
Net present
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This feature peculiar to public debt played a decisive role when, from 
2009 on, developed-country governments borrowed in order to stabilise 
economic activity. This borrowing was the only means of absorbing the 
savings generated by the steep rise in private savings ratios. At a time 
when aversion to risk had become extreme, placing these government 
stocks posed no problem. Because they were seen as being riskless, the 
financial system absorbed this mass of stocks without constraint and 
‘created’ in return the riskless forms of placement (deposits, in this case) 
demanded by the savers. The problem posed by the public debt stocks’ loss 
of riskless status then becomes evident: by submitting the holding of public 
debt to the same prudential rules as private debt, it eliminates a degree of 
freedom that is central to the management of macroeconomic equilibrium. With 
public debt now a risky asset, government bonds are in competition with 
private bonds for a place in savers’ bond portfolios or on bank balance 
sheets. This means that full employment could now become inaccessible 
(Box 8).  
It is worth paying attention, in fact, to the modalities of this change in 
the status of public debt. Not only can it complicate the management of 
macroeconomic equilibrium, it can also threaten the very stability of the 
system. What would happen if savers and the financial system – reduced in 
this case to just the banks – were spontaneously and gradually to stop 
regarding public debt as a riskless asset? If, prior to the change, the 
constraints related to the taking of liquidity and credit risk were saturated, 
it would no longer be possible to take up the totality of the debt issued. For 
this not to be the case, it would be necessary for the banks to be able to 
increase their equity – so as to be able to make an upward adjustment in 
their capacity for taking credit risk – and also their bond issues – in order to 
bring their liquidity ratio back to its previous level. In the immediate 
aftermath of a confidence shock, such an additional taking of risk on the 
part of savers is unlikely. For the same reason, there is little likelihood that 
operators in the financial system would decide at this precise moment to 
relax the scope of the prudential rules being applied.  
There is therefore the risk of starting a destructive dynamic similar to 
that seen in 2007-09. This would be the manifestation, as on the earlier 
occasion, of an ‘endogenous risk’ (Box 6), with the financial system 
becoming destabilised to the point that only intervention by the central 
bank can provide a remedy. By increasing the size of its balance sheet, the 
central bank alone is capable of relieving private operators of a mass of 
credit risk and/or liquidity risk that they are no longer able to bear. The 
Federal Reserve did just this, starting at the end of 2008, by buying 
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hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of securitised mortgage claims and 
later Treasury securities. The ECB took similar action at the end of 2011: by 
financing for three years and for an unlimited amount the European banks, 
it relieved them in the space of three months of almost €1,000 billion of 
liquidity risk. 
6.2 A reduction in international financial intermediation capacity  
At the beginning of 2012, the loss of riskless status by sovereign debt 
securities was far from general, being limited to a few eurozone countries. 
The fact that reputedly ‘riskless’ debt securities had in a small number of 
cases ceased to be so nevertheless constituted a precedent, leading banks to 
adopt a more prudent attitude with regard to the debt of governments in 
the eurozone. Nor is there anything to show that such a change might not 
start to take place in other countries. We have already seen that Japanese 
banks have built up increasingly large amounts of government securities in 
their balance sheets. However, there is an essential difference limiting the 
effects of such a change on financial stability in Japan in that the BoJ stands 
ready to purchase the stocks no longer being purchased by the banks or 
being sold by them. The same would be true of the United States – at least 
as long as the macroeconomic situation induces the central bank to want to 
maintain an accommodating monetary stance. Nevertheless, even if limited 
just to the eurozone countries, the loss of riskless-asset status for public 
debt is capable of affecting macroeconomic equilibrium at world level. 
The international division of risk-taking 
To understand how this operates, take the case of the closed-economy 
model used earlier to represent the world economy in the years prior to the 
2007-09 crisis. The borrowers are the households and firms in the deficit 
countries, while the savers are the households and firms in the surplus 
countries. The former, borrowing essentially long-term, were a source of 
credit and liquidity risk that the latter, in search of liquid and safe 
placements, failed to take on. Nevertheless, the world economy enjoyed a 
high level of activity during these years because the globalised financial 
system – reduced in this case to the banks – took on the liquidity and credit 
risk involved. In reality, the system comprised banks in different economies 
and also various other financial agents (insurance companies, investment 
banks, hedge funds, etc.) whose behaviour was governed by a wide variety 
of prudential rules. The manner in which the risks related to international 
THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  111 
transfers of savings in the 2000s were taken on by these operators deserves 
attention. The roles played by individual groups were far from identical.  
Contrary to what one might have expected, inasmuch as a large part 
of the savings transferred was used to finance American private borrowing, 
American banks did not in fact ‘overburden’ themselves with credit risk 
(the only type that can easily be measured using macroeconomic data). Far 
from deteriorating, their equity ratios in fact improved until the end of the 
2000s. Even so, on the eve of the financial crisis, the United States had 
‘placed at the disposal’ of the rest of the world a substantial net amount of 
non-risky assets: between 1998 and 2007, this rose from around $1,000 
billion to around $4,000 billion (Figure 37). At the same time, additional 
domestic demand for $8,000 billion of riskless assets was also satisfied. 
Given that the issue of riskless securities by the American public sector rose 
by $4,000 billion, this meant that the total credit risk absorbed by the 
American financial system rose by more than $7,000 billion over the period! 
The risk carried by deposit institutions doubled, but so did their 
equity capital. This was not the case, however, for operators in the ‘shadow 
banking system’. In their case, the mass of credit risk taken on was 
multiplied by more than 2.5, but without any matching rise in their 
shareholder capital. This was the case in particular of the securitisation 
agencies – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – which have since been placed 
under conservatorship. This imprudence, made possible by the US 
administration’s blind confidence in the financial operators’ capacity for 
self-regulation, contributed to the relaxation of the constraints that would 
otherwise have prevented international transfers of savings on such a scale 
[Brender & Pisani, 2009]. 
These operators in the shadow banking system were by no means 
alone in making a significant contribution to this increase in risk-taking. A 
quick analysis of the eurozone’s balance of payments [Gros et al., 2010] 
shows that it too took on a substantial portion of the risks of this type. Not 
having a current-account deficit to finance, the eurozone was not directly 
concerned by the international transfers of savings then taking place. It 
nevertheless played a central role in the functioning of the globalised 
financial system making these transfers possible. At the end of the 2000s, 
the eurozone had in fact placed at the disposal of the rest of the world ‘safe’ 
investments regarded as carrying no credit or liquidity risk (bank deposits 
or public debt securities) amounting to around $3,000 billion (Figure 37). It 
was just as if, taken as a whole, the eurozone had acted as a risk-taker 
borrowing short-term to finance the acquisition of risky assets, thus 
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relieving the rest of the world of credit and liquidity risk that it would 
otherwise have had to bear. 
Note that this position was radically different from that of Japan, 
which, in line notably with China, is a structural net purchaser of riskless 
assets. Note also that these positions in the “international division of risk-
taking” were already in place at the end of the 1990s [Brender & Pisani, 
2001]. The build-up of current-account disequilibria nevertheless gave them 
fresh importance.  
Figure 37. Net issues of riskless assets in the principal financial systems, 
1999-2011 ($ billion)  
 
Note: The net issue of riskless assets is calculated on the basis of data for net 
external positions supplemented as necessary by flow-of-funds data and the 
Treasury International Capital System. The principle is to regard as riskless 
public securities (or securities guaranteed by government-sponsored 
agencies) as well as bank deposits. The net issue is the difference between the 
country’s riskless liabilities and riskless assets. For details of the calculations, 
see Gros et al. [2010].  
Sources: National central banks, US Treasury and authors’ calculations. 
The central role played by European banks 
These observations leave to one side an important dimension of this 
international division of risk-taking. They do not indicate the nature of the 
participating operators in each region. Data published by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) make it possible to fill this gap, to a certain 
extent at least (Figure 38). They clearly show the central role played by the 
European banks and in particular those of the eurozone. Starting at the end 
of the 1990s, these banks, unlike their American counterparts, considerably 
expanded their international activity. In 2007, their claims on the rest of the 
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world amounted to almost $10,000 billion, five times the corresponding 
figure for American banks.  
Figure 38. Foreign claims of banks reporting to the BIS*, 1999-2011 ($ billion) 
 
* Consolidated statistics on an immediate borrower basis. 
** Developed Europe excluding eurozone countries. 
Sources: BIS and authors’ calculations. 
Shin [2011], taking the analysis by Bertaut et al. [2011] a stage further, 
highlights in particular the absorption by eurozone banks of a large part of 
the credit and liquidity risk related to the private securitisation of mortgage 
lending (i.e. the part not guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac). To 
buy these claims and avoid taking an exchange risk, these banks borrowed 
huge amounts of dollars short-term in the United States, notably from 
money market funds. Contrary to what was seen in the case of the 
American banks, their risk-taking leverage (the ratio between the size of 
their balance sheets and their shareholder equity) increased considerably 
during these years. 
Shin explains this contrast by the enthusiasm shown by European 
regulators – and bankers – for the provisions of Basel II: the use of internal 
evaluation models and the recourse to rating agency scores in order to 
provide the weighting of risks enabled European banks to uncouple the 
size of their balance sheets from the sum of their weighted assets (the 
former increasing distinctly more than the latter). In practice, they were 
applying prudential rules that were more permissive than those of the 
American banks. Like that of the operators in the shadow banking system, 
this imprudence on the part of European banks made possible the 
absorption of a substantial portion of the risks generated by current-
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account imbalances at world level, but at the price of an excess of credit and 
liquidity risk-taking that the 2007-09 crisis then exposed. 
And it is precisely these European banks, the cornerstone of the 
globalised financial system, that are now being affected by the public debt 
securities’ loss of riskless status. The result is a reduction in the system’s 
capacity for risk-taking, due as much to the reduction in shareholder equity 
suffered by the banks as to the change in their behaviour. Not only have the 
rules they apply – because of the regulator or on their own initiative – 
become more prudent, but they are being applied to a mass of credit and 
liquidity risk that has been increased by the inclusion of the debts issued by 
a large and perhaps increasing number of eurozone governments. At the 
beginning of 2012, data from the European Banking Authority made it 
possible to put a figure of at least 30% on the increase in equity needed to 
deal with the problem. The rise in aversion to risk provoked by the 
European crisis nevertheless raises fears that the banks may prefer to adjust 
the size of their balance sheets to the shareholder equity at their disposal, 
rather than the reverse. The threat to the world economy is clear. If banks 
from other regions do not rapidly step in to replace the European banks, 
the globalised financial system’s capacity for intermediation will diminish 
and the possible scale of current-account disequilibria will find itself 
reduced. 
This constraint could obviously be lifted if the ‘demand’ for 
intermediation generated by these disequilibria were to be reduced. This 
would be the case, for example, if the surplus countries were to take on – 
again, fairly rapidly – an increased portion of the risks associated with 
international transfers of savings. China seems willing to move in this 
direction, having announced at the end of 2011 that it wanted to use part of 
its foreign exchange reserves to finance two new funds, each for $300 
billion, intended for investment in American bonds and equities in one 
case, European bonds and equities in the other. The rate at which these 
investments are made will show whether these measures can make a 
significant contribution to easing the financial constraint. Nor can it be 
ruled out that the deficit countries may issue less risky debt. Inasmuch as 
the only agent currently borrowing in the United States is the government, 
the situation is radically different from that prevailing throughout much of 
the 2000s. As long as US Treasury debt remains a riskless asset, its issue 
will not be constrained by the risk-taking capacity of the globalised 
financial system. This is the reason why the United States’ net issues of 
riskless assets continued to increase after 2007 (Figure 37). This increase, 
which has enabled the United States to maintain a substantial current-
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account deficit, obviously cannot continue indefinitely. The moment doubts 
emerge concerning the creditworthiness of the American government, the 
situation could become explosive. Admittedly, the central bank will be 
there to try to preserve financial stability, but downward pressures on the 
dollar could rapidly become irresistible and its status as a reserve currency 
could even be called into question  
The sovereign debt crisis, by affecting the globalised financial 
system’s intermediation capacity, therefore imposes on the deficit 
developed economies a constraint that compounds the one already facing 
them domestically, obliging them to improve their external balance. 
However, it extends this constraint to deficit emerging regions – in Eastern 
Europe in particular – whose financing relies on the system. Given that one 
country’s deficit is another country’s surplus, the sovereign debt crisis will 
therefore act as a limitation in the coming years on the intensity of 
international financial disequilibria.  
6.3 A threat to exchange rate stability  
There is every likelihood that the forces that are going to push down 
current-account disequilibria will be powerful. They are the result both of 
the reduced intermediation capacity of the international financial system 
and of the need for public and private agents in the large developed 
economies to make their indebtedness sustainable. For the United States 
and Japan, as for the European countries, a rapid consolidation of budget 
balances and the maintenance of adequate growth are, as we have seen, 
compatible only in a world environment where growth is relatively firm 
and at the cost of depreciation in their real exchange rates.  
Admittedly, the priorities and the most pressing needs are not the 
same in all cases. Europe has opted for accelerated budgetary 
consolidation, and a rapid fall in the euro would enable it to avoid too 
prolonged a stagnation of activity. However, neither the United States nor 
Japan can allow its currency to appreciate substantially against the euro. 
Such an appreciation would in fact oblige these countries – which have 
given priority to a return to growth – to delay still further the consolidation 
of their budget and place their public debt on a trajectory that would be 
increasingly difficult to keep under control. Japan in fact in 2011 resumed 
its interventions on the foreign exchange market to stem the increasingly 
worrying rise in the yen.  
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Are the real exchange rates of the emerging economies set to 
appreciate?  
Without the support of the emerging regions, the developed economies are 
therefore going to have difficulty in maintaining a growth rate sufficient to 
absorb the potential rise in unemployment generated by the crisis while at 
the same time avoiding a ‘currency war’. The mechanism that could enable 
these economies, taken together, to improve their current-account surplus is 
in fact the same as that already described for each of them taken 
individually. It involves the highest possible growth in the demand from 
their trading partners – in this case, the emerging countries – combined 
with a depreciation in their exchange rate vis-à-vis these same partners. 
The corollary, namely an appreciation in the exchange rates of the 
emerging regions, would not necessarily be objectionable; between the 
beginning of the 1980s and the beginning of the 2000s, these countries, with 
the notable exception of those in emerging Europe, have managed to 
correct a relative overvaluation of their currencies and this correction 
explains, in part at least, the rise in their current-account surpluses 
[Brender & Pisani, 2010]. The fact that these surpluses are now turning out 
to be unsustainable shows that this correction was excessive. Nor would its 
reversal through an appreciation in their real exchange rate necessarily be 
dramatic for the emerging regions. Part of this appreciation could take 
place gradually via the inflation differentials between them and the 
developed regions. For the rest, relatively moderate nominal movements 
could be sufficient, in that the emerging regions have become increasingly 
important trading partners for the developed regions.  
This is clearly illustrated by the case of the United States. The share of 
emerging regions in the country’s trade is now 55%, compared with less 
than 30% in the mid-1980s. The share of China alone has risen from 2% to 
20%, distinctly higher than that of Japan or Canada and even higher than 
that of the eurozone. This increased importance of the emerging regions is 
a factor facilitating a fall in the dollar’s real exchange rate. If, as the IMF 
was predicting in the autumn of 2011, inflation in the Latin American and 
emerging Asian countries is set to be higher over the next five years than in 
the United States – by 3.5% and 2%, respectively – these differentials will be 
sufficient, everything else remaining equal, to bring the dollar’s real 
effective exchange rate down by some 5% by 2016. A nominal appreciation 
of the emerging Asian currencies amounting to 4% a year between 2012 
and 2016 – a rate close to that posted by the Chinese currency since mid-
2005 – would provide an additional 7% depreciation for the dollar and this, 
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combined with the inflation differentials, would bring the decline in its real 
exchange rate to 12%. This fall is close to the one calculated in Chapter 4 as 
being needed to bring the public deficit down to 3.5% of GDP in 2016 and 
at the same time bring the unemployment rate below 6.5%. 
 On the same assumptions, the euro’s real exchange rate would fall by 
only slightly more than 7%. Admittedly, the weighting of China on its own 
in the eurozone’s effective exchange rate today exceeds that of the United 
States, but inasmuch as no appreciation of the emerging European 
currencies has been included in the calculation, the decline in the euro’s 
effective exchange rate is smaller. 
An appreciation in the real exchange rate of the emerging economies 
would therefore facilitate the developed countries’ adjustment. Even if only 
gradual, it would nevertheless reduce the support that demand from the 
developed countries has so far provided for growth in the emerging 
economies. For them to avoid a backlash, their domestic demand must 
therefore grow more rapidly. This is now the explicit objective of the 
policies being implemented in many emerging economies. None of the 
evolutions needed for restoring balance to the world economy seems out of 
reach, therefore. Without agreed cooperation between emerging and 
developed regions, however, the world economy will have difficulty in 
keeping to the narrow path on which it must now set out. This cooperation 
should, ideally, extend to the ‘management’ of the oil price. A steep 
increase in the oil price, by widening the current-account surplus of the oil-
producing countries in a world where imports of savings are under 
constraint, would have a dangerously deflationary impact on the world 
economy.  
The euro/dollar exchange rate in a state of precarious equilibrium  
A return to the cooperation framework sketched out in the aftermath of the 
2007-09 financial crisis is all the more urgent in that the potential for 
destabilisation of the exchange rates of the major currencies, that of the 
dollar vis-à-vis the euro in particular, has increased. These two currencies 
are also those of the economies issuing the public securities that have 
become the preferred vehicle for the holding of international reserves. At 
the end of 2011, 80% of reserves were, as we have seen, held in this form, 
compared with close to 50% at the beginning of the 1980s. These reserves 
were composed of more than $4,000 billion of securities issued by – or 
guaranteed by – the American government and of $1,500 billion of public 
debt securities issued by eurozone countries. Increased doubts regarding 
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the creditworthiness of these issues could then threaten the relative 
stability shown until now by the euro/dollar exchange rate.  
Despite the financial turmoil seen in the winter of 2008, the rate 
continued to be largely responsive to expectations regarding the relative 
evolutions in monetary policy seen on the two sides of the Atlantic. 
Movements in this exchange rate had in fact tended in the direction 
determined by the intentions of the respective central banks (or at least the 
intentions as perceived by the markets), thus favouring the transmission of 
their policies. When, for example, the markets had the feeling that the 
Federal Reserve wanted to stimulate activity more than the ECB, the dollar 
depreciated versus the euro, and vice versa (Box 9).  
Box 9. The euro/dollar exchange rate 
In order to analyse the evolution of the euro versus the dollar since 2005, a 
very simple equation can be formulated. This introduces an interest-rate 
differential as explanatory variable. To be more precise, it is posited, in 
accordance with Brender & Pisani [2010], that:  
 
 )1( $€  ttt rrke  (1) 
where te  is the exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar at time t 
( dollarseuro1 e ), €tr  is the three-month eurozone interest rate expected at 
time t to apply in a year’s time (deduced from futures contracts), $tr  is the 
American three-month interest rate expected at time t to apply in a year’s 
time (deduced from futures contracts), ε, is the expected annual rate of 
appreciation of the dollar versus the euro, assumed to be constant, β is the 
elasticity of the exchange rate to the expected yield differential (when β is 
low, aversion to risk is high and the exchange rate is relatively insensitive to 
expected yield differentials) and k is in this case a scale parameter. 
In order to calibrate the equation, the first step was to carry out a 
regression of the exchange rate e on the interest-rate differential using daily 
data for the period January 2007-July 2008. Estimation of )(ln $€ ttt rrbae   
gives 34.0ˆ a  and 4.7ˆ b . Identification with the parameters of equation (1) 
gives b  and ak  ln . The value of β used was 7.4 and, setting k 
arbitrarily at 1.12 (the purchasing power parity value of the early 2000s), we 
obtained ε = -3 %. The negative sign indicates that operators are expecting 
the dollar to fall. The amplitude of this fall is obviously a function of the 
value adopted for k, but for the calibration to remain compatible with the 
observed values of e and of the interest-rate differential, ε must be less than 
-2 %. 
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Figure 39 illustrates the key role played during the period by the 
interest-rate differential. It nevertheless brings out an initial episode of 
‘unexplained’ strength of the dollar during the 2008-09 crisis. This can be 
interpreted as a rise in aversion to risk (a decline in β) linked to the financial 
crisis. By estimating the elasticity β implied by the observed change in the 
dollar during this crisis, one finds (Figure 39) that it indeed reflects a sharp 
rise in the VIX (the volatility index of the American stock market), which is a 
commonly used indicator of aversion to risk.  
Figure 39. Expected interest-rate differential, aversion to risk and euro/dollar 
exchange rate 
 
Sources: Thomson Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
From early 2010 on, the euro’s exchange rate has again been below what 
could be explained simply by interest-rate differentials. However, this 
episode is of a very different nature from the previous one, as there was no 
major movement in the VIX on this occasion. One is therefore led to interpret 
it as a change in the regime of exchange-rate expectations, meaning that ε 
ceased to be constant. The intensification of the eurozone crisis weighed 
down expectations of the euro/dollar exchange rate. This can be verified in 
noting that with k and β constant, the value of ε needed to explain the 
observed evolutions in the exchange rate to a large extent fluctuated with 
the CDS of the French government. 
Starting at the end of 2009, a regression was made of this implicit value 
of parameter ε on this CDS and this estimation was introduced into the 
previously calibrated equation. Starting in the summer of 2011, this last 
equation, which again made it possible to simulate fairly faithfully the 
observed evolutions in the exchange rate, nevertheless leads to an 
overestimation of the weakness of the euro. The introduction of a dummy 
variable in order to make a downward correction in the estimated value of ε 
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remedies this. This variable can be interpreted as a revision by the markets 
of the expected fall in the dollar. The date when this occurred (July 2011) 
coincided with the final phase of the debate regarding the raising of the US 
debt ceiling.  
Whereas in the period after the beginning of the 2000s the fluctuations 
in the euro/dollar exchange rate largely reflected revisions in the expected 
level of interest-rate differentials, from the beginning of the 2010s on 
revisions in exchange-rate expectations have played a more important role. 
So far, countervailing forces have prevented a speculative destabilisation of 
the euro or the dollar. However, if at some time in the future the eurozone 
crisis were to take on greater amplitude, there is a risk that expectations of a 
more profound decline in the euro might develop. Conversely, if at a 
subsequent stage doubts regarding the euro were to dissipate at the same 
time that the sustainability of US public debt was called into question, to a 
greater extent than at present, a substantial fall in the dollar would become 
possible. Mastering this potential instability can only be achieved through 
close cooperation between the authorities not only of the developed 
countries but of all countries, including the emerging ones.  
 
Since the beginning of 2010, however, a different set of forces has 
been at work. In a first stage, the euro was relatively weaker than was 
justified simply by the evolution in expected interest rate differentials and 
its rate began to fluctuate in line with the intensity of the eurozone crisis. 
Taking into account from this time on an additional variable measuring this 
intensity, i.e. the CDS of a European country in a situation of ‘intermediate’ 
vulnerability, in fact makes it possible to understand the fluctuations in the 
euro versus the dollar, at least until the summer of 2011, when another 
major change occurred and the observed value of the euro became much 
stronger than that expected. This change took place in July 2011, at the time 
when the debate over the raising of the US debt ceiling was taking a 
dramatic turn. There is a temptation to interpret this as reflecting increased 
doubts over the sustainability of American public debt – and hence over 
the soundness of the dollar. The euro/dollar exchange rate then began to 
fluctuate also in line with the relative credibility of fiscal policies. The risk is 
that, at some time in the future, abrupt revisions in judgement may lead 
market operators and holders of exchange reserves to become sellers on a 
massive scale of one or other of the two currencies. The sovereign debt 
crisis can be seen in this way to have become a source of potential increased 
volatility for the currency markets of the developed countries. 
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CONCLUSION 
he crisis in the autumn of 2008, in a matter of days, made 
governments aware of the closeness of the links that financial 
globalisation had established, de facto, between their economies. For 
a few months, there was real cooperation between them. From one end of 
the planet to the other, stimulus programmes were put in place and the 
threat of an economic depression was averted. Once the immediate 
emergency had passed, international cooperation resumed its more usual 
formal character. Admittedly, the G20 continues to meet at regular 
intervals, but while its discussions still relate to the policies that each 
country should implement in order to help the world economy avoid the 
dangers facing it, there is generally little in the way of follow-up. 
What the sovereign debt crisis is calling for is in fact greater 
coordination. This crisis, acute in Europe and latent in many developed 
countries, is forcing governments to re-balance their budgets more or less 
rapidly. However, the emerging regions and certain developed countries 
continue to be the source of savings surpluses. In a context in which private 
borrowing cannot be expected to pick up at all rapidly, drastic fiscal 
tightening would have a severely deflationary impact on the world 
economy. If the governments of the developed countries are no longer 
adding to their debt, how can the countries that are saving more than they 
can invest domestically – the Asian countries and the oil-exporting states, 
in particular – be expected to continue to do so? The measures announced 
by them aimed at relying for their growth more on domestic demand will 
take time to operate. In the meantime, it is in the general interest that the 
developed countries reduce their budget deficits only progressively. 
This assumes, of course, that indebted governments will be capable in 
due course of meeting their commitments. For many developed countries, a 
further increase in public debt for some years to come would not in itself be 
cause for concern, provided that it is accompanied by a rationalisation of 
T
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fiscal revenue and expenditure and also by the reforms needed to ensure 
the financing of social spending programmes in the coming decades. This 
would be the best guarantee they could give to those whose savings they 
will be absorbing, and far better than a precipitate return to fiscal 
equilibrium or its blinkered preservation. The western democracies have 
little choice: if they wish to continue to use fiscal policy as a tool of 
economic regulation they have to learn to respect fiscal discipline over the 
long term. The sovereign debt crisis is a test of their maturity. 
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